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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to enquire into the role of law in the reform programme for the Nigerian 
petroleum industry (NPI), in order to determine the extent to which it can be utilised to 
actualise a functional petroleum industry. The thesis will seek to test the hypothesis that an 
effectively managed petroleum industry will be efficiently regulated, have a significant local 
content, and will invariably be dependent on how sustainable and efficient petroleum 
revenues are distributed.  
 
My significant contribution to knowledge is that Nigeria should seek to develop local content 
and industry regulation, and aim to effectively distribute petroleum revenues, by pursuing 
industry reforms as an integrated whole. To that extent, it would require a coherent legal 
framework, and the development of policies that recognise the interconnectedness and 
interdependency of several factors in the petroleum industry. To that extent, a suitable and 
strategic legal architecture should be erected in Nigeria: one that will give room for co-
operation without stifling independence and innovation.  
 
This thesis also notes that the development of a viable National oil company is imperative 
and should be anchored around which other industry reforms should revolve. Such a firm 
should however be privatised in a manner that guarantees its performance and promotes good 
corporate governance, whilst limiting avenues for external interference. It advocates that 
Nigeria should seek a national oil company model that is deliberately tailored to restrain 
‘external interference’ in the daily workings of the NOC.  
 
Finally, this thesis argues that for an efficient regulation and management of the industry will 
require the active participation of all actors in the industry, and that the government should 
not have prerogative over the industry, especially in the light of past failures to effectively 
turn the industry around. There should thus be a deliberate effort to restrain government 
interference in the NOC, empower citizens in regulation and encourage the development of 
 iv 
 
indigenous petroleum exploration and production companies (PEPCs), while in utilization of 
petroleum resources; there should be direct citizenship participation. 
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1  C H A P T E R  O N E :  I N T R O D U C T I O N ,  P U R P O S E ,  A N D  
M E T H O D O L O G Y  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
Situated on the West Coast of Africa, Nigeria is a federation of 36 states, with a federal 
capital territory at Abuja. With about 36 billion barrels of crude oil reserves and 5.29 trillion 
cubic meters of gas,
1
 it goes without saying that Nigeria has great economic potentials.
2
 
Petroleum accounts for over 70 per cent of Nigeria’s export earnings and 85 per cent of 
government revenues and impact the whole of the Nigerian fabric.
3
 The management of the 
Nigerian petroleum Industry therefore has a significant bearing on the Nigerian economy, and 
on the lives of average Nigerians.  
 
At the top of the Nigerian petroleum industry (NPI) is the president of the Federal republic of 
Nigeria whose powers are exercised mainly through the minister of petroleum (the minister). 
The minister’s powers are further delegated and exercised by the main industry regulator: the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). Other agencies which have some other 
regulatory function in the NPI include National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA), and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), the 
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and the Nigerian 
Content Development Management Board (NCDMB).  
 
                                                 
1
 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), ‘Nigeria: Facts and Figures’ (2011) 
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm> accessed 1 October 2012, British Petroleum, ‘BP 
Statistical Review’ (2011) http://www.bp.com/sectionbodycopy.do?categoryId=7500&contentId=7068481 
accessed 1 October 2012.  
2
 Nigeria has had a steady economic growth since 2005.  In 2011 grew by 7.2 per cent.  Source: Central 
Intelligence Agency, ‘World Fact book Nigeria’ (2012) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ni.html> accessed 01/10/12. 
3
 Alex Gboyega and others, ‘Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria’ (2011) World Bank Policy 
Research, Working Paper 5779 <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5779> accessed 23 
June 2014, see also  Musa Jibrin and others,  ‘  Impact of Petroleum Profit Tax on Economic Development of 
Nigeria’ (2012) Vol. 5(2) British Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences  
 15 
 
At the upstream operational level, the NPI consists of local and international oil companies. 
The international oil companies include Shell, Mobil, Total, Chevron, Agip, Statoil etc. The 
indigenous petroleum companies (IPCs) include Dubri Oil, Seplat Oil, Monipulo, and Conoil 
etc. Then there is the NNPC, Nigeria’s NOC, which stands at the intersection and acts as part 
regulator, and oil company. The NPI is relatively developed with a wide berth of petroleum 
infrastructure which includes four refineries, and a pipeline facility which criss-crosses the 
length and breadth of Nigeria. Figure 1.1 outlines the structure of the NPI. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Nigerian petroleum industry 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Ownership of vast resources is one thing, but good management and regulation of that 
industry for the benefit of the public, is another. While Norway and Brazil have had relative 
successes in the management and regulation of their petroleum industries, Nigeria has been 
known to struggle. Some consistent features that can be found in the former [countries 
include robust industry regulation, a significant local content spearheaded by viable NOCs, 
and a sustainable application of petroleum revenues.
4
 Weaknesses in the three 
aforementioned factors (the triune factors), have negatively impacted Nigeria’s 
industrialisation programme, its human environment and the general standard of living, 
resulting in poverty in the midst of plenty. 
 
1.3 IMPERATIVE FOR A HOLISTIC AND INTEGRATED REFORM 
OF THE NIGERIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BILL AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE 
AND EXTRA LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES  
 
Since 1999, Nigeria began a series of legislative and extra legislative reforms aimed at the 
reinvention of its petroleum industry. The reforms which have focused mainly on regulation, 
the national oil company (NOC) and local content are expected to culminate in the eventual 
passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 2012. The PIB 2012 which has reached 
committee stage at the National Assembly is a holistic reform bill which touches on the triune 
factors in many ways. It is hoped that the Bill will result in the birth of a petroleum industry 
model which is similar in some ways to Brazil’s, and in other ways to Norway’s. The 
expectations of Nigerians that the PIB 2012 will transform the industry positively, is not 
misplaced. Similar reforms in the telecommunications sector led to an increase in mobile 
                                                 
4
 They include Norway, Brazil, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.  
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telephony from four hundred thousand phones in 2000, to one hundred and thirteen million in 
2012.
5
 
 
Prior to 2001 the Nigerian telecommunications sector was monopolised by the Nigerian 
telecommunications company limited (NITEL), and marginally regulated by the Nigerian 
Communications Commission (NCC).  Like most Nigerian public enterprises however, 
NITEL, which was poorly funded, struggled with weak corporate governance, corruption, 
and poor operational performance, became a drain on public funding. In order to improve the 
performance of the sector, Nigeria introduced market reforms which included liberalisation to 
attract foreign and local investors, the privatisation/liquidation of NITEL, and the 
strengthening of the independence of the Nigerian Communications Commission as sector 
regulator. The outcome of the reforms were dramatic, as Nigerian  phone lines increased from 
400000 in 2001, to 13000000 in 2014.
6 
  
Liberalisation allowed market forces to determine the price for subscription to telephone 
lines, subject to regulation aimed at preventing price fixing, and cabalisation among 
operators.
7
 Liberalisation, competition, and other market reforms in the telecommunications 
sector have also led to job creation, improvement of services and generation of revenues for 
the Nigerian economy. In fact by 2012 $25 billion had been invested in the sector, up from 
$500 in 2001.
8
  
 
There are lessons the proposed reforms of the NPI can gain from the telecommunications 
sector reforms. For instance in terms of local content development in the NPI, Nigeria can 
                                                 
5
 Yaron Assabi, ‘Mobile Transformation in Nigeria’ IT News Africa (11 October 2012)   
<http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2012/10/mobile-transformation-in-nigeria/> accessed 16 October 2012 
6
 NCC, ‘Subscriber Statistics: Monthly Subscriber Data’ (2014) 
<http://www.ncc.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=125:art-statistics-subscriber-
data&catid=65:cat-web-statistics&Itemid=73> accessed 16 July 2014. Yaron Assabi, ‘Mobile Transformation in 
Nigeria’ IT News Africa (11 October 2012)   
<http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2012/10/mobile-transformation-in-nigeria/> accessed 16 October 2012 
7
 The decision of the Nigerian government to regulate the sale of petroleum products has been blamed cited as 
one reason why it has been unable to attract significant investors in refineries and gas markets. A factor that has 
also been blamed for ongoing gas flaring, which has detrimental consequences for the Niger Delta. 
8
 Prince Osuagwu, ‘Telecom Activities may keep Nigeria’s Rebased GDP Green’ Vanguard (April 23 2014) 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/04/telecom-activities-may-keep-nigerias-rebased-gdp-green/> accessed 16 
July 2014 
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learn from the telecommunications sector, where government policy and legislation, led to 
the development of Globacom into an African multinational, with external operations in 
Ghana, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire. With its 25 million subscribers, indigenously owned Globacom, 
which was licensed in 2003, now competes favourably with other international 
telecommunications giants, notably Etisalat and MTN. Globacom firm has also generated 
millions of dollars for the Nigerian government in taxes, besides employing a large number 
of Nigerians.
9
  
 
There are also regulatory and privatisation lessons to be learned from Nigeria’s approach to 
the privatisation/liquidation of NITEL, which freed the NCC to regulate the industry and 
grant operational licenses to telecommunications firms, with significantly improved 
independence. This approach holds lessons for regulation in the NPI in terms of DPR, 
NOSDRA, and NIMAS in the petroleum industry, which currently struggle with 
independence. NCC is able to regulate the sector with reduced incidences of conflict of 
interest, because the FGN is no longer directly involved in the telecommunications industry 
other than as regulator and tax collector.
10
 And the FGN is able to confer powers on NCC and 
give it some relatively high level of support, because it has no direct stake in the operations of 
any of the telecommunications firms, currently operating in Nigeria.  
 
Lack of consensus on certain controversial aspects of the PIB, particularly section 116, which 
provides for the Petroleum Host Community Fund (PHC) Fund, is the main reason the Bill 
has not been enacted into law.11 Section 116 of the PIB, will require petroleum companies to 
pay 10 per cent of their net profits to petroleum producing communities in the Niger Delta 
Region (NDR). Northern legislators view the proposed PHC Fund as an attempt to increase 
                                                 
9
 See Olusegun Adeniyi, ‘Globacom at ten : a Remarkable Story’ Thisday (29 August 2013) 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/globacom-10-a-remarkable-story/157510/ accessed 2
 
August 2014 
10
 The privatisation of NITEL has had a chequered history. In 2007, the Federal government cancelled a 2005 
sale of the firm to Transcorp on the ground that Transcorp was unable to improve the performance of the firm. 
Similarly New Generation Telecommunications which was its preferred buyer, was unable to satisfy a series of 
deadlines to pay the sum of $2.5 billion. The BPE decided to sell NITEL on a ‘guided liquidation’ basis, 
pursuant to which a liquidator was appointed in that regard. The process is ongoing. 
11
 Petroleum Industry Bill: In Whose Interest’ Thisday (06 August 2013) < 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/petroleum-industry-bill-in-whose-interest-/155566/> accessed 1 August 
2014 
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the derivation of the NDR, which already benefits from 13 per cent of all petroleum produced 
from that region.
12
  
 
The PIB also faces significant opposition from IOCs who operate under the umbrella of the 
Oil Producers Trade Section (OPTS). This group, which argues that the fiscal measures as 
proposed by the PIB would make the Nigerian regime one of the harshest in the world, and 
would increase the Nigerian take from about 70 per cent to over 90 per cent, has intensified 
lobbying against the PIB.
13
  
 
It is posited that even if the FGN chooses to ignore the objections of the OPTS, it would be 
almost impossible to enact the PIB without the consent of the Northern region, which has 
majority of seats in Nigeria’s National Assembly. It is for that reason that it may be safely 
asserted that section 116 of the PIB will have to be expunged or further whittled down, if the 
PIB is to be enacted into law. It is a fact that the non passage of the Bill has stalled billions of 
investment funds due to the uncertainty of the proposed fiscal regime.
14
 That the PIB will be 
enacted into law is almost without doubt, as government in the Northern and Southern 
regions of Nigeria are funded almost entirely by petroleum resources, a factor which makes it 
imperative for the PIB to be enacted, in order for the NPI to move forward. In what form the 
Bill will take however, is unclear, as it is almost certain that some of its contents will be 
expunged, as negotiations continue. 
 
The core argument of this thesis is that a significant local content, vibrant regulation and an 
equitable framework for the distribution of petroleum revenues are imperative for an 
effectively managed Nigerian petroleum industry (NPI). But the attainment of these factors is 
often dependent on other factors which may extend beyond the province of law. And the 
interconnectedness of various factors which impact the NPI, make a holistic approach to legal 
                                                 
12
 Niyi Oyebode, Fidelis Soriwe, Chukwudi Akasiwe, Success Nwogu and Etim Ekpima, ‘Again, North Kicks 
against Derivation Fund’ Punch Newspapers (Abuja, 28 July 2012) <http://www.punchng.com/news/again-
north-kicks-against-derivation-fund > accessed 30th  July 2012 
13See Ejiofor Alike, ‘ PIB: FG, IOCs Feud Deepens over Fiscal Terms’ Thisday (10 July 2013) < 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/pib-fg-iocs-feud-deepens-over-fiscal-terms/152953/> accessed 2 August 
2014 
14
 Thomas Hansen, ‘Nigeria: Growing away from Oil?’ Forbes (18 November 2013) 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2013/11/18/nigeria-growing-away-from-oil/> accessed 31 July 2014 
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reforms, necessary.  For instance, a vibrant local content is often dependent on viable NOCs 
and indigenous petroleum exploration and production companies (PEPCs). But a viable NOC 
is also dependent on human capacity from which it can source professional employees, and in 
return create wealth for the nation. In the same vein, a capable regulator is impossible without 
experienced and qualified human capital, the bulk of which can be sourced from a functional 
NOC. And the industry itself cannot operate successfully without adequate security, which 
can be improved when poverty is reduced. But poverty can only be reduced when petroleum 
revenues are equitably distributed, and justly applied. To therefore attempt an isolated reform 
m agenda may thwart the overall objective, which is to ensure the industry operates smoothly, 
for the benefit of the people. Thus the research questions in this thesis will be focused on how 
the triune factors can be developed in Nigeria through the use of legal and extra legal 
initiatives. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Among other things, Nigeria’s legal reform agenda, as embodied in the PIB, seeks to improve 
and develop regulation, local content, and distribution of petroleum revenues, but the extent, 
depth and pattern of the reform requires investigation in order to determine if the anticipated 
impact of the reform is feasible. If local content, industry regulation, and the application of 
petroleum revenues are critical to the effectiveness of the NPI, then that raises the following 
questions:  
What factors, if any, can be used to determine if a petroleum industry is effectively managed 
and regulated?  
And  
To what extent can Nigeria combine a functional and inclusive privatised NOC, with other 
administrative and legal reforms, in order to develop and generate positive outcomes from the 
NPI?   
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1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
 
The objectives of the thesis are: 
To argue for a two-pronged approach to the development of the Nigerian petroleum 
industry. One that utilises and harnesses the effectiveness of the private sector with 
that of legislative and administrative reforms.  
 
To show the extent to which a functionally private sector driven NOC can 
complement reform in regulation, local content, and develop a sustainable and 
equitable application of petroleum revenues.  
 
To highlight the need for a more integrated legislative, institutional, and regulatory 
reform in the NPI. 
 
In order to determine the extent to which the PIB and other reformatory strategies can 
lead to a functional petroleum industry, and to which extent, lessons can be drawn 
from experiences of petroleum producing countries like Brazil and Norway.  
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study seeks to utilize a doctrinal approach. Focus will be placed mainly on the upstream 
sector of the NPI, although where necessary the downstream sector will also be analysed for 
purposes of elucidation. It critiques the reform programme for the NPI within the context of 
what has been found to be obtainable in Brazil and Norway. Emphasis will be placed on 
legal, regulatory, institutional, and other underlying factors like the investment climate, 
infrastructure and indigenous capacity. The role of NOCs in the development of petroleum 
industries will be analysed and compared. The thesis will seek to determine the indices that 
have made it possible for Brazil and Norway to develop relatively successful petroleum 
industry models. 
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1.7 WHY BRAZIL AND NORWAY? 
 
Brazil and Norway are the primary case studies in this thesis, frequent comparisons will be 
made between them and Nigeria, mainly because these countries have performed relatively 
well in developing the triune factors in their petroleum industries. Brazil is particularly 
important because of its many similarities to Nigeria. For instance Brazil’s population of 190 
million people is comparable to Nigeria’s over 160 million. And Brazil like Nigeria, is a 
developing economy, has some issues with corruption and poverty, while operating a federal 
constitution like Nigeria. Again, like Nigeria, Brazil is deeply religious, ethnically diverse, 
and rich in petroleum resources. From the 1940s to the late 1980s Brazil struggled with 
political instability due to military incursion into its political arena and weak governance, 
while Nigeria struggled with similar challenges from the 1960s to the 1990s. And like 
Nigeria also Brazil also separates industry regulation from its NOC, while leaning more on 
the latter to develop its petroleum industry.  
 
Unlike Nigeria however, Brazil’s NOC stands out as a model not only in South America, but 
also to the rest of the world, while Nigeria’s NOC struggles with corruption, operational 
inefficiency, and board instability. In the same regard Brazil has also been able to develop a 
regulatory framework for the environment which operates with some level of independence 
and efficiency, in contrast to Nigeria, where regulation has been largely ineffective, as 
attested to by frequent oil spills, and the daily flaring of a huge amount of associated gas.  
 
Unlike Brazil however, there are some notable differences between Nigeria and Norway. For 
instance, Norway’s population of less than 6 million is in direct contrast to Nigeria’s over 160 
million, and Norway does not struggle with corruption, poverty, and weak governance. 
Norway’s experience democracy and the rule of law, and its technological competence 
gained through its experience from its hydro and ship building industries, are also in contrast 
to the Nigerian scenario. Notwithstanding the differences between both countries, Nigeria 
still has some lessons to learn from the Norwegian experience, while making room for unique 
national issues. This is because the Norwegian model has been hailed by many as the ‘ideal’ 
model. For instance Norway’s NOC is recognised as being largely successful, playing a 
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dominant role in the Norwegian petroleum industry, while operating beyond the borders of 
Norway. Its framework for offshore regulation generally considered robust, while its 
framework for the management of its petroleum revenues is equally hailed as being 
successful.
15
 
 
Attaining to the heights of the Norwegian model should therefore be the destination of 
Nigeria’s reforms in the NPI, especially in the area of regulation, and NOC development. 
And where Nigeria is unable to attain to that ‘ideal’ because of unique national challenges 
and limitations, it should more realistically aim to attain the achievements of Brazil, 
especially in terms of NOC development, and environmental regulation. Beyond Brazil and 
Norway, lessons will also be drawn where necessary from other jurisdictions like Malaysia, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Angola.  
 
1.8 BENEFICIARIES 
 
As Nigeria seeks to reform the NPI for economic and environmental transformation, it is 
imperative that she gets it right this time. Excuses of colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
inexperience, and weak institutions will not avail Nigeria, 50 years after independence from 
Britain. Thus the thesis seeks to offer guidance to Nigeria and other African countries like 
Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique. Some in the latter countries are wary that 
their new found ‘black gold’16 may lead to what economists have now termed a ‘resource 
curse’, if not properly managed.17 This thesis also seeks to offer guidance to legislators, 
                                                 
15
 See Mark C. Thurber and others, ‘Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of  
Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance’ (2011) Vol 39 Energy Policy 
16
 The term ‘black gold’ is often used to refer to crude oil.  
17
 This theory postulates that resource rich developing countries are tend to have worse economies than their 
relatively resource poor neighbours . See Richard Auty ‘ Resource Abundance and Economic Development’ 
(2001) World Institute for Development Economics Research (Oxford University Press), Jeffrey Frankel, ‘The 
Natural Resource Curse: A Survey’ (2010) Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series  
<https://www.google.co.uk/#hl=en&sugexp=les%3B&gs_nf> accessed 01/10/2012, Uwafiokun Idemudia, ‘The 
Resource Curse and the Decentralization of Oil Revenue: the Case of Nigeria’ (2012) Vol. 35 Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 183 -193, Marcus J. Kurtz, ‘ Conditioning the “Resource Curse”: Globalization, Human Capital, 
and Growth in Oil-Rich , Nations (2011) Comparative Political Studies 
<http://cps.sagepub.com/content/44/6/747> accessed 01/10/12 
 24 
 
policy makers, law teachers and regulatory institutions, and suggests the adoption of a 
holistic view in addressing the challenges of the NPI.  
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter two lays the theoretical framework for the thesis and presents an overview of the 
historical, legal, regulatory and institutional framework for the NPI. The chapter will analyse 
the current performance of the NPI within the context of Norway and Brazil, and to that 
extent, will analyse the extent of local content, regulation, and the application of petroleum 
revenues in the NPI. The chapter will seek to establish that in Norway and Brazil the triune 
factors are present in some measure, but significantly weak in Nigeria, even though the three 
industries began at comparatively the same period. 
Chapter three will enquire into the legal framework for effective regulation of the NPI. It 
appraises Nigeria’s current regulatory framework, its strengths, weaknesses and proposed 
reforms as contained in the PIB. It argues that as long as petroleum remains the mainstay of 
the Nigerian economy, independent regulation will be difficult within the current and post 
PIB legal framework. The chapter argues for citizen participation through a viable 
whistleblower regime and the encouragement of regulatory litigation, as a complementary 
approach to effective regulation of the NPI. 
 
 Chapter four examines legal strategies for local content development within the NPI and 
compares same with the approaches in Norway and Brazil. It notes that while Nigeria seeks 
to develop local content by relying virtually on a legal framework without the corresponding 
infrastructure required to make its objectives achievable, other jurisdictions have combined 
laws with industry collaboration, while providing corresponding infrastructural and economic 
atmosphere.  
 
Chapter five seeks to determine the extent to which the proposed privatization of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) as contained in the PIB, can impact the 
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fortunes of the firm post-privatization. It argues that while the legal framework for 
privatization may engender greater transparency, patterning the proposed firm after 
Petrobras/Statoil is not suitable for Nigeria’s unique challenges. To that extent, it proposes an 
approach under which the shareholders of the firm will be able to restrain external 
interference in order to ensure good governance. As an alternative to Petrobras/Statoil, it 
proposes that Nigeria should pattern its NOC after a model that embraces a partnership 
between the Nigerian government, and the private sector. The chapter will end by identifying 
the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) company limited, that viable alternative.  
 
Chapter six: This chapter examines the need for a comprehensive legal framework for an 
equitable application of petroleum revenues in Nigeria. Past efforts of Nigeria to sustainably 
utilize petroleum revenues will be addressed. They include the Petroleum Trust Fund, 
Petroleum Trust Development Fund, Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), and 
the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). Nigeria’s 
Sovereign Investment Authority (Establishment etc.) Act 2011 will be analysed in order to 
determine its prospects for sustainable application of wealth. The chapter also examines 
initiatives towards developing the Niger Delta, and petroleum host communities.  
 
 In Chapter seven, the study is drawn to a close by the provision of concluding remarks on 
the research findings. The chapter will also seek to identify how the theoretical analysis of the 
earlier chapters can be translated into a roadmap for the future.
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2  C H A P T E R  T W O :  A N  I N T E G R A T E D  A N A L Y S I S  O F  
F A C T O R S  T H A T  D E T E R M I N E  E F F E C T I V E  
P E T R O L E U M  I N D U S T R Y  M A N A G E M E N T  A N D  
R E G U L A T I O N   
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to lay a theoretical foundation for the arguments and solutions that 
will be proffered in this thesis. It begins by seeking to determine the factors that must be 
present to a reasonable degree before a country can be said to manage and regulate its 
petroleum industry effectively. Factoring unique national contexts, the chapter will argue that 
to a reasonable degree, an effective and functional petroleum industry should be robustly 
regulated and have a significant local content. For instance, a significant local content will 
link the gains from the industry to the wider segment of the society, create jobs, and transfer 
technology. Finally, government policy and action should be geared towards a sustainable 
and equitable application and distribution of petroleum revenues for the public benefit. 
Having identified the above factors, the rest of the chapter will seek to analyse the interplay 
between law, petroleum industry policy and models, in attaining development of the 
identified factors: Norway, Brazil and Nigeria will be used as case studies.  
 
2.2 THE INTERPLAY OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION  
 
It will be difficult to apply objective criteria when analysing the performance of various 
petroleum industries due largely to peculiar national contexts like population, technology, 
extent of petroleum reserves, rule of law, and democratic experience. For instance, Norway’s 
technological capacity was already developed from its shipbuilding experience, when it 
discovered oil in 1969. It also had an entrenched democratic culture and a respect for rule of 
law. Norway also relied on experiences gained from the management of its hydropower 
resources in the early part of the 20
th
 century to define its relationship with international oil 
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companies (IOCs).
1
 The Norwegian experience is in contrast to Nigeria whose 1956 
discovery of petroleum was on the eve of her independence from Britain. Nigeria therefore 
lacked democratic experience and the requisite industrial capacity to tackle the challenges of 
the NPI.  
 
But while taking peculiar national contexts into consideration, this chapter argues that 
industry regulation, direct indigenous participation, and utilization of petroleum revenues, are 
reasonable criteria that can determine how effective a country manages its petroleum 
industry. And this criteria will be shown to cut across board, from developing Angola, to 
developed Norway, it remains a valid yardstick to determine and measure the extent to which 
a country has managed its petroleum industry. 
 
The chapter postulates that the interconnectedness of the above factors (the ‘triune factors’)2 
implies that the development of one will invariably impact the other. For instance, a 
significant local content will produce a pool of skilled man power from which regulators and 
industry managers can be sourced. It will also provide jobs which will positively impact the 
economy. On the other hand, effective industry regulation will ensure the state gets funds due 
to it from the industry, promote environmental protection, and reduce regulatory burdens on 
petroleum exploration and production companies (PEPCs). This will lead to better 
government revenues, benefit the wider general economy generally, and in particular will 
feed Nigeria’s local content since the government will be in a better position to invest in 
research and fund scholarships. Similarly, a viable national oil company which is evidence of 
a strong local content can help monitor joint collaborations with PEPCs, and in essence 
promote regulation. This has been the Malaysian experience, as will be seen in paragraph 
4.4.2.  
 
                                                 
1
 See Tina Hunter, ‘Sustainable Socio-economic Extraction of Australian Offshore Petroleum Resources through 
Legal Regulation: Is it Possible?’ (2011) 29 JERNL, 215. See also Bruce Campbell, ‘Managing Oil Wealth the 
Alberta/Canada Model vs. the Norwegian Model’ Canadian Centre  for  Policy 
Alternatives<http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/commentary/managing-oil-wealth> accessed 14 
November 2012  
2
 The triune factors refer to the local content, industry regulation, and the application of petroleum revenues for 
the benefit of the public. 
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The gains from the petroleum industry are essentially dependent on how equitably petroleum 
revenues are managed for the public good: a factor that prima facie appears to be outside the 
core of the industry. But a closer scrutiny will reveal that the extent to which petroleum 
revenues are applied, is not a factor that can be divorced from the industry, but remains an 
integral part of it. For if petroleum revenues do not promote public welfare, and are not 
properly utilised in promoting research, technology, and industry, it can result in a backlash 
of weak local content and weak industry regulation. It can also lead to deindustrialisation, 
what researchers in essence refer to as the ‘Dutch disease’ which is closely allied to the 
resource curse phenomena.
3
 This can also lead to societal unrest and the disruption of the 
petroleum industry.
4
 For instance poverty can result in sabotage of petroleum infrastructure, 
illegal refineries, bunkering, and criminality as demonstrated in Nigeria. And in extreme 
cases the frustration of the people can result in an outright revolution (the so called Arab 
spring in Libya, Egypt and Syria), which will in turn make petroleum exploration and 
production difficult, if not impossible. 
 
An understanding of the industry as an integrated whole is therefore imperative if any reform 
is to be meaningful and impactful. This chapter will be devoted to analysing and comparing 
the extent to which Norway, Brazil and Nigeria have used law and policy to develop the 
triune factors. 
 
2.3 LAW, POLICY AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT 
 
A good combination of law and strategic industry policy, set within a defined developmental 
framework, is required for the development of the petroleum industry of any country. A 
policy is a firm statement of intent published by a government or organisation to guide its 
practices and procedures.
5
 It states matters of principle and action, and outlines what is to be 
                                                 
3
 This theory refers to some adverse impact of other sectors of an economy by virtue of exploitation of natural  
resource. See R.G. Gregory, ‘Some Aspects of Growth in the Mineral Sector’, (1976) Vol. 20  Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics,  71-91, and Jeffrey Frankel ibid. Frederick van der Ploeg, ‘Fiscal policy and 
Dutch Disease’ (2011) 8 International Economics and Economic Policy, 121 –138, Akorlie A. Nyatepe-Coo, 
‘Dutch Disease ,  Government Policy and Import Demand in Nigeria’ (1994) Vol. 26 Applied Economics, 327 
4
 Nigeria for instance contends with militancy and oil thefts. In Libya’s case, it resulted in an outright revolution  
5
 See Oxford Online Dictionary <http://oxforddictionaries.com/> accessed 15 November 2012 
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done and by whom.
6
 Without a properly articulated policy, attaining definite criteria to 
measure performance will be difficult, if not impossible. Thus the extent to which a country 
has achieved its policy objectives is a starting point in determining how successful it is in 
managing its petroleum industry. A good industry policy will be clear, comprehensive and 
achievable in the light of in-country capacities, now and in the near future.  
 
While policies can be instrumental in giving direction to a government on petroleum industry 
management, laws are required for the implementation of policy objectives and to give 
legitimacy.  Thus laws give ‘teeth’ to policy implementation. Laws are especially important 
since the possible application of sanctions for default makes it a desirable vehicle for policy 
implementation; especially where there is the likelihood that policy implementation may be 
resisted. Legislating on a policy also makes industry and public officials accountable to the 
legislature and the public since legislation means that the policy is no more a manifesto of 
government intention, but a compulsory requirement which must be adhered to. 
 
Virtually every aspect of the workings of a petroleum industry requires legal arrangements 
for the benefit of the state and operators. From the award of contracts, regulation of 
operations, utilization of resources, and the enforcement of contracts, there is either 
dependence on legislation, guidelines, standards or contract. It can therefore be argued that 
the business of petroleum cannot proceed without a viable legal framework. This is aptly 
demonstrated in the Nigerian petroleum industry (NPI), where billions of investment funds 
have been stalled until uncertainties over delays in the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB) 2012, are addressed.
7
 Similarly Nigeria’s NLNG could not attract foreign investment 
until a legal framework was erected in the form of the NLNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees 
and Assurances) Act of 1989.
8
 This law was used to assure investors of government’s 
commitment to the project, and provided for international arbitration in cases of dispute or 
                                                 
6
 University of Sydney, ‘What is a Policy’ <http://sydney.edu.au/legal/policy/what/index.shtml>  accessed 16 
June 2013 
7
 See Olusola Bello, ‘$72bn investments lost as FG dithers on PIB’ Business Day (6 November 2013) < 
http://businessdayonline.com/2013/11/72bn-investments-lost-as-fg-dithers-on-pib/> accessed 19 November 
2013 
8
 Cap N 87 LFN 2004   
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the nationalisation of assets.
9
 There are however various approaches to the application of law 
and policy in the petroleum industry, which differ from country to country. These differences 
are reflected in the various petroleum industry models adopted by various countries to meet 
their peculiar needs. The various petroleum industry models and the elements of a basic 
petroleum industry legal framework will be analysed next.  
 
2.4 ELEMENTS OF A PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MODEL  
 
The above analysis argued that a successfully managed and regulated petroleum industry is 
usually achieved through the instrumentality of legal frameworks that implement strategic 
industry policy. It is now intended here to briefly clarify how a petroleum industry 
framework is likely to be framed and how it may be reflected in various petroleum industry 
models (PIM), and the standard elements of any such model. 
 
2.4.1  A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 10 
 
A petroleum industry legal framework may encompass local and international laws especially 
where petroleum is extracted offshore. Similarly, where international oil companies (IOCs) 
operate in a local jurisdiction, recourse to international arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism may necessitate the application of international treaties and agreements.
11
 A 
country’s petroleum industry legal framework is likely to be mainly statutory, although it 
may be supported by a series of contracts that are executed between governments, PEPCs, 
and other stakeholders in the industry.  
 
                                                 
9
 See U Udoma, 'Incentives For Gas ventures in Nigeria' (1998) 2 Modern Practice Journal of Law and Finance 
Law 1 
10
 See William Onorato and J Jay. Park,  ‘World Petroleum Legislation : Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas 
Development’   (2001) 39(1) Alberta Law Review 70  
11
 For example because some of Nigeria’s petroleum is found offshore, it has enacted the Territorial Waters Act 
1967, Ch T5 LFN 2004, Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1979, Ch E7, LFN 2004, under which it can explore for 
petroleum offshore. Similarly, it has entered into a joint development zone agreement with Sao Tome and 
Principe for joint offshore explorations.  
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A petroleum industry legal regime may be contained in a multi statute framework, or in a 
single comprehensive law that is supported by regulations made thereunder. Even in a multi 
statute petroleum regime like Nigeria, there is usually a principal petroleum law which will 
provide for administrative, economic and fiscal guidelines to guide investment in the 
industry. This law will additionally clarify ownership of petroleum resources and in some 
cases, contain the derivation formula for sharing of royalties or profits between tiers of 
government and host communities.
12
 
 
Some petroleum laws are short, providing for a competent government authority on which 
will be conferred rule making powers, and authority to represent the government in 
negotiations with PEPCs.
13
 The competent authority may also be authorised to act as industry 
regulator in some cases.
14
 Some petroleum laws on the other hand are detailed and 
comprehensive, leaving out only certain details to be sorted by regulation and negotiation 
between the government and PEPCs.
15
 A standard petroleum law will also address taxation, 
fiscal stabilisation, environmental protection, unitization, gas development and contain a 
definition section. A legal framework will reflect the petroleum industry model adopted by 
each country for the management of its industry. It is intended here to analyse some of the 
most widely used PIMs. 
2.4.2  STATES WITHOUT NATIO NAL OIL COMPANIES  
 
Some countries like the USA, Canada, United Kingdom and Australia, manage their 
petroleum industries without establishing national oil companies (NOCs). 16 
                                                 
12
 For instance articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Brazilian Petroleum Law, 9478/1997 and section 1 of the Nigerian 
Petroleum Act, Ch. P.10, and LFN 2004.   
13
 A prime example is Nigeria’s Petroleum Act of 1969, which has only 16 sections.  
14
 The competent authority may be a sole NOC or a different body established to administer the industry and 
issue petroleum contracts. Its power to award contracts may be arbitrary or regulated. Where it is regulated, 
contracts are awarded only after an open bidding process that guarantees fairness to all the parties. In Nigeria the 
competent authority is the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), and although rule making powers is 
vested in the Minster of Petroleum Resources, this power is exercised by DPR in practice.  
15
 For instance the PIB 2012 is an example of a comprehensive petroleum law. So also is the Norwegian 
Petroleum Activities Act of 1996. See Bernard Taverne, Industry And Governments: An Introduction To 
Petroleum Regulation, Economies And Government Policies (Kluwer, 1999)  222-231  
16
 In 1975 however, the UK had actually established British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) under the 
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act of 1975 to function as the UK’s NOC. The BNOC however did not 
enjoy the support of the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, which came into power in 1979, and 
by it ceased operations when its exploratory and production responsibilities were transferred to its subsidiary. 
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The role of the state in this model is to grant licences for exploration and production to 
PEPCs, usually after a competitive and transparent bidding process.
17
 Thus the state limits 
itself to industry regulation, the management of the industry, and the collection of taxes.
18
 
Countries that adopt this model open their industries to IOCs and indigenous PEPCs, subject 
to government oversight and regulation. Other features of this model include deregulation of 
the price of petroleum products, and a heavy dependence on royalties and taxes.
19
  
 
2.4.3  STATES WITH NOCS  
 
Beyond regulation and collection of taxes, many petroleum producing countries (PPCs), 
especially in the developing world, elect to participate directly in the petroleum industry 
through NOCs.
20
 These NOCs, which as direct agents of their home governments, usually 
enjoy preferential privileges in their petroleum industries. This model can be further divided 
into the traditional and the non traditional NOC sub models.  
 
The Traditional NOC sub model  
Here NOCs take the centre stage as policy makers, industry regulators (either totally or 
partially), and as petroleum companies.
21
 Malaysia’s Petroliam Nasional Berhad, (Petronas), 
Iran’s NIOC, Angola’s Sonagol, and, Nigeria’s NNPC pre-1988, adopted this model. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Between 1982 and 1985, Britoil was privatised, while BNOC itself was formally closed in 1985, only a decade 
after its establishment. See generally Daintith, Willoughby and Hill (eds), UK Oil and Gas Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 3
rd
 edn, 2011), paras 1-109-1.113. See also Gordon, Paterson and Usenmez (eds), Oil and Gas Law: 
Current Issues and Emerging Trends (Dundee University Press, 2
nd
 edn, 2011) 66 
17
 And while British Petroleum (BP) was until 1987, owned by the UK government, it is worth stating that it 
was not primarily established to manage the British petroleum industry, but operated like any other petroleum 
firm, in the Middle East and all over the world long before Britain’s North Sea industry was developed. See B.P 
‘Our History’ < http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/our-history/history-of-bp.html> accessed 19 
November 2013 
18
 The US state of Texas allows private ownership of petroleum resources. See Bruce M. Kramer and Owen L. 
Anderson, ‘The Rule of Capture –An Oil and Gas Perspective’ (2005) 35 Environmental Law 899 
19
 See Maxwell Gidado, ‘Petroleum Development Contracts with Multinational Oil Corporations : Focus on the 
Nigerian Oil Industry’, (PhD Thesis University of Warwick 2009) University of Warwick Publications Service 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/4320/> accessed 11 September 2012  
20
 All OPEC countries and non-OPEC countries like Brazil, Norway, Malaysia and China have also employed 
this strategy.   
21
 Iran and Saudi Arabia are among countries with dominant NOCs. 
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Traditional NOCs in most cases collaborate with PEPCs through arrangements like joint 
ventures (JVs), production sharing contracts (PSCs) and Risk Service Contracts (RSCs). 
Although some countries with traditional NOCs attempt to separate industry regulation from 
their NOCs, in practice, a thin line exists between the two as most NOCs in this model have 
been known to overshadow and side-line industry regulators. This was the case with Brazil 
before 1990, and remains the case in Nigeria. Such development is possible because 
regulators and NOCs are usually supervised by the same authority, as in Nigeria, and this 
factor in effect blurs the thin line between regulation and NOC.
22
 Lack of significant 
competition and independent regulation however, has been the undoing of many NOCs in this 
sub model. This is because rather than innovate to enhance performance, most of such NOCs 
rely almost entirely on government patronage and continuing financial support to be kept 
afloat. 
 
The competitive NOC sub model 
 
This model seeks to make NOCs competitive by establishing separate independent and 
capable regulatory and policy making agencies. Countries that adopt this model also subject 
their NOCs to competition with private firms, and ensure they operate with a strong 
commercial orientation. And although some privileges may still be reserved for them, NOCs 
in this model are encouraged to rely rather on their competitiveness for the award of 
petroleum concessions. This model is best epitomised in Norway, where the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the Ministry of Energy are responsible for industry 
regulation and policy formulation, while Statoil operates as the commercial arm of the 
government. It can also be seen in Brazil post 1997, where a competitive Petroleo Brasileiro 
SA (Petrobras) works side by side with the industry regulator: National Petroleum Agency 
(ANP) and the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE), which is the industry policy 
maker.
23
 But no matter the model adopted by a country, the effectiveness of each model will 
                                                 
22
Thurber and others note that Saudi Aramco has thrived despite minimal institutional oversight. And while its 
petroleum industry regulator: the Supreme Council on Petroleum and Mineral Affairs (SCPMA) is relatively 
capable, it exerts only a light supervisory role, mainly because the Saudi monarchy and the NOC leadership 
share similar objectives. See Thurber and others, ‘Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of 
Administrative Design on Oil Sector Performance’ (2011) Vol 39 Energy Policy 
23
 Malaysia adopts a hybrid between the two models. Its NOC Petronas is operated on company law principles 
even though it is a fully owned by the Malaysian government. It regulates the industry, formulates policies and 
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be determined by a variety of factors that indicate that the model a country adopts is not the 
only factor that can be responsible for the effectiveness of that industry. This will be 
demonstrated when Nigeria, Norway and Brazil are compared later in this chapter.  
 
2.5 APPROACHES TO PETROLEUM INDUSTRY REGULATION 
AND MANAGEMENT 
 
There is no clear cut approach to the application of legal frameworks for industry regulation, 
but variances which reflect history, culture and the political structures of various countries 
can be seen from country to country.  Some countries implement petroleum industry policies 
through detailed legal frameworks, while others create discretionary regimes by authorising 
capable administrators to determine the extent of implementation as individual contexts 
allow. For instance, although Brazil and Norway were very nationalistic in their approaches 
to petroleum, Brazil adopted a strict legal approach with little room for administrative 
discretion in the application of its petroleum industry policies, while Norway adopted a 
flexible bottom up approach.
24
  How the various approaches have played out in the petroleum 
industries of Brazil, Norway and Nigeria, and their merits, will be considered next. 
 
2.6 THE ROLE OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE BRAZILIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
 
In 1939, Brazil discovered petroleum in commercial quantities in its Bahia oil field and 
adopted a policy of exclusive resource nationalism. This policy was epitomised by Law 
                                                                                                                                                        
explores for oil as an oil company. See Leslie Lopez, ‘Petronas: Reconciling Tensions Between Company and 
State’ in David G. Victor and others (eds) David G. Victor, and others, (eds) Oil and Governance State-owned 
Enterprises and the World Energy Supply (Cambridge 2012) 809  
24
 Top down regulation generally involves issuance of prescriptive regulations in a command fashion. Here the 
regulator acts as ‘superior’, and the regulated, as ‘inferior’, with breaches visited with sanctions. There is less 
collaboration between regulator and regulated under this approach, which has been criticized as often being 
reactive, cumbersome, and resource intensive. On the other hand, bottom up regulation is more conciliatory, 
collaborative, and often involves the issuance of flexible and relaxed regulatory standards in a manner that is 
almost akin to self regulation. Here the regulator the regulated are often treated as ‘partners’ rather than 
‘superior’ and ‘inferior’. See generally Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation (Oxford, 1999) 363 
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2004/1954 which conferred exclusive upstream monopoly on its NOC: Petróleo Brasileiro 
S.A (.Petrobras). The result was that for nearly 40 years, Petrobras operated without any 
competition in the upstream sector of the industry.
25
 And although Brazil later allowed some 
foreign participation through RSCs in the 1970s, the RSCs were later abandoned for 
contravening Law 2004/1953 and Brazil’s 1967 Constitution.26 Article 177 of the 1988 
Brazilian constitution banned foreign participation in the Brazilian petroleum industry (BPI) 
and in essence restated the nationalistic principles behind Law 2004.
27
 It is arguable that 
the wisdom behind Brazil’s strict monopolistic approach may have played out in the 
dominance of Petrobras, pre and post liberalisation of the BPI.
28
  
 
And even though the BPI was liberalised in 1997, strict resource nationalism still underpins 
the Brazilian approach.
29
 The Brazilian model has however undergone some changes, and has 
crystallised into a model that resembles the Norwegian model in many ways.
30
 The 
substratum of strict petroleum nationalism is still retained however, and this as will be seen 
has reflected in its local content policy, its NOC, and in industry regulation. 
 
2.6.1  LOCAL CONTENT DEVELO PMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY: X-RAYING THE ROLE OF L AW AND POLICY 
 
Brazil has a three pronged approach to local content development: it relies on the 
functionality of its NOC and combines its strengths with administrative agencies, and other 
government initiatives. Petrobras took advantage of the virtual absence of foreign 
                                                 
25
 Subsequently articles 167 and 177 of the 1967 and 1988 constitutions of Brazil respectively also reiterated 
Brazil’s commitment to an exclusively manned petroleum industry. It is pertinent to note that IOCs which were 
operating in refineries prior to the formation of Petrobras continued operating until they were nationalised in the 
1960s. See Adilson De Oliveira, ‘Brazil’s Petrobras: Strategy and Performance’  in  David G. Victor (eds) (n  
22) 515 
26
 For a discussion on Brazil’s risk service contracts and their implications on Petrobras’ monopoly, see João 
Santos Coelho Neto, ‘Risk-Bearing Service Contracts in Brazil’ (1985) 3 JENRL 114 
27
 See Adilson De Oliveira, ‘Brazil’s Petrobras: Strategy and Performance’, in David .G. Victor eds, (n 22 ) 535. 
28
 Petrobras produces over 90 per cent of Brazil’s daily crude production even though it has competition from 
firms like Chevron and Shell.  
29
 Between 1995 and 1997, Brazil liberalised the BPI through Law 9/1995 and Law 9478 of 1997. See Yanko 
Marcius de Alencar Xavier, ‘ Legal Models of Petroleum and Natural Gas Ownership in Brazilian Law’ in 
Aileen McHarg and others (eds) , Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (OUP 2010) 
30
 Like Norway, Brazil separates policy formulation from regulation, and regulation from its national oil 
company. And like Norway, Brazil’s NOC is partially privatized, with the government retaining controlling 
shares in Petrobras.  
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competition, to develop its technological and management capacity into a level of global 
competitiveness.
31
 Currently, it controls over 90 per cent of Brazil’s crude oil production and 
although privatised since 2000, the Brazilian government remains its controlling shareholder. 
This relationship with the government has ensured that Petrobras retains its influence in the 
BPI, as it enjoys legislative privileges over and above other privately owned PEPCs.
32
  
 
In addition to Petrobras, Brazil relies on the administrative regulator of the BPI: ANP. ANP’s 
local content requirements, as contained in Clause 20 of its model petroleum contract, is 
considered as being among the most stringent in the world.
33
 These requirements vary from 
company to company and depend on factors like the location of the petroleum field, and the 
stage of operation, among others.
34
 On a general note however, companies operating in Brazil 
are required to attain 55 per cent local content in areas with more than 100 meters depth and 
65 per cent in development areas. ANP uses a methodology to measure compliance to its 
local content requirements.
35
 It imposes fines by considering the contract amount, the level of 
local content required from each company, and the extent of compliance.
36
 Even state 
                                                 
31
 Hildegunn Kyvik Nordas, Eirik Vatne and Per Heum, ‘The Upstream Petroleum Industry and Local Industrial 
Develoment: A Comparative Study’ (2003) Private Sector Development in the Nigerian Upstream Industry SNF 
Report No. 08/03 <http://brage.bibsys.no/nhh/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_21925/1/R08_03.pdf> 
accessed 18 May 2013; www.worldbank.org/ogmc/socialandeconomicimpact.htm  as cited in Wade Locke, 
‘Exploring Issues Related to Local Benefit Capture in Atlantic Canada’s Oil and Gas Industry’(2004) < 
publications.gc.ca/collections/collection.../AC5-10-2004-eng.pdf> accessed 14 November 2012 
32
 Peter Millard & Mario Sergio Lima, ‘Petrobras Debt Crunch Buoys Exxon’s Prospects in Brazil’ (Bloomberg 
12 April 2013 ) Brazil’s PSC Law, 12.351 of 2010, authorises the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy to 
enter into PSCs with PCs under an auction system administered by the ANP. With this law, Brazil departed 
from its traditional RSCs and concessionary contracts. Its PSCs are for 35 year duration. Article 10 of the Act 
however provides that Petrobras shall be given 30 per cent in all concessions awarded to PEPCs in the presalt, 
and in addition, it makes Petrobras the sole operator of all such concessions. 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-11/petrobras-debt-crunch-buoys-exxon-s-prospects-in-brazil-
energy.html> accessed 18 May 2013 
33
 ANP, ‘The Local Content Reg for  Concession Agreements’ 
<www.braziltexas.org/attachments/files/401/ANP-Marcelo.pdf> accessed 9 June 2013 
34
 See Magda Chambriard, ‘Brazil’s Regulatory Framework Challenges of a Rapidly Expanding Petroleum 
Industry) <http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=60260&m=conteúdo local&t1=&t2=conteúdo 
local&t3=&t4=&ar=0&ps=1&cachebust=1352472654403> accessed 13 November 2012   . Concessions in 
Brazil are awarded for fields that are not in the Pre-Salt area, while PSCs are used in the Pre-Salt in pursuance to 
the PSC Act 12,351, See W. Bryan Blades, ‘Production, Politics, and Pre-Salt: Transitioning To a PSC Regime’ 
(2012) 7 Texas Journal of Oil and Gas Energy Law, 41-45 
35
 ANP has issued the following regulations relating to Local Content regulation : Resolution No. 36 -Reg of 
Local Content Certification, Resolution No. 37 - Rules of Accreditation Entity for Local Content Certification 
Resolution No. 38 - Rules of Certification Audits, and Resolution No. 39 - Reg of Local Investment Report. 
36
 See Velda Adilson , ‘Brazil’s Local Content Policy Stirs Concerns ’ (E and P , 21 October 2012) < 
http://www.epmag.com/Technology-Regulations/Brazils-Local-Content-Policy-Stirs-Concerns_109056 > 
accessed 22 November 2012. See also Alexandre Bittencourt Carmon and Cameiro Otavio Cameiro, 
‘Challenges of Local Content’ , Advogados, < www.veirano.com.br/veirano/.../Default.aspxCached> accessed 9 
November 2012 
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controlled Petrobras is not left out of the requirements, and was fined the sum of $18 million 
for breaching local content rules in development of 44 concessions.
37
 ANP is also involved in 
local content development by investments in research and the award of scholarships.
38
 
 
Thirdly, Brazil relies on other collaborative initiatives to strengthen local content: they 
include the Mobilization Program of the National Petroleum Industry (PROMINP), and the 
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDE). Foreign firms are encouraged 
to establish local subsidiaries in Brazil. In terms of research and technology promotion, 
article 48 of Brazil’s Petroleum Law (Law 9748/1997) requires a certain per cent of royalties 
paid by petroleum firms to the government, be paid to the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. This money is to be used to finance programs to foster the scientific research 
and the technological development applied to the petroleum industry. Brazil also established 
CTPetro, a local content initiative, in 1998 as an investment fund for the development of 
research and innovative technologies in Brazil.
39
 
 
2.6.2  LAW, POLICY AND PETR OLEUM INDUSTRY REGUL ATION IN BRAZIL  
 
Brazil’s top down approach to petroleum industry regulation is spearheaded by ANP which 
makes local content regulations, negotiates with petroleum firms, and awards contracts after 
open and competitive bidding rounds.
40
 Brazil’s regulatory structures appear to be robust, due 
in part to a strict approach to environmental protection, and in part to regulatory reforms 
introduced by Law 9478.  
                                                 
37 ‘ANP Slaps Petrobras with $18 million Fine’  (Upstream, 1 September 2011)< 
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article276020.ece> accessed 22 November 2012  
38
 Ibid 
39 
See Andre Torsi Furtado, ‘Institutional Changes and Innovation in the Brazilian Petroleum Industry’ (2003) 
International Symposium on 'Energy Reforms and Institutional Development in Latin America,  National 
Autonomous University of Mexico, University of Grenoble PMF Mexico City, November 2003 < 
www.depfe.unam.mx/p-cientifica/.../10CbAndrefurtadoenglishLtt.pd..> accessed 20 November 2012  
40 
Other relevant agencies include the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), the CNPE, the Brazilian Institute 
of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), the National Environment Council 
(CONAMA), the National Waterway Transportation Agency (ANTAQ) and the Brazilian Navy. See BNDE, 
‘Studies of Regulatory, Corporate and Financial Alternatives for the Exploration and Production of Oil and Gas 
and the Industrial Development of the Oil and Gas Production Chain in Brazil’ (2009) 
<http://www.bain.com/bainweb/images/LocalOffices/BNDES_Consolidated_Report_BNDES_eng.pdf> 
Accessed 18 May 2013 
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Brazil’s environmental regime is clearly one of the strictest in the world, with the 1988 
constitution making environmental protection a duty of the state.
41
 Environmental laws in 
Brazil are enforced by independent public prosecutors who are enabled to bring actions 
against PEPCs, individuals, and the Brazilian government, where necessary. Brazil’s 
environmental laws include Law 5.357/1967,
42
 Law 6938/1981,
43
 Law 9.478/1997,
44
 Law 
7.735
45
 of 1989 and Law 9,605 of 1998, which established a regime for environmental 
crimes. Brazil also relies on subsidiary legislations and standards which PEPCs are required 
to comply with.  
 
2.6.3  APPLICATION OF PETROLEUM REVENUES IN BRAZIL 
 
Brazil’s petroleum wealth is centrally controlled.46 Article 49 of Law 9478 provides for the 
sharing of petroleum royalties between the federal, states and municipal governments.
47
 
Unlike Norway which exported (and still exports) most of its petroleum, Brazil used its 
limited petroleum resources to satisfy its local population, and was thus not a petroleum 
exporting nation for many years. Following the 2007 offshore discoveries of an estimated 50 
billion barrels of crude oil, Brazil’s status as a major petroleum owning country rose 
significantly, and in 2009 it became a net exporter of petroleum.
48
  
 
While it may be hasty to conclude that Brazil will succeed in managing expected petroleum 
revenues from its offshore reserves, termed ‘pre-salt’ 49 Brazil appears to be on the right 
                                                 
41
 See Chapter 6 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988.  
42
 See Carlos O. Saraiva, ‘Brazilian Legislation on Pollution of the Sea and Inland Waters’ (1974-1975)  6 J. 
Mar. L. & Com. 435  
43
 It also established a strict liability regime for environmental damage.  
44 
Established ANP and made environmental protection one of the objects of the Act  
45
 Established IBAMA  
46
 Arts 20(ix), and 177 of the Brazilian Constitution. See also Arts 3, 4 and 5 of Law 9748 of 1997, which 
restates this principle.  
47 Fernando Antonio Slaibe Postali, ‘Petroleum royalties and regional development in Brazil: The Economic 
Growth of Recipient Towns’ (2009) 34 Resources Policy, 206  
48
 See Aditya Malhotra, ‘Brazil's Oil Future: The New (Big) Kid on the Block’ (2012) April Issue, Journal of 
Energy Security <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=346:brazils-bright-
oil-future&catid=123:content&Itemid=389> accessed 12 July 2012  
49
 The reserves at the pre-salt are estimated to be between 50 and 100 billion barrels of crude oil. At 
conservative estimates however, they are said to triple Brazil’s current petroleum reserves which exceed 10 
billion barrels of crude oil. See Katia Cortes, ‘Brazil  to Auction Pre-Salt Oil Fields After Royalties’, Bloomberg  
(7 January  2011), <http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2011-01-07/brazil-to-auction-pre-salt-oil-fields-after-roy 
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track, as legislative initiatives will indicate. Article 47 of Brazil’s PSC Act 2010, (Law 
12.351) established a social fund for the management and utilization of Brazil’s petroleum 
revenues. This law provides that revenues from Brazil’s pre-salt fields will be used to fund 
education, culture, sports, public health, science and technology and the environment.
50
 
Proceeds from the social fund will also be applied in the mitigation of price fluctuations in 
the Brazilian economy and to combat the so called Dutch disease.
51
 
 
2.7 THE NORWEGIAN APPROACH TO PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
REGULATION AND MANAGEMENT  
 
When in 1969, Norway discovered huge petroleum reserves in its Ekofisk field situated in the 
Norwegian continental shelf (NCS); its petroleum industry was born. After that discovery, the 
growth of the industry has been positively impacted by the interplay of policy, law, and good 
administration. Early in the 1970s, Norway’s legislature, (the ‘Storting’) commissioned a 
committee to define a policy framework for the petroleum industry. The report of the 
committee was published in 1971, and contained the so called ‘ten oil commandments’ which 
formed the basis of Norway’s petroleum industry policy.52  
                                                                                                                                                        
Alties-updatel-.html.> accessed 17 October 2012 . See also Peter Millard, ‘ Brazil Oil Fields May Hold More 
Than  Twice Estimates,’ Bloomberg ( 19 January 2011)  <http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2011-01-19/brazil-
oil-fields-may-hold-more-than-tw ice-estimated-reserves.> accessed 17 October 2012. 
50
 By pre-salt, we refer to the giant oil fields found in the Santos Basin area, 300 kilometres off the coast of 
Espirito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina. The petroleum found in these fields are trapped 
under a layer of salt about 7 kilometres under the surface of the ocean, and are estimated to contain over 50 
billion barrels of crude oil, see Peter Millard, ‘Brazil Oil Fields May Hold More than Twice Estimates’ 
Bloomberg (7 January 2011),    <www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-19/brazil-oil-fields-may-hold-more-than-
twice-estimated-reserves> accessed 18 November 2013 
51
 See Articles 47 and 48 of the PSC Act. See W. Bryan Blades, ‘Production, Politics, and Pre-Salt: 
Transitioning To a PSC Regime’ (2012) 7 Texas Journal of Oil and Gas Energy Law 33, 44.See also Cristiano 
Villardo and Alexandre Campos, ‘Pre-Salt and its Contribution to Sustainable Development in Brazil: a 
Preliminary Assessment’(2012) < www.iaia.org/.../IAIA11%20-%20Cristiano%20Vilardo%20-%20Pre-.salt> 
accessed 17 October 2012 
52
 Among other things, the policy at Norwegian dominance of operations at the North Sea Continental Shelf 
(NSCS). It also aimed to explore for petroleum to make Norway sufficient while taking account of 
environmental concerns. To that extent, gas flaring was prohibited from inception except during periods of 
testing. The Norwegian state was to be involved at all appropriate levels in contribution and coordination of 
Norwegian interests in the industry. In response to the policy, the Norwegian Legislature, in 1972 unanimously 
resolved that Statoil be formed as Norway’s NOC. See Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll, ‘ Statoil: A Study 
in Political Entrepreneurship’ (2010) The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in the International Energy 
Market , Energy Forum, James Baker 111 <http://bakerinstitute.org/files/3911/> accessed 7 July 2013 Bjørn 
Lidar Lerøen, ‘Ten Commanding Achievements’ (2010) Norwegian Petroleum Directorate  < 
http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Norwegian-Continental-Shelf/No2-2010/10-commanding-achievements/> 
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Norway’s policy thrust was geared towards prudent management of petroleum resources, 
robust regulation and resource nationalism, spearheaded by Statoil and other indigenous 
PEPCs on the one hand, and by capable administrators, on the other.
53
 Norway erected its 
petroleum industry strategy/model, and supported its implementation with vibrant laws in 
response to that policy, which essentially bordered on resource nationalism.  
 
Unlike Brazil however, Norway’s resource nationalism policy was implemented through a 
largely discretionary and flexible approach. Broad powers were conferred on administrators 
to determine when to participate with foreign firms, monitor local content, and stipulate rules 
for environmental protection.
54
 Norway entered into contractual arrangements under which 
operators operating in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) had to comply with its 
nationalistic policy. By establishing a broad and general framework for its industry 
administrators, Norway ensures they are able to address specific issues as they arise with 
flexibility and skill. This is in contrast with Brazil’s iron clad rules and laws which give 
administrators little discretion to operate.  
 
2.7.1  LOCAL CONTENT IN NORWAY: THE ROLE OF LAW AND POLICY  
 
Norway relied on several factors to develop its local content. They include its technological 
advancement at the time of its discovery of petroleum, the implementation of a nationalistic 
policy through a legal framework geared towards encouraging indigenous PEPCs, and local 
contractors, and the establishment of Statoil. 
                                                                                                                                                        
accessed 1 November 2012  and Mark C. Thurber and Benedicte  Tangen Istad, ‘Norway’s Evolving Champion: 
Statoil and the Politics of State Enterprise’ in David G. Victor (eds) ( n 1) 599 
53 Baines, ‘Studies of Regulatory, Corporate and Financial  Alternatives for the Exploration and Production of 
Oil  and Gas and the Industrial Development of the Oil and  Gas Production Chain in Brazil’ (2009) 48  
<http://www.bain.com/bainweb/images/LocalOffices/BNDES_Consolidated_Report_BNDES_eng.pdf>  
accessed 2 April 2013 
54 
See Geir Sverre Braut and Preben H. Lindoe (2004). "Risk Regulation in the North Sea:  A Common Law 
Perspective on Norwegian Legislation  : The Norwegian model " Safety Science Monitor 14(1). See also  
Preben H. Lindøe and others  ‘Robust Offshore Risk Regulation – an assessment of US, UK and Norwegian 
Approaches’  (2012) Being a paper presented at the European Safety and Reliability Conference,  25-29 June, 
Helsinki.<http://seros.uis.no/getfile.php/SEROS/Robust%20Regulation/Lindoe,%202012,%20Robust%20Offsh
ore%20Risk%20Regulation%20%E2%80%93%20an%20assessment%20of%20US,%20UK%20and%20Norwe
gian%20approaches,%20ESREL%20conference.pdf> accessed 7 August 2014 
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Local content in Norway is currently adjudged as one of the highest in the world. It ranges 
between 50-60 per cent in the development of new fields, and up to 80 per cent, if 
maintenance and operations are included.
55
 Government controlled Statoil currently produces 
about 80 per cent of the NCS’s petroleum, and champions Norway’s local content policies.56 
Statoil developed adequate technological capabilities which were used as a launching pad for 
the development of Norway’s domestic petroleum services industry.57  
 
Norway did not set a specific local content target for petroleum firms in the NCS. A Royal 
Decree of 1972 however obligated all production companies to ensure that Norwegian 
suppliers were given preference in contract awards provided they were competitive in terms 
of price, quality and delivery reliability.
58
 Operators were equally required to notify the 
Norwegian petroleum ministry of all contracts they awarded in excess of one million 
Norwegian Kroner ($150,000), in order to ensure that Norwegian firms were considered in 
such contracts.
59
 From an institutional level, Norway monitored compliance through Statoil’s 
partnership with IOCs, and through formal regulators.  
 
Section 4(11) of the Petroleum Activities Act of 1996 requires all petroleum produced from 
the NCS to be landed in Norway before being exported abroad. This Act in effect empowered 
indigenous Norwegian firms. The requirement has however been removed for breaching 
Norway’s obligations in the European Economic Area.60 Thus by a deliberate combination of 
policy, law and capacity, local firms in Norway benefited from the royal decree and were 
able to develop further capacity and make profits for the Norwegian economy.   
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Another effective local content strategy of Norway was the incorporation of Statoil in 1972 as 
a fully owned NOC, through a parliamentary vote. Statoil was mandated to drive Norway’s 
policy of petroleum nationalism and benefited largely from the 1963 Petroleum Act regime. 
Under this regime, Statoil was given a 50 per cent stake (with an option to increase to 80 per 
cent), in all concessions awarded in the NCS.
61
 When Norway joined the European Economic 
Area (EEA) in 1992, Statoil lost all exclusive privileges in the NCS, but by this time it had 
already dominated the NCS, and was able to stand on its own with little government support. 
Were such privileges absent in the 1970s, it is doubtful if the Statoil would have risen to the 
status it has now attained. 
 
Other strategic developments in Norway’s petroleum industry have also been influenced by 
hard or soft law. For instance, when in the early 1980s, the Norwegian government deemed it 
necessary to reduce Statoil’s influence, it transferred some of its upstream interests to a state 
owned investment entity called the State Direct Finance Investment (SDFI). The SDFI was 
established in 1984 in pursuance to a parliamentary resolution, to operate as a cash flow-
system under which the Norwegian government will hold shares directly in the petroleum 
industry, and not through Statoil.
62
 With the SDFI Statoil lost some its automatic privileges 
and control in the NCS, but this move also positioned Statoil to develop its competitiveness, 
and was thus prepared for its eventual privatisation in 2001. 
 
2.7.2  REGULATION OF PETROL EUM OPERATIONS IN THE NORWEGIAN 
CONTINENTAL SHELF 
 
Norway benefits from a collaborative and holistic health, safety and environment (HSE) 
framework which has resulted in robust regulation. It established institutional, legal and co-
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operative frameworks which were combined towards reducing accidents and environmental 
challenges in the NCS.
63
  
 
A regulatory framework that harnesses and integrates the resources of regulators, employers, 
and their employees, while promoting inter-agency co-operation in HSE regulation, can be 
said to be collaborative. For instance in Norway, consultation is often encouraged and is 
carried out between regulators, employers, and employees, in order to chart ways for ensuring 
safety in petroleum explorations.
64
 Generally, Norway places overall responsibility on 
employers to create safe working conditions, while equally creating room for employee 
involvement in HSE development, subject to regulatory supervision.
65
  
 
 
In the light of the above definition, the Nigerian HSE regime cannot be said to be 
functionally collaborative, although some consultations occur between industry and 
regulators. Nigeria’s almost undue reliance on administrative regulations, and top down 
prescriptions, have not made effective collaboration possible.  Nigeria also lacks a framework 
for effective inter-agency co-operation, a factor that explains frictions between DPR and 
NOSDR.
66
 And while some oil companies have HSE departments, there is no vital link 
between the regulatory agencies, employees, and their employers. In many ways, the 
Nigerian approach to HSE regulation is often reactionary and responsive, and rather than 
being geared towards accident prevention.
67
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A holistic HSE regulatory approach is one which functionally combines health, safety and 
environmental issues as an integral whole and utilizes risk prevention, identification, and 
response mechanisms. In that regard, Norway integrates Petroleum Activities Act (PAA)
68
 
and its Working Environment Act (WEA) of 1977, in to integrate HSE as a single and 
holistic issue. Unlike the Norwegian approach however, Nigeria’s approach to HSE 
regulation is not holistic, rather Nigeria appears only to focus on the environmental 
regulation, while placing less emphasis on employee health and safety.
69
 And Nigeria has not 
made any significant effort to integrate the ministry of health, and the ministry of labour, into 
the petroleum industry as Norway has done. This factor perhaps explains why with little 
protection, employees in the oil industry can be fired at will, unionisation is restricted, and 
trade union members are routinely victimised by oil companies, again in contrast to Norway, 
where trade unions in the petroleum industry are an active voice.
70
 Ironically, focus on the 
environment has not yielded significant success either, given frequent oil spills, accidents, 
and continuous gas flaring.  
 
So successful is the Norwegian approach that it has become the subject of much study by 
many OECD, and non-OECD member countries.
71
 Beyond HSE regulation, Norway is also 
efficient in monitoring payments to the government from petroleum firms, and in the 
monitoring of petroleum operations, and is regarded as one of the least corrupt countries on 
earth.
 72
  Farouk Al Kasim and others note that although Norway is Western Europe’s largest 
oil producer, and the world’s third largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia and Russia, Norway 
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‘…has avoided many of the political, social and economic problems associated with the 
resource curse, and the so-called ‘Norwegian model’ of petroleum industry management is 
recognised internationally as an example of how to successfully manage large natural 
resource endowments.
73
   
 
Although Norway is not a corrupt country, Norwegian firms are not immune from corruption 
scandals outside the shores of Norway. For instance, in 2004, Statoil was found guilty of 
offering bribes to secure contracts in the Iranian oil industry, and was fined $2.9 million by 
the Norwegian regulators.
74
 That these acts are performed outside the shores of Norway 
however, is testament to the effectiveness of Norway’s internal control systems in regulating 
the movement of petroleum revenues within its borders.  
 
At the institutional level, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (NMPE) is 
responsible for the management of Norway’s petroleum resources on the NCS. It ensures 
petroleum activities are carried out in accordance with the guidelines set by the Storting and 
the Norwegian government, and is also responsible for overseeing Norway’s interests in 
state-owned companies, Petoro AS, Gassco AS, and Statoil.  
 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) which is a technical and advisory body for the 
NMPE, exercises administrative authority in connection with exploration for and production 
of petroleum deposits on the NCS. NPD makes regulations and decisions in order to give 
effect to Norway’s petroleum laws.75 In 1994, a Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) was 
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created from the NPD and placed under the Norwegian ministry of environment. It is 
responsible for the regulation of HSE in the NCS.
76
  
 
2.7.3  NORWAY’S APPLICATION  OF PETROLEUM REVENUES  
 
From inception, Norway devised strategies to link its petroleum industry to its capital market, 
oil rig construction, petrochemicals and other sectors of its economy.
77
 The industry was 
managed in such a way as to withstand volatile petroleum prices and its petroleum wealth, 
was used to create one of the most sustainable welfare systems in the world.
78
 In order to 
cater for future generations, Norway established a Petroleum Fund in 1990. This fund which 
was renamed the Norwegian Pension Fund Global in 1996 is currently one of the biggest 
petroleum revenue related funds in the world and returns from it are estimated to be higher 
than Norway’s annual oil revenues.79 Norway’s management of petroleum revenues has been 
influenced by its legal framework in addition to the fact that Norway has a history in 
democracy, rule of law and financial transparency and integrity.  
 
2.7.4  THE ROLE OF LAW IN T HE DEVELOPMENT OF TH E NORWEGIAN 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY  
 
Although the role of effective administration cannot be downplayed, it is pertinent to argue 
that Norway’s legal framework benefited its petroleum industry immensely. Norway however 
has combined law, policy, credible commitment and co-operation between industry, operators 
and labour, rather than relying exclusively on its legal framework. For instance, through its 
first petroleum Act of 1963, which was essentially a Royal proclamation, Norway asserted its 
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sovereignty over all petroleum in the NCS, and created the basis for further regulatory 
activity.
80
 By the issuance of regulations in the form of royal decrees, Norway defined the 
terms of licences that were to be granted to companies for exploration of petroleum in the 
NCS.
81 
Regulations were made under the Act in the form of royal decrees, the most 
influential being the 1972 decree which contained more detailed requirements.
82
 But these 
privileges would have not amounted to much without technical capacity, a commitment to 
integrity, and the 1972 establishment of Statoil. 
 
Other legal developments in Norway’s petroleum industry include the passage of the 1985 
Petroleum Act which replaced the 1963 Petroleum Act and the 1972 Royal decree made 
under it.
83
 The 1985 Act was equally replaced by the Petroleum Act of 1996 which was 
enacted to facilitate Norway’s compliance with its international obligations under the EEA.84 
The above analysis sought to analyse how Norway and Brazil combined laws, policies, and 
industrial capacity to develop their petroleum industries in the areas of local content, 
regulation, and application of petroleum revenues. The next segment of this chapter will seek 
to analyse the extent of development of the triune factors in Nigeria, and the role of law and 
policy in all of these.  
 
2.8 THE NIGERIAN APPROACH TO PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION 
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In 1956, after decades of exploratory endeavours, Shell-BP discovered oil in commercial 
quantities at Oloibiri, in the present day Bayelsa State of Nigeria. In 1958, Nigeria began 
exporting 5100 barrels of oil per day (bpd), its first shipment arriving at Rotherham.
85
 Thus 
was born the NPI, which for the past four decades has been the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy.  
 
In contrast to Brazil and Norway however, Nigeria lacked any strategic legal framework for 
the NPI due mainly to the absence of a discernible petroleum industry policy bordering on 
resource nationalism, in the formative years of the industry. This perhaps explains why most 
of the concessions were virtually in the hands of IOCs in the early days of the industry, and 
such concessions were for very long terms, and very extensive.
86
 It is arguable that most of 
the challenges of the NPI are traceable to this fundamental foundational flaw of the lack of a 
petroleum industry policy.
87
 For had Nigeria developed a well thought out policy for the 
management and regulation of the NPI, and been committed to it, it would have enacted 
strategic laws that would have provided the framework for an effectively managed industry. 
This factor arguably, would have also influenced behaviour positively, for instance the ‘oil 
boom’ revenues of the early 1970s and 1990s may have been put to more sustainable uses.88 
 
Due to the fact that Nigeria was under colonial rule when it discovered petroleum, it could 
not adopt a nationalistic approach to petroleum industry management and regulation. Rather, 
its initial approach favoured Britain, even to the detriment of Nigeria’s interests. For instance, 
in 1937, the British government granted Shell a concession which covered the whole land 
mass of Nigeria.
89
 This was done pursuant to section 6(1)a of the Minerals Oils Act of 
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1914.
90
 In 1949 Shell’s concession was extended over the whole of Nigeria’s territorial 
waters.
91
  
 
Perhaps Nigeria’s colonial legacy as reflected in the Minerals Act of 1914, explains why 
Nigeria retained a discretionary approach to the management of the petroleum industry as 
epitomised in the Mineral Oils Act, and the extant Petroleum Act of 1969.
92
 Such 
discretionary approach means that the managers of the industry can exercise their discretion 
in granting petroleum contracts to PEPCs, as they deem fit. Thus the Petroleum Act 
authorises Nigeria’s minister for petroleum to exercise broad discretions over the industry.93 
The federal government of Nigeria (FGN) however began to assert some authority over the 
industry, spurred on by its 1971 membership of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Thus Nigeria began to demand better terms from IOCs which had 
operated under very liberal terms under the colonial era.   
 
Currently, Nigeria participates directly in the upstream sector of its petroleum industry 
mainly through JVs, PSCs, and other similar collaborations.
94
 The Petroleum Act authorises 
the minister of petroleum to exercise broad discretion over the industry.
95
 It has an average of 
55 per cent of all joint ventures, and about 85 per cent of PSCs. Nigeria therefore takes 
advantage of its discretionary regime to grant petroleum contracts to PEPCs as the context of 
each case requires. The FGN has also been able to utilise its discretion and flexibility to 
develop local content by awarding sole risk concession to indigenous PEPCs.
96
 While the 
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discretionary approach encourages flexibility however, in hands of a corrupt leadership, 
petroleum contracts can be used as a tool for patronage rather than development of public 
welfare. 
 
And although the NPI has been the mainstay of the Nigerian economy for decades, Nigeria 
still struggles with archaic legislation,
97
 inadequate regulatory capacity,
98
 and conflict of 
interest issues. These challenges often result in financial corruption and weak regulation. 
Nigeria also struggles from an incoherent legal framework that is not comprehensive, nor 
suited to meet the current challenges of the petroleum industry.
99
 
 
While Nigeria’s legal regime for the NPI remains largely discretionary and flexible, there has 
been an increasing trend to migrate towards a detailed and strict top down approach similar in 
many ways to the Brazilian approach.
100
 The latter approach has its challenges of being 
inflexible and sometimes unduly bureaucratic, but may be preferable in a regime like Nigeria 
that struggles with corruption issues. This is because, in principle, a more detailed regime 
will reduce opportunities for patronage, environmental degradation, and a misapplication of 
petroleum revenues. The extent, to which these challenges have played out in the triune 
factors in the NPI, will be considered next. 
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2.8.1  THE CHALLENGE OF WEA K LOCAL CONTENT IN N IGERIA  
 
Many PPCs establish local content frameworks in order to maximise national economic value 
from their petroleum industries, and may thus require petroleum firms to patronise local man 
power, products, industries, and services, in the hope that this would create jobs and 
strengthen their economies. A significant local content has potential for the development of 
indigenous technology, fund retention, and may create some linkages to other sectors of the 
economy like shipping, fabrication, and manufacturing.
101
 It can also ensure the dominance 
of the petroleum industry by a country’s citizens, a factor which beyond economics can also 
have national security implications in time of war and international sanctions.  
 
Independent and reliable data is essential to determine the extent of local content 
development in the petroleum industry. Nigeria has however struggled with producing 
reliable local content information because its statistics on issues like population, employment, 
and local content development, or sometimes viewed with suspicion for lacking in integrity, 
riddled with corruption, or being mere political propaganda.
102
 Another difficulty Nigeria has 
had in regards to measuring its local content is with IOCs, some of which have been known 
to flagrantly violate Nigeria’s local content requirements with the complicity of some of their 
Nigerian partners.
103
  
 
Compared to Norway and Brazil however, local content in Nigeria is considerably low. And 
while there is no verifiable statistics to measure local content in Nigeria, many experts estimate 
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local content in the NPI to hover between 12 and 18 per cent.
104
 That Nigeria’s local content 
is weak is not difficult to determine however, since its NOC currently controls only about 5 
per cent of daily production, despite the fact that it was established before Statoil.
105
 And 
although the number of Nigerians employed in the NPI is relatively high, weak local content 
is discernible from the fact that most capital and technology intensive petroleum service 
contracts are executed abroad. These contracts include development of floating production, 
storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs), rigs, tank farm developments, fabrication and 
equipment production, etc. In fact it is estimated that these contracts account for over 90 per 
cent of the estimated $18 billion invested in the NPI annually.
106
 It has been estimated that 
Nigeria lost about $380 billion to capital flight due to the absence of a viable local content 
from 1956-2006.
107
 
 
In contrast to the Norwegian approach, Nigeria’s lack of a vibrant local content policy can be 
discerned from the absence of strategic local content requirements from IOCs other than for 
them to employ Nigerians.
108
 In fact prior to 2010, IOCs were not required to establish local 
subsidiaries in Nigeria, or to patronise Nigerian firms. In fact it was only in 1991 that some 
form of local content policy became discernible in Nigeria, and it was only in 2010, that a 
comprehensive legislation was enacted in that regard.  
 
Lacking a viable local content policy and with inadequate technological capacity, Nigeria 
was for a long time content with petroleum rents paid by IOCs. Its weak local content and 
even weaker NOC negatively impacted the NPI. NNPC played the role of a ‘non-operator’ in 
all JVs and PSCs and lost opportunities for technology transfer and development of 
indigenous technology. Rather than exploits opportunities for growth, NNPC was unable to 
develop into a viable NOC, but relapsed into the role of a ‘profit collector’.  
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It is arguable that administrative discretion which was used to the advantage of Statoil in the 
NCS, was used to the detriment of NNPC. This is because NNPC did not have any legal 
obligation to develop into a viable operator and thus relapsed into its weakened state. But 
even though Statoil did not have any similar obligation, it was able to assert itself in the NCS 
within ten years of its incorporation. Lacking in any serious vision for NNPC, the 
government did not encourage the firm to grow in the NPI, but rather looked to IOCs to 
develop Nigeria’s fields. Nwokeji argues that some of the challenges of NNPC stem from the 
fact that some fields that were successfully discovered by its upstream subsidiary, the 
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), were sold off to IOCs by successive 
government administrations.
109
 Thus rather than seek to develop its operability, 
administrators of the industry actually weakened the firm and deprived it of opportunities to 
gain experience from exposure to industrial challenges. This is in contrast to Petrobras, which 
is legally mandated to operate all fields in the pre-salt, and to have a 30 per cent stake in all 
PSCs awarded by the Brazilian government. It is arguable that a legal requirement that NNPC 
operate a certain percentage of all concessions granted in the NPI would have helped it to 
develop its capacity, as is the case in Brazil. This is because NNPC, like Statoil and 
Petrobras, would have been ‘forced’ to develop strategies to pursue such statutory directives, 
and by so doing would have developed capacity over time.  
 
2.8.2  PETROLEUM INDUSTRY REGULATION IN NIGERIA   
 
Nigeria’s DPR and other allied regulatory agencies have struggled to effectively regulate the 
NPI. This has resulted in a weak and often volatile HSE. Nigeria also suffers from inefficient 
monitoring of petroleum resources and revenues. Industry regulation in Nigeria is weakened 
by inadequate finance, technology, human capacity and an undue closeness to the industry.
110
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Beyond weak enforcement and monitoring challenges, DPR’s position as regulator appears to 
lack any direct and specific legislative backing, as the regulator is not mentioned in any 
particular Act of the National Assembly. Rather DPR assumes some legitimacy from section 
10 of the NNPC Act which dealt with the erstwhile Petroleum Inspectorate of the NNPC, 
whose duties were transferred to the DPR. It also derives some legitimacy from the 
delegation to it of the powers of the minster of petroleum as contained in the Petroleum 
Act.
111
 The case of DPR is in contrast to NPD of Norway and ANP of Brazil which derive 
their legislative authority from clear statutory provisions and operate with clear legislative 
delineations of their jurisdiction. That the regulator of so important an industry is not 
mentioned in any particular statute, may be evidence of the fact that regulation is not given 
the priority it should have gotten in the NPI.  
 
Environmentally, Nigeria has the second highest gas flaring record in the world and is one of 
the most severely impacted countries by reason of petroleum operations.
112 
It suffers from 
crude oil spills which occur due to operational failures, pipeline explosions, blow outs, and of 
recent by reason of a rise in sabotage of petroleum infrastructure. A DPR report noted that 
between 1976 and 2005 there were about 9000 incidents of oil spills in the Niger Delta 
Region (NDR) which resulted in the release of approximately 2,662,900 barrels of crude oil 
into the environment.
113
 Between 1989 and 2005 alone, a total of 1, 038, 947 spillages 
occurred.  Out of this volume about 94,600 barrels or nine per cent was recovered. One report 
has concluded that the average annual crude oil spills in Nigeria is equivalent to that released 
in the Valdez oil spill disaster.
114
 Nigeria also suffers environmental degradation from 
refining, frequent pipeline leakages, transportation of petroleum products, and failure to 
properly plug abandoned wells.  
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Apart from its environmental challenges, Nigeria also struggles to properly monitor the 
movement of petroleum funds, and corporate financial returns from the oil industry. This 
aspect appears even more difficult than environmental regulation. This is due in part to the 
complex nature of the industry which requires adequate capacity on the part of the Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), NNPC, and the DPR, and in part to self dealing politicians 
and IOC officials.
115
 FIRS and DPR have been said to lack adequate capacity to monitor and 
deter creative accounting practices by PEPCs and the result is that millions of dollars are 
allegedly lost annually by Nigeria to creative accounting practices.
116
  
 
A 2006-2008 audit report of the petroleum industry published by the Nigerian Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) noted that royalties due to Nigeria were underpaid 
to the tune of about $2.33 billion. The reason for this was the subjective interpretation of 
volume, pricing and American Petroleum Institute (API) grading variable adopted by 
IOCs.
117
 In the same vein, IOCs have been repeatedly accused of shortchanging the Nigerian 
government annually by resorting to unethical practices, paying huge bribes to regulators and 
government officials.
118
 Financial corruption is possible in the NPI partly because of a lack of 
transparency and accountability in the management of petroleum revenues. This is because 
details of transactions between the FGN and IOCs are often shrouded in secrecy, which 
makes the system prone to fraud and manipulation.
119
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2.8.3  THE CHALLENGE OF POO R UTILISATION OF PET ROLEUM REVENUES  
 
If Nigeria can be excused for a weak local content and poor industry regulation on the basis 
of lack of adequate technology and viable policies, few observers will excuse it for its poor 
management of petroleum revenues. Despite having earned billions of dollars from the 
industry within a 50 year period,
120
 Nigeria remains a predominantly poor country with weak 
infrastructure, a low standard of living, inadequate power and transport, and a high maternal 
mortality.
121
  
 
The reason for this poor state of things is largely due to weak accountability and transparency 
in the management of petroleum revenues in the NPI.
122
 Although the word ‘accountability’ 
is subject to evolving definitions, it basically connotes responsibility for an act or the 
outcome of a series of acts.
123
 The extent to which regulators, managers and operators of the 
petroleum industry of any country are answerable for their actions is important in preventing 
and dissuading financial corruption, and abuse of power. Transparency refers to openness and 
ease of access to understandable information.
124
 Transparency and accountability are 
therefore essential if Nigeria is to succeed in the management of petroleum revenues and to 
that extent, are determining factors for the effectiveness of the industry. In fact the NEITI Act 
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2007 was enacted deliberately to address these challenges. The extent to which it has 
succeeded in its objectives will be analysed in chapter six. 
 
2.9 MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES 
TO PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MANAGEMENT AND 
REGULATION, AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR NIGERIA  
 
The above analysis attempted to establish how law and policy have been combined to 
develop the triune factors in Norway and Brazil. It established that strategies differ from 
country to country depending on several factors. USA, Britain, Australia and Canada did not 
champion local content through NOCs, but relied mainly on regulations and regulatory 
agencies. This was possible because of indigenous capacity and sound infrastructure in those 
developed economies. In fact it is arguable that the UK’s privatisation of British Petroleum in 
1988 is evidence that the UK did not consider an NOC an essential tool for protecting its 
interests in the British petroleum industry.  
 
Some countries have developed strong NOCs, but are weak on other aspects. For instance 
although Angola’s Sonangol is not in the class of Statoil and Petrobras, it is appreciably 
efficient in managing Angola’s petroleum industry.125 But the utilisation of petroleum 
revenues for the development of Angola is another thing however. Al Kasim and others note 
that while the Angolan regime is generally perceived to be corrupt, its petroleum industry is 
professionally managed.
126
 Similarly although Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
and Russia’s GAZPROM are relatively competent operators in their own right, Iran and 
Russia have struggled with equitable application of petroleum revenues, and corruption 
issues.
127
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From a holistic perspective, it is arguable that the Angolan petroleum industry cannot be said 
to be properly managed as long as the masses reek in poverty. For it is only a matter of time 
before the poverty in the wider society begins to negatively impact the Angolan petroleum 
industry. This is the case in Nigeria, Iraq and in Libya. Any meaningful petroleum industry 
reform will have to seek to improve the triune factors in a significant way, and specifically 
ensure that petroleum revenues are properly distributed. It is therefore in the interest of IOCs 
and their home countries to look beyond profits, and seek to promote effective distribution of 
petroleum revenues. This is based on the fact that ultimately, the misappropriation of 
petroleum revenues will ‘haunt’ not only the government of those states, but their IOC 
partners. This chapter has shown that the NPI is inefficiently managed due to weak industry 
regulation, a comparably low local content, and poor utilization of petroleum revenues.  
 
Cognisant of the need for change, Nigeria began a process of holistic industry reform in 
1999. Of these efforts, the PIB 2012 is without doubt the most comprehensive and far 
reaching. First Nigeria developed policies for the various aspects of the industry, and laws in 
that regard. 
128
 It is however important that the reform agenda should be tailored to 
addressing unique and fundamental defects of the industry. It should therefore be geared 
towards ensuring that Nigeria is on the path to effective industry regulation, a significant 
local content, and a sustainable application of petroleum revenues. To that extent, Nigeria 
needs to combine law, policy and good administration, as was the case in Norway and Brazil 
within a people-focused developmental framework. For without this approach, reforms may 
only end up benefiting a few people and making them over-night billionaires, while the rest 
of the population wallow in poverty. The case of the Russian Oligarchs, who rose to immense 
wealth after the fall of the communist era in the early 1990s is a good example. The activities 
of these Oligarchs, who were accused of corruption and abuse of Russia’s privatisation 
                                                 
128
 The National environmental policy of 1989 revised in 1989. Nigeria also enacted  the Harmful Waste 
(Special Criminal Provisions) Act 1988, the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992, the National Oil Spill 
Detection and Response Agency Act 2006 and Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry in Nigeria ( EGASPIN) 2002 , The Nigerian Gas Master Plan of 2008  in pursuance to which fiscal 
incentives to encourage investment in natural gas were set in place, The Nigerian Local Content Policy 
embodied in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010. Policy on the deregulation of 
downstream petroleum products which is to be effected in phases by the PIB and the policy for sustainable 
utilization of petroleum revenues embodied in the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act 2011.  
 59 
 
programmes, dashed the expectations of many Russians that the fall of communism would 
lead to better standards of living.
129
 
 
A post PIB Nigerian social change in order to translate the proposed reforms into reality, for 
the benefit of petroleum model will resemble in many ways the Norwegian model, and in 
some other ways that of Brazil which consists of a partially privatised NOC, and separate 
agencies for policy, and regulation. Nigeria should however seek to make law an instrument 
for effective policy implementation and operators, the government, and the masses.  But if 
law is to be an instrument for policy implementation and social change, it should be publicly 
accessible, general in application, and operate prospectively. Such law should have 
reasonable clarity, be internally consistent and be practicable to comply with. Furthermore 
there should be a genuine congruence between the ought of the law and the can of law, and 
that it should be relatively stable with a congruency between it and enforcement.
130
 A legal 
regime that lacks these attributes may end up being an exercise in futility.  
 
The state is responsible for introducing social change and should discharge this responsibility 
by enacting laws to define ‘patterns of behaviour, and by directing officials to act in new 
ways with respect to sanctions’.131 It is however worth noting that laws cannot by themselves 
solve all the problems of the NPI. Laws can be effective if they are recognised as being only 
one of many tools required to effectively manage and regulate the petroleum industry.
132
 
They are only tools and tools have to be properly utilized to produce desired results.  
 
To achieve a viable petroleum industry however, Nigeria needs to determine what approach 
to regulation and petroleum industry management would fit its unique needs. And to that 
extent, one may therefore legitimately ask, would the discretionary collaborative approach of 
Norway suit Nigeria, or should Nigeria like Brazil, adopt strict and detailed legal regimes as 
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it seeks to develop the NPI? What advantages would the above approaches hold for the NPI 
and what challenges would Nigeria face in adopting either? Determining which legal 
approach, between the flexible or the strict is better, will be difficult, since country 
experience and national context has to be considered. The end however justifies the means in 
and to that extent, an approach that works for a particular country is good for that country. 
The Malaysian model cannot be said to be better than that of Norway, nor the Norwegian 
model better than the Malaysian model. The most important thing is that the various models 
adopted by these countries seem to have led to effective management of their petroleum 
industries. Thus functionality is more important in this case than structure and form. 
 
No country should however expect to rely entirely on one approach but rather each country 
should be ready to change where necessary, and to combine various measures also. This is 
the case with Mexico, which is about to privatise its NOC Pemex after more than 70 years of 
exclusively strict nationalism.
133
 Similarly Brazil adopted a more liberal approach to its 
industry when its policy of exclusive resource nationalism became too burdensome for the 
country to continue.  
 
The peculiar challenges of Nigeria should determine the strategy to be adopted, for instance it 
was shown that Norway relied on a more bottom up and discretionary approach to industry 
regulation and local content development because it was suitable at the time. This was 
possible because it already had an entrenched democratic culture by 1969 and a reasonable 
level of technology which it developed from its hydro power and shipping sectors.  Brazil on 
the other hand relied on a top down and strict legal approach to industry regulation and local 
content development, since unlike Norway; it was desperately in need of petroleum in order 
to drive its local industrialisation agenda.  
 
The discretionary bottom up approach to industry regulation is preferable where 
administrators are trustworthy, capable, independent, and are committed to acting in the 
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interests of the government and the public in general. The advantage of this approach is that 
administrators can address specific issues without requiring a legislative amendment every 
time. This implies they can act with speed, justice and equity and reasonableness, as the case 
determines. Again it is arguable that although the discretionary approach benefits from 
administrative flexibility as against the strict approach, it may have actually been the bane of 
the NPI. For although somewhat similar to Norway’s, the NPI suffered from weak capacity 
and financial corruption as against the integrity and skill with which Norway managed its 
industry.  
 
But a  more prescriptive and strict regime may have actually benefited NNPC more than the 
flexible approach it assumed, since without any mandatory provisions similar to Brazil’s PSC 
Act, NNPC remains what it has essentially been since the days of its predecessor: a debt 
collector and an asset manager .  
 
The strict top down approach is preferable where there is the likelihood that administrators 
may be self-seeking, or are likely to be ‘hijacked’ by a political machinery for corrupt 
purposes. This approach can potentially reduce instances for conflict as it stipulates 
obligations in clear terms. The effect is that it will reduce opportunities for abuse of 
administrative discretion. Such a framework however, will have to be realistic, and seek to 
capture a broad range of challenges of the industry, if it is not to be frustrated, or be too rigid. 
Furthermore it may not work in a country that lacks adequate regulatory capacity to oversee 
the implementation of a broad range of issues 
 
Again strict exclusive resource nationalism may be difficult to apply where a country’s 
reserves are large and may require foreign input. For instance in the 1950s, Brazil could 
afford this approach and conferred exclusive monopoly on Petrobras because it had only 
about 15 million barrels of crude oil.
134
 But Norway could not do this, because unlike Brazil, 
the Ekofisk field discovery ran into billions of barrels of crude oil, and in fact remains 
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Norway’s largest oil field to date.135 Norway therefore needed foreign input, since it had no 
NOC in 1969, and did not have any experience in petroleum production.   
 
Brazil’s enactment of Law 2004/1953 in retrospect was a stroke of genius, since foreign 
competition from IOCs like Chevron, Shell and Agip may have stifled the growth of 
Petrobras during its fledging years. This has been the scenario where Nigeria still largely 
depends on IOCs, fifty years later. And a ‘stifled’ Petrobras would have indirectly affected 
Brazil’s local content development since Brazil anchored the growth of the industry on the 
strength of the firm.  
 
Technological advancement in 1969 also meant that Norway had reduced fears of domination 
from foreign firms, unlike Brazil which was reeling under economic and political instability 
in the 1940s and 1950s, and thus required a monopolistic protection of its industry. Another 
important factor remains that with a low corruption index, Norway could adopt a flexible 
approach by ‘entrusting’ its petroleum industry to administrative regulators who were 
expected to exercise their discretion in the interests of the state. But such ‘entrusting’ to 
regulators who struggle with integrity and commitment can result in significant abuses of 
power.  
 
It may be right to say that law played a more significant role in the growth of Brazil’s 
petroleum industry more than it has done in Nigeria or Norway. For although guided by a 
general legal framework, Norway relied equally on co-operation between its administrators, 
labour and industry, and even till date adopts a bottom up approach to industry management. 
But although law played a lesser role in Norway, its discretionary approach has also been 
very successful given that Statoil remains the dominant player in the NCS and environmental 
regulation in the NCS is considered very robust. A careful consideration is therefore required 
in the case of Nigeria before choosing to emulate a particular model. This requires an 
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objective evaluation of the merits and demerits of the various approaches, be weighed against 
Nigeria’s capacity, needs and objectives.  
 
The rest of this thesis will be dedicated to analysing the reform agenda of the federal 
government and the extent to which such will be able to address the current challenges of the 
NPI. It will therefore consider what pattern of legal reform will positively impact regulation, 
local content, and the application of petroleum revenues to a mould comparable to Norway 
and Brazil but adaptable to Nigeria’s particular context. This is because any disregard of 
current challenges and limitations in Nigeria, may make any legislative and institutional 
attempts at industry reform to be cosmetic.  
 
If effective regulation is an integral part of the effectiveness of any petroleum industry as 
demonstrated in this chapter, then there is need for Nigeria to pay serious attention to it. The 
next chapter will analyse Nigeria’s regulatory framework for the NPI, noting its strengths and 
weaknesses, and will make recommendations for reform in the light of comparisons that will 
be drawn from other jurisdictions. 
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3  C H A P T E R  T H R E E :  T H E  I M P E R A T I V E  O F  
V I A B L E  R E G U L A T I O N  A S  A  S I N E  Q U A  N O N  F O R  
A  F U N C T I O N A L  N I G E R I A N  P E T R O L E U M  
I N D U S T R Y   
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
Chapter two identified robust regulation as being among indicators of functionality and 
effectiveness in any petroleum industry. It was noted that while Norway and Brazil have 
invested in developing vibrant regulatory systems, Nigeria has struggled to co-ordinate its 
various regulatory agencies. This has resulted in weak regulation which plays out in massive 
oil spills and continuous gas flaring. The consequence is that the Niger Delta Region (NDR), 
which hosts much of the NPI, is negatively impacted, environmentally. Chapter two also 
argued for a holistic reform of the NPI which should include a robust regulatory framework 
in the interest of the public, and companies operating in the industry.  
 
This chapter will analyse Nigeria’s approach to the regulation of its petroleum industry, in the 
light of ongoing reform initiatives. It argues that in the light of limitations of administrative 
regulation, Nigeria should seek complementary approaches to administrative regulation in the 
form of private citizen participation. To that degree, it proposes that regulatory litigation and 
a comprehensive whistle blower regime can complement perceived weaknesses of Nigeria’s 
administrative regulators. Thus the chapter asks the question: in the light of Nigeria’s 
regulatory constraints what role can private citizens play as an alternative/complement to 
administrative regulation? But first, it is appropriate to investigate what is meant by 
regulation.  
 
3.2 A SHORT DISCOURSE ON REGULATION 
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Scholarly perspectives of regulation are largely dependent on disciplinary involvement. Thus 
legal scholars view it as legal instruments, economists as a tool to address market failures, 
sociologists, as control, while public administrators view regulation from an authority 
perspective.
1
 The conventional view however is to see regulation as the ‘administrative 
policing of a private activity with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest.’2  
 
Regulatory activity entails the issuance of a specific set of commands to be applied by a body 
devoted to that purpose.
3
 It is usually, although not exclusively, aimed at the furtherance of 
public interest.
4
 In a broader sense, it could imply all forms of social control or influence, in 
which case ‘all mechanisms affecting behaviour whether these be state-derived or from other 
sources…are deemed regulatory’.5 There is the legal/moral divide from which regulation may 
ensue, thus commitment to a deeply religious conviction may regulate behaviour beyond 
legislative requirements. It could also stem from moral or other social norms. For purposes of 
analysing the regulatory framework of the NPI, various regulatory approaches used by 
Norway, Brazil, and Britain, will be considered. 
 
Government regulatory activity may entail passage of enabling or prescriptive laws. Enabling 
laws are used to authorise courses of action. For instance in the NPI, they are used to clothe 
upstream PEPCs with exclusive rights to work and win oil and gas resources found within 
their concession areas.
6
 Other laws are enacted to protect the right of international oil 
companies (IOCs) to transfer monies outside the country without restrictions, and grant tax 
reliefs and tax holidays where necessary.
7
 Prescriptive regulations on the other hand 
determine operational limits for purposes of environmental protection, health and safety, 
returns to the government, disclosure of oil resources etc. They are usually backed with 
sanctions which are imposed on defaulting firms. 
                                                 
1
See David Levi-Faur, 'Regulation and Regulatory Governance' in David Levi-Faur (ed), Handbook on the 
Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2011) 3-6 
2 
Barry Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation, ( New York, Columbia University Press, 1980) 
3 
Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation (Oxford, 1999) 2 
4 
Christensen JG, 'Public Interest Regulation Reconsidered : From Capture to Credible Commitment' 
(Regulation at the Age of Crisis: ECPR Regulatory Governance Standing Group, 3rd Biennial Conference, 
2010) <http://regulation.upf.edu/dublin-10-papers/1J1.pdf> accessed 9 March 2013  
5
 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave (n 3) 2  
6
 S 2 of the Petroleum Act  
7
 They include the Petroleum Act 1969 and the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 1995 etc.  
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Although regulations are generally aimed at achieving socially desirable goals, or at 
preventing the occurrence of wrongful conduct, they are not always implemented efficiently, 
nor obeyed. This is because a regulator may lack jurisdictional, technological and financial 
capacity, may be ‘captured’,8 corrupt, or be outrightly incompetent. Where this happens in a 
particular industry, the outcome is usually regulatory failure.
9
 In contrast to regulatory 
failure, regulatory quality is the outcome of efficient regulatory regimes which are 
characterized by clarity, cost effectiveness, transparency and accountability.
10
  
 
Various regulatory strategies exist and are often crucial in determining the impact of a 
regulatory activity. They include command and control, wealth deployment, harnessing of 
markets, information and education, direct interference and the conferment of protected 
rights.
11
 A strategy that is successful in one industry may be unsuccessful in another. Multiple 
regulatory strategies are therefore often employed in the petroleum industry due to its 
complex nature. They range from conferring incentives, imposition of mild and stiff fines, 
cancellation of concessions, sanctions, imprisonment, and in extreme cases, the death penalty. 
For example, while Nigeria imposes the death penalty for sabotage of petroleum 
infrastructure, it imposes fines for gas flaring, and seeks to regulate gas flaring by granting 
tax incentives to operators who comply with its gas policies.
12
  
 
The command and control approach appears to be the most prominent and widely used. Its 
effectiveness is however premised on the existence of adequate regulatory capacity, credible 
commitment and well thought out detailed rules which capture almost every conceivable 
                                                 
8
 The phrase ‘regulatory capture’ refers to a situation where a regulator becomes so close to the industry that in 
effect it begins to regulate for the industry rather than on behalf of the state. See Christensen JG (n 4) 
9 Investment Climate Advisory Services, ‘Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries’ (2010) Working 
Paper 55645, Regulation for Better Growth <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/07/13/000334955_20100713050729/R
endered/PDF/556450WP0Box0349461B0GovReg01PUBLIC1.pdf> accessed 15 November 2013 
10
 OECD , Building Capacity for Regulatory Quality, Stocktaking Paper 11 delivered at the 29th Session of the 
Public Governance Committee ,International Energy Agency, Paris  
<http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/PGC(2004)11&docLanguage=En> 
accessed 7 May 2013 
11 
Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave (n 3) 34 
12
 In 1975 the Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act Cap P. 12 LFN 2004 and s 3(2) of 
AGRA 1979, Cap A. 25 LFN 2004, see also Ibironke T. Odumosu, ‘Transferring Alberta's Gas Flaring 
Reduction Regulatory Framework to Nigeria: Potentials and Limitations’ (2007) 44 Alberta L. Rev. 863  
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risk.
13
 Social and economic regulations are also employed in the petroleum industry. Social 
regulations are aimed at the protection of the citizenry, health and safety and the human 
environment. Economic regulations include licensing, taxation and the granting of incentives 
where necessary and are mainly concerned with the contractual orderings between 
governments and operators.
14
   
 
3.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATION TO THE PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY  
 
Petroleum operations are complex and technical, as petroleum firms often operate in very 
difficult terrains like swamps, offshore, and deep offshore. Accidents may result in the loss of 
lives.
15
 Furthermore oil spills and well blow outs can result in the loss of property in addition 
to environmental pollution.
16
 The efficient regulation of such an industry is thus a sine qua 
non for high quality management.
17
 
 
                                                 
13P.H. Lindøe, and others, ‘Empowered Agents or Empowered Agencies? Assessing the Risk  Regulatory 
Regimes in the Norwegian and US Offshore Oil and Gas  Industry’ (2011) Paper delivered at ESREL-
conference 8. 
<http://www.uis.no/getfile.php/risk.uis.no/Robust%20Regulation/Lind%C3%B8e,%202011,%20Empowered%2
0agents%20or%20empowered%20agencies.%20Assessing%20the%20Risk%20regulatory%20regimes%20in%
20the%20Norwegian%20and%20US%20offshore%20oil%20and%20gas%20industry.pdf > accessed 7 July 
2012  
14Yohannes K.G. Mariam, ‘ Environmental Sustainability and Regulation: To-Down  
Versus Bottom-Up Regulation’ (2001) Munich Personal RePEc Archive <http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/413/1/MPRA_paper_413.pdf> accessed 2 May 2013 
15
 In 1980, 123 persons perished in the Kieland disaster when an oil rig sunk in the North Sea, Kjell Hausken 
and Jun Zhuang, ‘The impact of Disaster on the Strategic Interaction between Company an Government’ (2012)  
Vol 221 European Journal of Operational Research 
16
 They range from upstream (ultra-deep offshore, deep offshore, and onshore), midstream to the downstream, 
and from production to refining and distribution. 
17
 Productivity Commission Research Report, ‘Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil 
and Gas) Sector’ (2009) 316 <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/87923/upstream-
petroleum.pdf> accessed 30 April 2013, Rauf Gönenç and others, ‘The Implementation and the Effects of 
Regulatory Reform: Past Experience and Current Issues’ (2001) No. 32 OECD Economic Studies < 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/reform/2731922.pdf> accessed 30 April 2013 , Preben H. Lindoe and others, ‘Robust 
Offshore Risk Regulation – an assessment of US, UK and Norwegian approaches’ (2012) 
<http://www.uis.no/getfile.php/risk.uis.no/Robust%20Regulation/Lindoe,%202012,%20Robust%20Offshore%2
0Risk%20Regulation%20%E2%80%93%20an%20assessment%20of%20US,%20UK%20and%20Norwegian%
20approaches,%20ESREL%20conference.pdf> accessed 30 April 2013 , In July 2012,  a fuel tanker explosion 
killed over 200 people in Port Harcourt, Rivers State Nigeria, see   Chukwudi Akasike and Mike Odiegwu, 
‘tanker Fire Kills 200’ Punch (July 13 2012) <http://www.punchng.com/news/tanker-fire-kills-200/ > Accessed 
30 April 2013 
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The risks associated with the petroleum industry are not restricted to developing countries 
with weak regulatory capacity. Serious accidents have occurred in developed countries 
known for relative regulatory efficiency. For instance the BP Gulf of Mexico 2010 incident 
resulted in the death of 11 oil workers, and about 4.9 million barrels of oil was spilled into the 
environment.
18
 There was also the Piper Alpha oil incident in the British side of the North 
Sea which resulted in the loss of 167 lives, and the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989 resulted in the 
loss of approximately 10.8 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Alaska.
19
 Similarly in 
Nigeria, oil related pollution and accidents have led to much loss of lives, and much 
environmental degradation. It was pointed in chapter two that between 1976 and 2005, there 
were about 9000 incidents of oil spills in the NDR in which over 2,662,900 barrels of crude 
oil were spilled into the environment. Between 1989 and 2005 alone, a total of 1, 038, 947 
spillages occurred.  Out of this volume about 94,600 barrels were recovered, representing a 
figure of about nine per cent. One report has concluded that the average annual crude oil 
spills in Nigeria is equivalent to that released in the Valdez oil spill disaster.
20
 In order to 
minimise these risks and ensure that petroleum is sustainably extracted, many governments 
establish processes and establish regulatory institutions to ensure compliance with laws and 
standards in line with international best practices.
21
 
 
For the managers of the NPI, and in many developing countries, the challenge is how to 
adequately establish independent and capable administrative agencies manned by persons of 
integrity, who work within a proper legal framework.
22
 This challenge is heightened by the 
fact that many developing countries rely heavily on petroleum resources for the running of 
their governments; a fact which subjects sustainable extraction and environmental protection 
to economic considerations.
23
 Regulators also have to contend with the issue of a lack of 
                                                 
18 
See Al-Maied and others, ‘A sustainable Approach to Controlling Oil Spills’ (2012) Vol 113 Journal of 
Environmental Management  
19
 The Mariner Group, 'Oil Spill History' ( Mariner Group, 2011)<http://www.marinergroup.com/oil-spill-
history.htm> accessed 8/04/12 
20
 See Chapter 2, para 8.6.2. See also Federal Ministry of Environment, ‘Niger Delta resource Damage 
Assessment and Restoration Project: Phase 1 Scoping Project (2006). 
2006)<https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Hj6QhYvS6PYJ:cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/niger_delta
_natural_resource_damage_assessment_and_restoration > accessed 1 April 2012. 
21 Patrick Luff, ‘Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation ‘(2011) 64 Rutgers L. Rev. 73 .  
22
A framework that is unequivocally clear , in line with best practices, and enacted for the benefit of operators 
and regulators,  
23
 See Tina Hunter, ‘Sustainable Socio-economic Extraction of Australian Offshore Petroleum Resources 
Through Legal Regulation: Is it Possible?’ (2011) 29 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 209  
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regulatory co-operation among agencies; an issue that has weakened regulatory quality and 
imposed undue regulatory burdens on operators and governments.
24
  
 
The attainment of that fine balance between developed legal institutional frameworks that are 
managed by capable individuals on the one hand, while on the other hand are regulating 
without being unduly burdensome on operators, is the hallmark of effective petroleum 
industry regulation. J. Marshall Burgess notes that ‘…an efficient regulatory system 
decreases investor uncertainty, reduces costs, and improves project cycle times. Thus the 
province's ability to attract investment capital is enhanced.’25 The next segment will consider 
the Norwegian and Nigerian approaches to petroleum industry regulation in order to 
determine lessons that can be learned for Nigeria.  
 
3.4 THE NORWEGIAN APPROACH TO PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
REGULATION 
 
Norway adopts a more flexible approach to petroleum industry regulation.
26
 In chapter two, it 
was shown that Norway relies on various agencies and government institutions to regulate 
operators in the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD) offers technical support to the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
(NMPE).
27
 The Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), which is a parastatal of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Inclusion), is responsible for health, safety and environment (HSE) 
issues.
28
 The Oil Taxation Office in the Ministry of Finance collects revenues and taxes, 
while the State Pollution Control Authority of the Ministry of Environment regulates the 
                                                 
24
 Productivity Commission Research Report, ‘Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil 
and Gas) Sector’ (2009) <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/87923/upstream-petroleum.pdf> 
accessed 30 April 2013 34 
25
 J. Marshall Burgess,  ‘Effective and Efficient Regulation in Nova Scotia’ (2003)  26 Dalhousie L.J. 303  
26
 Productivity Commission Research Report, ‘Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil 
and Gas) Sector’ (2009) http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/87923/upstream-petroleum.pdf 
accessed 27 March 2014> accessed 27 March 2014, 315 
27
 The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘About Us’ < http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/> accessed 27 March 
2014  
28
 Petroleum Safety Authority, ‘About Us’ <http://www.ptil.no/role-and-area-of-
responsibility/category916.html> accessed 27 March 2014 
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external environment. There is also the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affaires which 
maintains contingency measures on pollution of the Norwegian waters.
29
 
 
In contrast to Nigeria however, Norway adopts a bottom up, more integrated, principle-based 
approach to its petroleum industry regulation. An approach that is flexible and generalised. 
Thus rather than rely on detailed rules, its regulators establish industry standards and allow 
operators to comply by adapting flexible internal standards.
30
 This approach which can be 
loosely referred to as ‘self-regulation’ or ‘enforced self-regulation’ is however dependent on 
the readiness of operators to comply, coupled with adequate regulatory capacity and 
resources. Without compliance from the regulated however, this approach may be ineffective 
as it relies on understanding on the part of both the regulator, and the regulated. 
 
Norway emphasizes engagement and collaboration between labour, industry and government 
on an almost equal basis, and as participants in developing a problem solving approach to 
operational regulation.
31
 Regulatory conflicts are resolved through mediation and recourse to 
higher administrative authorities, rather than through litigation.
32
 It may appear that the 
bottom up approach has been successful in Norway partly due to the fact that its petroleum 
industry is closely compacted, with a closely knit relationship between regulators, operators 
and unions.
33
  
 
Norway uses legal standards widely for offshore risk regulation. It issues standards signifying 
very explicit norms, but gives a wide linguistic berth in order to give regulators discretion as 
situations arise. For example, it issues industrial standards that reflect sound professional 
                                                 
29
 Getting Jane Wesenberg  and Sondre Dyrland, ‘Norway’ \92009) in Craig Spurn (ed), Oil Regulation in 28 
Jurisdictions Worldwide <http://www.kluge.no/arch/img.aspx?file_id=9084808&ext=.pdf> accessed 9th 
October 2012 
30
 See Preben H. Lindoe and others, ‘Robust Offshore Risk Regulation – an assessment of US, UK and 
Norwegian approaches’ (2012) 
<http://www.uis.no/getfile.php/risk.uis.no/Robust%20Regulation/Lindoe,%202012,%20Robust%20Offshore%2
0Risk%20Regulation%20%E2%80%93%20an%20assessment%20of%20US,%20UK%20and%20Norwegian%
20approaches,%20ESREL%20conference.pdf> accessed 30 April 2013, 3  
31
 For instance see the Working Environment Act, as amended in 2012, Act of 17. June 2005 No. 62, and the 
Framework Regulation of the PSA < http://www.ptil.no/framework/category408.html> accessed 2nd February 
2013 
32
 See Preben H. Lindoe (n 30) 5  
33
 Ibid 5 
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practice or ‘reasonable man standard’ in a specific field of activity. Legal standards, 
compared to explicit requirements, make the connection between the regulatory framework 
and the regulated activities more obvious.
34
 Norway uses legislation to establish a binding 
framework for mutual activities, essentially relying on principles based regulatory 
framework.
35
  
 
Mutuality between regulators and industry implies that Norway assumes that the industry is 
willing to co-operate with regulators to attain an effective industry. Wide regulatory 
discretion also implies that Norway trusts and expects regulators to work with credible 
commitment and to keep up with innovations in the petroleum industry.
36
 Thus in effect, 
administrative regulators rather than legislators, occupy the most prominent position in the 
regulation of the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
 
3.5 THE NIGERIAN APPROACH TO PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
REGULATION  
 
3.5.1  COMMAND AND CONTROL  
 
Structurally, Nigeria adopts a top down command and control regulatory approach to the NPI 
and for that purpose, authorises compliance monitoring agencies are empowered to issue 
detailed regulations and enforce sanctions.
37
 Nigeria has different rule making agencies for 
                                                 
34
 Ibid 1  
35
 Tina Hunter (n 66 chapter 1), 227 
36
 Ibid, 27  
37
 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave (n 3), 107, A Hopkins, ‘Risk-Management and Rule  Compliance: Decision-
making in Hazardous Industries’ (2011) 49 Safety Science, 49, 110-120, There is currently over sixty Acts of 
the National Assembly that border on the petroleum industry one way or another. They include the  Territorial 
Waters Act, Oil in Navigable Waters Act, the Offshore Revenues (Registration of Grants) Act Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act of 1978 The Petroleum Act 1969; and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(1999), the  Associated Gas Reinjection Act CAP A25 LFN, 2004,  the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin 
Production Sharing Contracts Act, Ch D3 LFN 2004  Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act No. 17 of 1965 Motor 
Spirits (Returns) Act  Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act No. 73 of 1977 Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (Projects) Act No. 94 of 1993;Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency 
(Establishment) Act 2003  Petroleum Equalisation Fund (Management Board etc.) Act No. 9, of 1975 Petroleum 
(Special) Trust Fund Act; Petroleum Technology Development Fund Act 
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various aspects of the NPI. The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) remains however 
the principal regulator by virtue of the fact that it executes most of the minster of petroleum’s 
(the ‘minister’) powers, to whom it is subservient.38   
 
Although Nigeria has detailed laws for almost every aspect of the NPI, most laws and 
regulations are old and unsuited to adequately tackle current realities and challenges.
39
  The 
difficulty of enacting up to date and comprehensive rules to capture industry needs and keep 
up with technological innovations, is a major drawback to the top down command and 
control approach. In this regard, Baldwin and Cave observe that: 
…even if it is assumed that a regulator knows the beneficial value of particular levels of 
cleanliness in a river, and is clear on social objectives, setting the optimal levels of allowable 
pollution…would require data on the differing abatement costs of all the various polluters on 
the river bank. The efficient level of pollution will, indeed, be specific to each enterprise yet 
the regulator has usually to produce a generalised rule.
40
 
 
Another limitation to the command and control approach is its inflexibility and reactivity, and 
sometimes outright unrealistic nature. This limitation is often evidence of a lack of wide 
consultation. A ready example is the Associated Gas Re-injection Act’s (AGRA) 1979, which 
required operators stop gas flaring by 1984. This was definitely a top down command, but 
has been proved to be unrealistic since Nigeria lacked, and still lacks purchasers for its 
trapped gas, or the infrastructure to make compliance with AGRA commercially viable.
41
 
                                                 
38 They include DPR which is the main industry regulator. DPR’s rules are made in pursuance to the powers of 
the minister and they include: Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Regulation 1965 Associated Gas Re-injection 
(Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations 1979 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969 Petroleum 
Regulations 1967 Oil Terminals (Terminal Dues) Regulations 1965 Petroleum Refining Regulations 1977 Crude 
Oil (Transportation and Shipment) Regulations 1984 Oil in Navigable Waters Regulations 1968 Mineral Oils 
(Safety) Regulations 1997 Oil and Gas pipelines Regulations 1995, EGASPIN. NOSDRA (oil spills), has also 
issued the National Guidelines and Regulations for Oil Spill Recovery; Clean-up, Remediation and Damage 
Assessment (CPAP 2009/2010) and the National Guidelines and Standards for Oil Spill Compensation for 
Nigeria(CPAP 2010/2011). NCDMB (Local Content), and NIMASA (marine environment), also have 
regulations bordering on the operations of oil companies.  
39 For instance, the Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Regulation 1965 and Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations 1969 , are over 40 years old 
40
 Baldwin R and Cave M, (n 3), 109 
41
 See Ibironke T. Odumosu, ‘Transferring Alberta”s Gas Flaring Reduction Regulatory Framework to Nigeria: 
Potentials and Limitations’ (2007) 44 Alberta L. Rev, 890 
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And 30 years since AGRA, Nigeria has been unable to develop the infrastructure or gas 
market required to stop gas flaring.
42
  
 
The hard stance of the command approach can result in low, if not impossible compliance, 
and eventually cause a regulator to capitulate by issuing a series of exemptions in order to 
ensure business continues unhindered.
43
 Since the command and control approach aims at 
addressing every conceivable mischief that may arise and reduce regulatory discretion, its 
rules are sometimes over detailed and bogus.  
 
Additionally, the command and control approach is often adversarial and lacks the level of 
industry collaboration sometimes required to make compliance possible. To wriggle out of 
the tough stance of unbending regulators, operators sometimes resort to litigation. Litigation 
however frustrates regulatory activity, as injunctions and counter injunctions may be granted 
against the regulator while the arduous long process of litigation continues.
44
  
 
 
3.5.2  COLLABORATION IN NIGERIA 
 
Although formally, Nigeria adopts a top down approach, in practice its various regulators 
adopt different approaches. For example, DPR and the Nigerian Content Development 
Monitoring board (NCDMB),
45
 adopt a more ‘collaborative’ approach. On the other hand, 
                                                 
42
 Ibironke T. Odumosu, ‘Transferring Alberta”s Gas Flaring Reduction Regulatory Framework to Nigeria: 
Potentials and Limitations’ (2007) 44 Alberta L. Rev  865 
43
 See G. S. Braut and P.H. Lindoe (n 53). For instance NOGICDA’s requirement that Nigeria attain an average 
of 70 per cent Local Content within three years is unrealistic and may lead to an amendment of the law in order 
for the minister to be able to legally grant waivers to operators to continue business. Until such amendment is 
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capital, technology and foreign human resources.  
44
 For instance in 2012, NOSDRA imposed a $5 billion fine on Shell for a 2011 oil spill in the Bonga offshore 
oil field. Clara Nwachukwu, ‘Bonga Oil spill: Presidency Approves $5bn Fine against Shell’ Vanguard (Abuja, 
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45
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NOSDRA and NIMASA adopt a more top down approach. Neither approach has been 
effective however.
46
 
 
From the collaborative stance, operators in the NPI are sometimes given some discretion to 
apply industry standards that reflect ‘good oil field practice.47 They are also expected to 
‘adopt all practicable precautions including the provision of up-to-date equipment’, in order 
to prevent pollution, and if pollution does occur they must take, `prompt steps to control and, 
if possible, end it’.48  
 
Nigeria’s selective application of the collaborative approach has nevertheless been 
ineffective, as will be shown presently. For rather than apply the ‘best available technology’ 
in complying with regulatory directives, operators in the NPI have been known to employ sub 
standards for economic reasons.
49
  DPR and NCDMB are subject to the minister of petroleum 
(the minister), who doubles as chairman of NNPC (a majority owner of JVs/PSCs). These 
relationships make some collaboration between DPR/NNPC and invariably IOCs, inevitable. 
The drawback to this is that rather than collaborate as ‘equals’ for the benefit of both parties, 
this arrangement appears tilted to the advantage of the industry more than to the Nigerian 
people. The result is weak and half hearted enforcement of regulatory requirements.  
 
While a less adversarial approach has led to robust regulation in Norway, it has resulted in 
‘capture’ in Nigeria, as DPR is seen more as a regulator for industry than regulator of 
industry. 
50
 DPR is not surprisingly, often viewed as the ‘weaker’ and ‘captured’ party in its 
relationship with industry since it lacks independence, capacity, funding and expertise, which 
                                                 
46
 Inadequate regulation of the NPI results in negative impact on the human environment, loss of funds for the 
government and financial corruption. These factors ultimately affect the quality of the industry as a whole. 
 
48
 Reg 25 Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations of 1969  
49
 See Richard Steiner ,  ‘Double Standard: Shell Practices in Nigeria Compared With i-International Standards 
to Prevent and Control Pipeline Oil Spills and the Deepwater Horizon’ , (2010) 
<www.milieudefence.nl/publicaties/rapoten/double-standard> accessed 11 May 2012 
50
 In its website, DPR lists NNPC as its industry partner, although it is meant to regulate NNPC. Invariably, 
IOCs are also to be regarded as ‘industry partners’ of DPR. While this approach is not inherently defective, 
collaboration can lead to capture in the event that there are not sufficient checks on regulatory activity. DPR, 
‘Industry Partners’ (2013) <http://www.dprnigeria.com/> accessed 1 May 2013  
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have made impossible any ‘equal’ collaboration with industry.51 The effectiveness of a 
collaborative approach to regulation is dependent on the capacity and credibility of the 
regulators. 
 
The more adversarial, top down approach adopted by NIMASA and NOSDRA,
52
 has not 
been very effective either, due at least in part to the fact that regulators are often restricted by 
inadequate funding and human capacity, coupled with a lack of regulatory independence. 
Furthermore, although NOSDRA has shown some zeal at regulation of petroleum spills, its 
jurisdiction appears to be limited to response to oil spills, and not to prevention of spills.
53
 
Accordingly, various strategies have not resulted in effective regulation of the NPI. This may 
indicate that factors beyond ‘strategy’ may be responsible for the current state of things. Thus 
the factors responsible for weak regulatory quality in the NPI will be considered in the next 
segment.  
 
3.6 FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR WEAK REGULATION IN THE 
NPI 
 
3.6.1  INADEQUATE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND POLITICAL WILL 
 
Government support for effective regulation of such a capital intensive industry is invaluable. 
Nigeria’s strong central government and relatively weak regulatory institutions means that 
effective regulation is heavily reliant on a committed political will. For most of Nigeria’s 
history as a petroleum producing country (PPC) however, regulation appears to have been 
relegated to the background in favour of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), 
                                                 
51
 In contrast to the credible commitment theory, capture theorists argue that as regulators and regulatees operate 
in a confined space, overtime, their closeness reaches an extent where regulators consciously or unconsciously 
begin to regulate in the interests of regulatees rather than that of the public. One reason why effective regulation 
of Nigeria’s oil and gas resources has been crippled is due to the extent to which IOCs have entrenched 
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every vital Government office in Nigeria. Rose M, 'Shell had "Access to Everything" in Nigeria: WikiLeaks' 
(2010) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/09/us-nigeria-shell-idUSTRE6B80HL20101209> accessed 
13/06/12 
52
 These agencies are not under the ministry of petroleum, but environment, 
53
 Ss 5,6 and 7 NOSDRA Act 
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and PEPCs. This may be underscored by the fact that the latter produce petroleum which 
funds the Nigerian government machinery.  
 
Inadequate regulation of an NOC and other operators can result in a situation where operators 
become too big to control and express irritation at regulatory efforts. This in fact was the 
position in Brazil’s petroleum industry before 1997, where Petrobras was given a preferred 
status when compared to the erstwhile regulator, the National Petroleum Council.
54
 Where an 
NOC, and PEPCs become uncontrollable however, regulatory capture becomes easy and the 
result can be weak management of the industry. For instance, if the directors of NNPC or 
IOCs in Nigeria feel they can bypass zealous regulators, and have direct access to the 
Minister or the political class, they are likely to express disdain and impatience with 
regulators who insist that things be done properly. 
 
Government support for industry regulation is therefore imperative either through preventive 
measures or in the enforcement of fines where necessary. In the wake of the 2010 BP Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill, the United States government required BP to set aside $20 billion in a 
compensation fund, even before the issue of fault was determined.
55
 And BP complied. The 
Nigerian government however has been unable to take a strong stance with IOCs for most of 
its history and has rather feted with them, even where there are clear violations of 
environmental and safety standards.  
 
IOCs operating in Nigeria have been indicted by Nigerian courts,
56
 and national and 
international organisations for involvement in gross environmental violations. And the legal 
defence of sabotage which is mainly relied upon by IOCs has not always availed them.
57
 For 
instance, the operations of Shell which is a joint venture partner with NNPC are said to have 
resulted in substantial environmental damage to Ogoniland. This was the finding of a 2011 
                                                 
54 In fact Ernesto Geisel made freedom from interference from Brazil’s  ministry of Mines, a precondition to 
becoming head of Petrobras in 1968. See Adilson De Oliveira, ‘Brazil’s Petrobras: Strategy and Performance’  
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UNEP report which also indicated that the environmental remediation of Ogoniland will 
require over $1 billion, within a 25 year period.
58
 Another report alleged that Shell uses 
double standards in its application of technology that can be used in reducing oil spills in 
Nigeria.
59
 If IOCs and other PEPCs are known to violate Nigeria’s environmental laws, it 
goes without saying that political commitment, as in the case of the USA and BP, is required, 
to address some of these challenges. Thus government will have to require firms to operate 
not only within the confines of the law, but also with a high standard of ethics. 
3.6.2  INADEQUATE REGULATOR Y CAPACITY  
 
Bertelli and Whitford argue that independent regulatory institutions are indication of a 
country’s regard for the rule of law, and integrity, and can benefit a country through 
increased foreign direct investments.
60
 And although independent regulation does not always 
guarantee better industry performance, the lack of it can impact performance negatively. For 
instance, the now disbanded Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the USA was reported 
to have lost its independence by unduly relying on BP. This factor was partly blamed for 
regulatory lapses that led to the 2010 spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
61
  
 
Nigeria’s ruling class perceive NNPC as the ‘basket of the nation’ and have paid more 
attention to it than to DPR. Consequently the regulator is effectively denied the backing 
required to discharge its duties effectively.
62
 DPR and other regulators struggle from 
inadequate funding,
63
 and what little is allocated to it, is not always released to it timeously. 
For example, of the 35.7 billion naira appropriated for DPR in 2012, only 26.02 billion naira 
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had been released by the third quarter of the year.
64
 Lack of funding weakens DPR’s 
equipment base, required for such a technology intensive industry.  As at 2012, it still relied 
on equipment acquired over forty years ago, and uses paper data collection systems in a 
computer age.  
Weak funds means DPR is unable to effectively train and retrain its staff in order to be 
professionally competent and to regulate innovatively and effectively. Currently, it lacks 
adequate metering equipment to monitor production output, and up-to-date equipment to 
determine the amount of crude oil produced daily in Nigeria.
65
 This gives PEPCs a 
knowledge based edge over DPR which ordinarily should be giving instructions to operators. 
The current director of DPR, Osten Olorunsula, commenting on this challenge aptly asked 
‘...how can you regulate those who know more than you?’66 
 
Funding challenges also means that DPR has to depend on PEPCs and NNPC for logistics 
and funding of regulatory operations. Such dependence has rendered independent and 
effective regulation of the NPI, difficult if not impossible.
67
 Summing up the challenges of 
DPR in this regard, Gboyega and others observe that in reality:  
‘DPR has been treated just like another arm of the NNPC subject to its    directives, those of 
the Ministry, and the presidency. It also is hampered by human and financial capacity 
constraints. As a result, DPR often fails to perform its functions effectively.’68 
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3.6.3  INADEQUATE MONITORIN G OF CRUDE PRODUCTIO N AND PETROLEUM 
REVENUES RECEIPTS 
 
Flowing from the above noted challenges is weak accounting for the amount of petroleum 
produced in the NPI which has been said to have given rise to oil theft, fraud and loss of 
billions of dollars.
69
 DPR and the National Petroleum Investment Management Services 
(NAPIMS), and the Federal Inland Revenue Service, often struggle to determine with 
certainty, the amount of crude oil Nigeria produces daily and has to rely almost exclusively 
on data from IOCs.
70
 This is due to the fact that the financial system in the petroleum industry 
is often complex and requires adequate human resources to monitor. This weakness has 
resulted in alleged sharp practices on the part of IOCs and other operators, and has also given 
room for internal corruption in NNPC. The result is that Nigerians do not know with certainty 
how much petroleum it produces daily.
71
 
 
3.6.4  REGULATORY OVERLAPS  
 
The NPI struggles with inadequate regulatory co-ordination, co-operation, and frequent 
regulatory overlap. DPR which is responsible for regulation of oil spills (at least prevention), 
often conflicts with NOSDRA which regulates clean up of spills after the fact.
72
 Similarly, 
NNPC’s Nigerian Content Division attempts to regulate local content compliance (in part), 
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although the burden for that rests squarely with the NCDMB.
73
 The consequence of such 
overlaps is regulatory friction which frustrates effective regulation, and makes compliance 
unduly burdensome.
74
 Operators are sometimes faced with multiple taxes, fines and sanctions 
which reduces regulator quality in Nigeria.
75
 For instance in 2012 NOSDRA imposed a $5 
billion fine on SNEPCO for a 2011 offshore oil spill at Bonga, even and NIMASA 
additionally imposed a $6 million fine for the same spill.
76
  
 
Cost cutting measures, negligence, and recklessness on the part of IOCs, has often resulted in 
oil spills and accidents, which have harmed the NDR environment. And financial sanctions 
imposed on them for environmental failures are often tampered with caution, because the 
FGN is directly involved in petroleum operations. It is proposed that Nigeria should seek to 
impose deterrent fines on firms with consistently poor safety records, and where necessary, 
terminate their concessions/contracts. Currently, the impact of administrative sanctions 
imposed on IOCs for oil spills, are significantly whittled down because the FGN pays about 
55 per cent of all such sanctions (even where the spill was due to the fault or negligence of 
the IOC). In that regard, it is proposed that Nigeria should by law, make IOCs solely 
responsible for damages caused to the environment by virtue of their negligence and 
recklessness. In such cases, the FGN should not be made to shoulder the burden with IOCs. 
This will position the FGN better, to regulate with less conflict of interest issues, while IOCs, 
will be equally motivated to invest further in environmental protection. 
 
In order to improve regulatory quality, the NPI requires a legal framework that will ensure 
clarity, and is tailored to specific areas of the industry. A specific law will reduce regulatory 
overlaps and undue regulatory burden on operators. In April 2012, a presidential committee 
recommended the winding up of NOSDRA, on the ground that its functions are also 
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performed by DPR and has resulted in undue economic burden for the government.
77
 While 
there is some merit in streamlining regulation of oil spills to one principal agency, it is rather 
proposed that the arm of DPR currently responsible for oil spill regulation, be taken over by 
NOSDRA. The reason is because NOSDRA appears to have shown greater commitment in 
sanctioning operators for oil spills. Secondly it is more separated from the industry and 
NNPC, being that it is supervised not by the minister of petroleum, but by the minister of 
environment.
78
  
 
With increasing global competition for investment capital, a country’s legal certainty and 
respect for the rule of law, have come to feature prominently in informing choices of 
investors.
79
 This fact is actually responsible for the stalling of billions of investment funds 
into the NPI, pending the passage of the PIB.
80
 It is therefore proposed that Nigeria should 
seek the creation of a viable and certain legal and regulatory framework, one in which 
sanctions and fines are imposed across board, and where the opportunities for corruption and 
undue bureaucracy are significantly reduced. 
 
In keeping with modern trends, there may be a need to explore a one stop shop for all 
operators seeking to process permits, make payments, and seeking approvals for local 
content, environmental impact assessment, environmental permits, technical permits, 
environmental impact assessment permits, and budgetary approvals.
 81
 A recent government 
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sponsored report called for the amendment of extant laws, the scrapping of some of the 
agencies, and for more collaboration among operators.
82
 There is also need for some 
consolidation of fiscal regimes in order to prevent multiple taxes, while efforts should be 
geared towards promoting inter agency co-operation.  
 
Certainly, some level of co-operation and regulatory overlap is inevitable in the NPI, but 
there is a need to delineate jurisdictional boundaries of agencies in order to prevent undue 
regulatory burden. An undue regulatory burden reduces Nigeria’s attractiveness as an 
investment destination, and can slow the pace of production in Nigeria.
83
 With companies 
having to comply with directives of various regulatory agencies, there is the tendency that the 
same may lead to undue regulatory burden and induce them to offer bribes in order for 
business to proceed smoothly. Stern and Holder note that ‘regulatory effectiveness can be 
attainable where there is clarity of roles and objectives, autonomy, accountability and its 
processes should be participatory, transparent and predictable.’84 
 
Nigeria also struggles with undue bureaucracy, delays, corruption and inefficiency. For 
example, in 2010, Halliburton, an international oil servicing firm, agreed to pay a fine of $35 
million to the Nigerian government. The fine was in settlement of a criminal charge brought 
against it for offering bribes to Nigerian officials in order to gain lucrative oil contracts.
85
 
Nigeria’s contracting process (from the allocation of oil blocks to granting of approvals for 
various outsourced jobs) in the NPI takes between 18 and 36 months, in contrast to Saudi 
                                                                                                                                                        
Implementing Administrative Simplification : Experiences and Challenges 
<http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/37026688.pdf > accessed 13 November 2012, See also NIPC, ‘One 
Stop Investment Centre’ < http://www.nipc.gov.ng/onestop.html> accessed 29 July 2014 
82
 Recently DPR canvassed the signing of a memorandum of understanding between regulators as the means to 
resolve conflicts among them Stanley Opara, ‘DPR Canvasses Collaboration Among Oil Industry Regulators’ 
Punch(3 January 2013) <http://www.punchng.com/business/energy/dpr-canvasses-collaboration-among-oil-
industry-regulators/> accessed 12 April 2013 
83
 See Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book : the Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness 
(Transaction Publishers 2002) 6, see also Timothy A. Slating and Jay P. Kesan, ‘Making Regulatory Innovation 
Keep Pace with Technological Innovation’ (2011) Wisconsin Law Review 1109 at 1115 
84
 Jon Stern and Stuart Holder, ‘Regulatory Governance: Criteria for Assessing the Performance of Regulatory 
Systems: an Application to Infrastructure Industries in the Developing Countries of Asia’ (1999) Vol 8(1) 
Utilities Policy) 42 
85
 Halliburton Settles Nigeria’s Bribery Claims for $35 Million’ CNN( 22 December 2010) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/12/21/nigeria.halliburton/>accessed 27 March 2014 
 83 
 
Arabia, Kazakhstan and Argentina which take 3-6 months.
86
 All of these give room for self-
dealing and back hand deals which harm the economy and the industry. 
 
The above analysis has noted that regulation is weak in the NPI due to weak legislations, lack 
of regulatory capacity and a weak government will. But what is the way out? How Nigeria 
can overhaul years of regulatory ineffectiveness in order to attain robust and effective 
regulation like Norway’s, will be the focus of the next segment of the chapter. ¬ 
 
3.7 TOWARDS ROBUST REGULATION IN NIGERIA AND THE 
DESIRABILITY OF REFORMS  
 
3.7.1  THE IMPERATIVE OF REGULATORY AUTONOMY  
 
Regulatory autonomy is imperative for impartial regulation. In principle, a regulator should 
be able to impose stiff fines, shut down platforms and production processes, in order to 
ensure laws and guidelines are complied with, without fearing economic or other 
consequences. And even if such regulator is affiliated to a particular ministry, it should enjoy 
some autonomy, subject to oversight supervision.  
Furthermore, promotion, remuneration and tenure of executives of regulatory agencies should 
not be subject to the political process to an extent that will cripple regulatory initiative. The 
recruitment process for regulators is therefore crucial to securing viable and independent 
regulators. For instance, as head of Nigeria’s financial industry, the Governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) enjoys a secured tenure and independence, subject to good 
behaviour.
87
 He can only be removed from office by the president, if his removal is supported 
by a two thirds majority of the Nigerian senate.
88
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When in December 2013, the president of Nigeria asked the governor of the CBN, Lamido 
Sanusi, to turn in his resignation over conflict of interest’s issues, the governor refused on the 
ground that he could only be removed by the Senate.
89
 The president however sought to 
bypass the statutory protection of the governor by suspending him pending investigations.
90
 
Lamido Sanusi has however challenged the legality of his suspension in court although his 
replacement has been confirmed by the Nigerian senate.
91
 
 
Similarly, Nigeria’s judges enjoy a secured tenure except in cases of inability to discharge 
their duty. They are only removable by the president in certain instances, on the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council.
92
 It is proposed that such protection be 
applied to executives in DPR, NOSDRA, NCDMB and other regulators in the NPI, given the 
importance of regulation to human lives, the economy and the environment.  
 
There is also need for adequate funding in order to attain professionalization and adequate 
equipment required to keep up with industry innovations. DPR’s funds should be released on 
time and not be delayed by much government bureaucracy. Furthermore, regulators need a 
legal framework that confers adequate legislative authority in order to authorize regulators to 
impose fines, enforce laws, and if possible, institute legal action. DPR’s jurisdiction should 
be clearly written in order for it to operate with legitimacy in a manner similar to those of 
Brazil’s ANP, and Norway’s NPD, which enjoy legislative backing. 93  
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It was noted earlier that DPR is directly subordinate to the minister, who also chairs NNPC. 
This invariably makes DPR and indirect partner of the IOCs.
94
 But to guarantee regulatory 
independence, there is clearly need to ensure that the minister does not have overarching 
authority over regulators, since this can lead to conflict of interests.    
            
   
Direct government involvement in petroleum operations is largely responsible for the absence 
of regulatory autonomy in Nigeria. By operating through the JV/PSC system, the federal 
government of Nigeria (FGN) has a direct interest in the profits of IOCs, besides taxes. It 
owns an average of 55 per cent in all JVs executed with IOCs. Furthermore, the FGN has an 
85 per cent stake in all PSCs, a factor that perhaps explains why the minister and the 
departments under her are not just concerned about operational regulation, but about 
economic realities and the outcomes of strict enforcement.
95
 
 
And although Nigeria does not own equity in IOCs, the implication of its ownership of an 
average of 55 per cent stake in JVs/PSCs, currently means that NAPIMS’ input is required 
for virtually every major internal decision IOCs take, as the costs are calculated as part of the 
JVs/PSCs. And it would appear that the PIB intends to continue with the JV/PSC tradition.
96
  
 
The advantage of direct government participation is that it gives the government a say in 
virtually every aspect of the industry. There is the prospect of employment, better regulation, 
and better financial intake. But the adverse effect on regulation can negate any such prospects 
due to the likelihood of conflicts of interests. Strict enforcement of laws bordering on the NPI 
can be interpreted as regulation of the FGN and can be easily addressed politically. For 
instance, in May 2013, NIMASA prevented the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Company 
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Limited’s (NLNG) vessels from leaving Bonny by blocking the Bonny channel. It grounded 
its action on breaches of Nigeria’s maritime laws by the NLNG.97  
 
Ordinarily, the issue should have been resolved through the courts or on compliance by 
NLNG with the NIMASA Act 2007, but this was not the case. The blockade was lifted within 
three days following the ‘intervention’ of the minister of petroleum, and the minister of 
transport.
98
 The quick resolution of the dispute was possible because the FGN has 49 per cent 
of the NLNG and would suffer financially by such blockades.  
 
The NIMASA case is one in a series of government interference with regulatory activity, 
owing to the fact that the government is a direct party in most petroleum operations.  Direct 
government participation in itself is not always wrong, as the cases of Norway and Brazil 
have demonstrated. It is however prone to lead to regulatory weakness in countries where 
there is an undue reliance in petroleum revenues.  
In the USA, Britain and Canada, the role of the state was limited to regulation and industry 
management without direct involvement in production. But this may have been possible 
because these countries’ economies are not entirely dependent on petroleum but have 
developed other sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, and services. This is in contrast to 
Nigeria where petroleum accounts for nearly 80 per cent of government revenues.
99
 
 
It is arguable that an arm’s length from the industry, subject to the granting of licenses, and 
collection of taxes will free Nigeria to confer independence on regulators. For example, as 
Nigeria has no stake in concessions operated by indigenous PEPCs and marginal field 
operators, it is in a better position to regulate these firms with reduced risk of conflict of 
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interests.
100
 Clearly there is need for regulatory reform in Nigeria. Such reforms should target 
Nigeria’s regulatory agencies and should promote transparency in petroleum industry 
management. The PIB does not leave out regulatory reform, but has some salient provisions 
in that direction. The extent of the PIB reforms and their potential for regulatory impact will 
be considered next.  
 
3.7.2  THE PIB AND REGULATO RY REFORMS IN THE NP I 
 
The PIB 2012 seeks to reform the Nigerian Petroleum Industry by repealing nine out of about 
fifty statutes that provide a legal framework for the industry.
101
 It provides significantly for 
regulatory reforms in the NPI and proposes to restructure regulatory institutions, and make 
provisions to improve transparency, taxation, and environmental protection.  
 
In terms of institutional reforms, the PIB seeks to establish an Upstream Petroleum Institute 
(UPI) and a Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Agency (DPRA), to cater for upstream and 
downstream regulation.
102
 Both institutions will be supervised by two separate boards,
103
 and 
both boards will in turn be subject to the Minister.
104
 For the first time, Nigeria seeks to 
clarify the objectives and powers of its regulatory institutions.
105
 It also seeks to provide a 
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fixed tenure for their boards,
106
 and provides for their funding.
107
 There is some hope that an 
improved tenure will translate into some regulatory autonomy with its implications for better 
industry regulation. But by subjecting these agencies to the control of the minister, the 
independence of these boards may be weakened.
108
 
  
The PIB proposes some far reaching reforms to the regulation and management of the NPI. It 
seeks to professionalise regulation and to adopt transparent and merit based procedures in the 
award of petroleum contracts.
109
 It prohibits discretionary award of petroleum contracts,
110
 
but nonetheless retains the president’s powers to grant concessions discretionarily.111
 
By 
placing no conditions on the exercise of his powers, the PIB essentially retains petroleum 
power in the president.
112
  
 
The PIB also has copious provisions geared towards environmental protection from 
petroleum operations. It seeks to ban gas flaring in Nigeria by requiring the Minister to set a 
flare out date,
113
 and to that extent, seeks to integrate the help of private citizens in reporting 
of continuous gas flaring.
114
 And to address the devastating effect of environmental pollution, 
requires operators to contribute a certain percentage of their earnings to an environmental 
remediation fund.
115
 The PIB also requires operators to submit detailed environmental 
management plans,
116
 and to apply internationally accepted principles for environmental 
protection, for the benefit of present and future generations.
117
 Operators are required to 
apply precautionary approaches, adopt environment friendly technologies, and are to comply 
with relevant guidelines and regulations.
118
 The PIB also provides for ‘fair and adequate’ 
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compensation for persons whose lands are affected by petroleum operations,
119
 and authorises 
the UPI to determine amount of compensation payable, after due consultation.
120
  
 
The PIB seeks to overhaul the present tax regime by integrating the operations of upstream 
PEPCs into the Companies Income Tax Act regime
121
 while imposing a resource tax called 
the Nigerian Hydrocarbon Tax (NHT) on all upstream PEPCs irrespective of whether they 
produce crude oil, gas, bitumen or condensate.
122
 It also seeks to repeal the Petroleum Profits 
Tax Act, amend portions of the CITA, and tax all oil and gas operations under the PIB and 
the CITA.  
 
Most of the reform initiatives in the PIB are decisively timely, if not overdue. Effective 
implementation of the environmental reforms for instance, can potentially reduce the amount 
of pollution suffered by the Niger Delta. And the tax regulations have the potential of 
generating greater earnings for the FGN. The PIB reforms however fall short of conferring 
independence on regulators. The Minster is retained as industry coordinator,
123
 and will be 
responsible for policy formulation, determination, and monitoring of the industry. She will be 
responsible for advising the government on all matters pertaining to the Industry and shall 
have direct access to information about the industry.
124
 She may grant, amend, renew, revoke, 
or extend licences and leases, on the advice of the UPI, and DPRA.
125
 While the boards of 
these institutions are to enjoy some tenure security, Nigeria needs to do more to confer them 
with greater autonomy with a view to promoting regulation. To that extent, Nigeria should 
seek to apply examples learned from its other agencies that have had some measure of 
regulatory success. One agency that stands out is the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC). 
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3.7.3  THE NATIONAL AGENCY FOR FOOD AND  DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND 
CONTROL STORY AND LESSONS FOR REGULATORY  EMPOWERMENT  
 
The NAFDAC story illustrates how capable regulation can impact an industry. In the 1990s, 
Nigeria was a popular destination for unsafe foods and drugs, which were smuggled in from 
outside the country. With the support of president Olusegun Obasanjo, Dr. Dora Akunyili 
was appointed head of Nigeria’s food and drug regulator: the NAFDAC in 2001.126 In what 
became known as the ‘war’ on fake drugs, Nigeria waged an intense campaign against 
importers of fake drugs, which was killing Nigerians by their thousands. Dr Dora Akunyili 
and her team took advantage of extensive regulatory powers contained in the NAFDAC Act 
to wage an intense campaign against importers of fake drugs in Nigeria.
127
 The campaign got 
so intense that an attempt was made on the life of Dr. Dora Akunyili in 2003.
128
 
 
The impact of NAFDAC under Dr. Dora Akunyili was almost immediate: from 1999-2007, 
the extent of fake drugs dropped drastically in Nigeria. This was because NADFAC, by 
asserting its legislative powers, frequently raided factories where fake drugs were produced, 
and prosecuted offenders to the delight of Nigerians and the international community.
129
 The 
success of Nigeria’s campaign against fake drugs became internationally recognised by 
various bodies, and Professor Dora Akunyili received local and international awards and 
recognitions for her doggedness in pursuing the NAFDAC mandate.
130
 
 
Although NAFDAC still faces its own challenges, its impact on the Nigerian psyche is 
strong. Manufacturers of foods and drinks are cautious and aware of the fact that there is need 
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to acquire NAFDAC approval before embarking on food production. In fact it is now 
common for the average Nigerian to demand to see the NAFDAC registration number before 
consuming processed foods or drugs in Nigeria.  
 
NAFDAC’s powers as contained in the Act appears to be in direct contrast to the powers of 
NOSDRA, and the NCDMB, which regulate oil spills clean ups, and local content 
respectively. This is because the latter institutions are not empowered by their respective Acts 
to enforce fines imposed on defaulting firms, through the court process. This lack of adequate 
legislative authority has led to the raising of fundamental jurisdictional questions on their 
ability to impose and enforce fines.
131
  
 
As in the case of NADFAC, it is obvious that the NPI needs independent regulators which 
will be able to monitor not only PEPCs, but should also be able to impose adequate fines with 
reduced political interference. There are however significant challenges to the attainment of 
this ideal, as will be discussed below. 
 
3.8 PETROLEUM POWER AND THE IMPERATIVE OF 
COMPLEMENTARY REGULATORY STRATEGIES FOR THE 
NPI  
 
Some level of regulatory independence should be a starting point for the attainment of 
effective regulation. Functionally, regulatory independence will require the conferment of 
clear and adequate regulatory authority, protected in a legislative document. It will also 
require statutory protection for the tenure of the executives who manage regulatory agencies. 
Such executives should however be appointable and removable by the Nigerian president, 
through a transparent process, subject to confirmation by the Nigerian senate. And although a 
part of the executive, the regulator itself should enjoy some autonomy from the ministry of 
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petroleum, and not be directly subordinated to it. And it should have the power to impose 
sanctions on defaulting firms without recourse to the minister of petroleum. The executives of 
the regulatory agency should be removeable only on the commission of an offence, 
misconduct, or are clearly unable to execute the duties of their office due to mental or 
physical infirmity. And in order to prevent abuse of their powers, the exercise of regulatory 
discretion should be subject to administrative review by the judiciary, and on a practical 
basis, be subject to some oversight (but not control) by the minister of petroleum, and be 
accountable to the National Assembly (Nigeria’s legislature).  
 
While independent regulation is desirable in principle, it appears that Nigeria is not yet 
sufficiently mature for same. The reason for this assertion is that petroleum is not only an 
economic asset, but also a tool for patronage and for holding the fragile central government 
together.
132
 Independent regulation will entail the erosion of the president’s powers to use 
petroleum as a tool for patronage, and Nigeria may not be ready for such approach yet in 
practice. The reduction of the president’s petroleum powers should be gradual and be directly 
proportional to Nigeria’s economic diversification. This perhaps explains why far reaching 
reforms proposed by the PIB hardly reduced the president’s powers in the industry, especially 
the absolute discretion to grant oil licences to companies.
 133
 
 
It is arguable that vesting presidential control of such a strategic asset is not a bad thing in 
itself, if politicians and the government can be trusted to act in the best interests of the 
Nigerian people. This has unfortunately not been the case in Nigeria, and ineffective 
regulation has impacted the economy and the industry negatively. The truth remains that 
‘petroleum power’ is required to maintain the co-existence of the country since the political 
elite often have to make decisions that sometimes transcend meritocracy and bureaucracy.  
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The case of Bayelsa state, in the Niger Delta Region will illustrate the extent to which 
petroleum power can be used to address grievances, and keep the industry going. Bayelsa 
state accounts for over 30 per cent of Nigeria’s petroleum resources, but is one of the most 
undeveloped states in the country.
134
 Since 1999 Bayelsa became the hotbed of militant 
activities as the aggrieved youths took to arms in protest of continued marginalisation. In 
other to pacify the people, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo took a political decision 
when DPR was instructed to award the Atala marginal field to Bayelsa state. This was done 
to gratify the people’s desire for greater participation in the oil industry and ensure peaceful 
transition of petroleum products. The Atala marginal field award was clearly a political 
decision that required wide discretions and transcended ideal principles of meritocracy. 
Similarly in 2012, repentant Niger Delta ex-militants were given a contract to secure NNPC’s 
pipelines. Although this political decision has been criticised by some commentators, the 
contract was awarded in order to ensure production continued unabated and keep repentant 
militants on the side of the government. These are clearly political decisions that a formal 
administrator will be unable and unwilling to make.
135
  
 
But while petroleum power has its benefits, it is proposed that there should be some 
qualifying conditions under which such powers should be exercised. For example it is hardly 
debatable that petroleum power should not be used to encourage the local industry, or host 
communities. Clearly there is need for either a reduction of petroleum power, or the ‘hold’ of 
petroleum on the Nigerian economy, if Nigeria is to confer regulatory autonomy on 
regulatory institutions. But this will require the exploration of other options which will make 
it practicable for Nigeria to do so. And those options will be the subject of the next segment.  
 
3.8.1  ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND REGULATORY QUALITY  
 
The premise of the above argument has been that regulatory autonomy is very unlikely as 
long as petroleum remains the mainstay of the Nigerian socio-political fabric. Apart from the 
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impact which petroleum power has on the Nigerian socio-political structure, it also places 
IOCs in a stronger position as they relate with the FGN which depends heavily on petroleum 
revenues. Threats to stop work by IOCs can therefore lead to major economic disruptions in 
Nigeria, and thus the FGN is to an extent held to ‘ransom’ by IOCs. The result is that the 
government is often willing to refrain from enforcing the letter of laws in the industry, even 
in cases of apparent breaches; as such enforcement may lead to economic disruptions. 
A deliberate economic diversification with the aim of reducing petroleum dependence will 
not only limit petroleum power on the part of the president, but will also position the 
government to regulate IOCs without fear. For instance, Norway’s robust regulation of its 
petroleum industry may have been impacted from the fact that petroleum accounts for only 
about 20 per cent of government revenues, unlike Nigeria where it accounts for about 80 per 
cent.
136
 That Nigeria readily conferred extensive regulatory powers on the NAFDAC board, 
may be explained from the fact that food and drugs have minimal economic or strategic 
importance when compared to petroleum. Thus the FGN may, in a case like NAFDAC, more 
readily cede regulatory power to a more independent and capable regulator, where petroleum 
loses its strategic place in the country’s economy.  
 
Currently Nigeria’s manufacturing sector is hardly able to compete with those of other 
countries due to infrastructural challenges like power, security and weak transport networks. 
Although there has been some reform in the power sector, the gains of the process are yet to 
materialise fully.
137
 It is hoped that the successful power sector reform privatization will lead 
to an improvement in the Nigerian economy and boost the non oil sector of the economy. 
Admittedly there has been some increase in Nigeria’s non oil revenues, due to investments in 
agriculture and telecommunications, but much remains to be done.
138
 
                                                 
136
 CIA ‘ The World Fact Book: Norway’ (2013) < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/no.html> accessed 1 May 2013 ; Paul Bang, ‘The Characteristics of Robust Regulation’ (2013) < 
http://regulationforum.org/docs/presentations/2013/Symposium-march-12-e.pdf> accessed 1 May 2013 
137
 In 2013,  Nigeria successfully privatised its power holding company, and appointed Canadian firm Manitoba, 
to manage the Transmission Company of Nigeria on a management contract. Oxford Business Group, 
‘Landmark Power Privatisation to Drive Nigeria’s Economy’ (2 December 2013) 
<economyhttp://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/oxford-business-group-landmark-power-
privatisation-drive-nigeria%E2%80%99s-economy> accessed 28 March 2014 
138Yemi Akinsuyi, ‘‘Non-oil Export’s GDP Contribution ’ll Increase to 20% in 3yrs’Thisday (12 March 2012) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/-non-oil-export-s-gdp-contribution-ll-increase-to-20-in-3yrs-/111235/> 
accessed 5 September 2013, Non oil exports contributing only about 4 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP in 2012.See 
Crusoe Osagie,’ Manufacturing in Nigeria: Rising from the Doldrums?’ 
 95 
 
  
 The ‘transformation agenda’ of President Goodluck Jonathan has sought to encourage large 
scale industries, small and medium Enterprises in the manufacture of goods. In February 
2014, the government launched the Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP) and the 
National Enterprise Development Programme (NEPED) in order to promote industrialization 
and manufacturing.
139
 Nigeria has also sought to revitalise ailing industries, local content and 
information technology communication.
140
  
 
Already, current reforms have led to a reduction in the impact of petroleum in Nigeria’s 
overall GDP.
141
 The National Bureau of Statistics noted that oil contributed only about 12.5 
per cent to Nigeria’s GDP in the third quarter of 2013, while the economy was sustained by 
the non oil sector.
142
 It is safe to conclude therefore that if current reform strategies are 
sustained, they will enable the growth of the non oil sector, and reduce petroleum power in 
the long term.  Until then however, petroleum will continue to remain more than an economic 
asset. The result is that the government will keep the industry close to its ‘chest.’  
 
3.9 THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATORY CREDIBILITY AND A 
CALL FOR ALTERNATIVE AND COMPLEMENTARY 
REGULATORY APPROACHES IN THE NPI 
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The case for regulatory autonomy and improved capacity is premised on the assumption that 
it will in principle, transcend into public interest regulation of the NPI. In reality however, 
there is still need for credible commitment on the part of regulators, for without this factor, 
the threat of capture and complicity/complacency will remain a significant problem in the 
NPI. The credible commitment theory of regulation assumes regulators are committed to their 
jobs and are not subject to capture either by industry or by other interests.
143
 The likelihood 
of capture exists even in the most advanced economies like America.
144
 The implication of 
the capture of Minerals Management Service (MMS) by BP was highlighted earlier as being 
partly responsible for the Gulf of Mexico oil disaster.
145
 Credible commitment has been a 
challenge in Nigeria due to the high level of public sector corruption.  
 
The possibility that regulators of a multi-billion dollar petroleum industry will compromise 
their integrity remains a major limitation in the NPI, even if they are properly paid and enjoy 
security of tenure. This has played out in Nigeria’s judiciary and worse still in the National 
Assembly. Although the National Assembly is one of the most independent and properly 
funded institutions in Nigeria, lack of credible commitment has weakened its performance. It 
has been embroiled in one financial scandal after another since 1999. In 2012, the House of 
Representatives set up a committee to investigate a $6.8 billion fuel subsidy fraud. 
Unfortunately, the head of the committee Mr Farouk Lawan later admitted to collecting over 
$500,000 dollars as a bribe from Mr. Femi Otedola, owner of Zenon oil, in order to clear 
Zenon oil from the probe report.
146
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The risk that regulators and government officials will be compromised by IOCs and other 
PEPCs is a problem all over the world. This prompted the ‘publish what you pay’ movement 
which will be treated in chapter six, and the adoption of directives and laws in the USA and 
Europe.
147
 Bribery of regulators by IOCs is a major problem all over the world, and the 
conviction of Statoil for bribery of Iranian officials is just one of many such instances all over 
the world.
148
 But the risk of regulatory corruption is even higher in Nigeria, and in fact may 
have justified the erosion of regulatory autonomy in Nigeria. Nwokeji observes that the first 
multi-billion dollar fraud in the NPI was perpetuated by officials of NNPC at a time when the 
firm still enjoyed some reasonable level of autonomy as an oil company, and industry 
regulator.
149
  
 
Nigeria therefore requires alternative strategies to address regulatory gaps that may arise from 
inadequate regulatory capacity or from outright complacency or complicity.
150
 These 
‘alternative’ strategies may include encouraging citizens’ participation in regulation, 
especially those whose lives are directly affected by petroleum operations and ineffective 
regulatory activity. The justification for this position is that Nigerian citizens (especially 
those in the Niger Delta), bear the brunt of environmental degradation and unsustainable 
extraction of petroleum. Should not this group of stakeholders be entitled to participate in 
what affects their daily existence? This is more so as experience has shown that the 
regulator/operator position of the FGN means that it cannot be relied on entirely for 
independent regulation of its IOC partners and NNPC, without considering the economic 
impact of such regulatory activity. 
 
The argument can be put forward that important stakeholders should not be made to watch 
from the stands, as regulatory laxity, capture, and lack of independence, affect their daily 
existence. A multi regulatory approach which engages the resources of the government, 
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citizens, NGOs and trade unions is not only imperative if the industry is to be effectively 
regulated, but sensible. 
 
 The debate for citizen participation in regulation is not new to Europe and the USA.
151
 
Citizens can play important roles in the attainment of transparency, accountability, and even 
in operational regulation. Firstly, they enjoy some advantage over administrative regulators in 
that they will not be constrained by capture and political constraints. For instance while DPR 
has been unable to constrain IOCs to stop gas flaring for political and economic reasons, 
private citizens in Nigeria have been able to seek permanent injunctions by relying on human 
rights laws. Thus far, much of the clamour for citizen participation in the NPI is however 
limited to resource control by petroleum host communities.
152
  
 
The PIB falls short of making use of citizen participation in environmental regulation, other 
than encouraging them to report cases of illegal gas flaring by companies to the UPI.
153
 In the 
light of regulatory constraints in the NPI, this thesis proposes that Nigeria should seek to 
establish a comprehensive whistleblower/disclosure protection framework, and encourage 
regulatory litigation. The potential benefits of such alternative complementary approaches 
will be explored next.  
 
3.9.1  HARNESSING THE REGUL ATORY POTENTIAL OF A  VIBRANT WHISTLE -
BLOWER PROTECTION RE GIME  
 
Most whistleblowers are employees and insiders of organizations who disclose information 
concerning breaches of the law and unethical practices. Because they complement 
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administrative regulators, their potential has been harnessed by many developed countries. 
By virtue of being insiders, whistleblowers regularly have privileged access to information 
which regulators may be unable to access. Commenting on the detection of organisational 
fraud, Maryam Hussain observes that whistleblowers are the first line of fraud detection.
154
 
 
In the NPI, whistleblowers can aid the curbing of operational violations by PEPCs. IOCs 
have been accused of resorting to creative accounting and remitting less to the FGN in taxes 
than they are legally required to do.
155
 A motivated whistleblower can release detailed 
information in cases of deliberate concealment of the amount of oil produced daily, or where 
activities of petroleum firms undermine the environment, health and safety or unsustainable 
extraction of petroleum.
156
 In the NNPC, and the ministry of petroleum, whistleblowers can 
also aid the regulation of the fraudulent mismanagement of petroleum revenues in Nigeria 
and thus undermine corruption.
157
  
 
Potential whistleblowers in Nigeria nevertheless, lack adequate legal protection from unjust 
employer victimization for disclosures made in good faith. This leaves them open to 
victimisation and sometimes personal harm.
158
 What limited protection they enjoy covers 
only employees of listed firms and capital market operators.
159
 Given the wide scope of 
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reinstate employees who were unjustly sacked for making such disclosures in good faith, and pay adequate 
compensation to the employee, while subjecting the employer to a fine not exceeding 5 million naira. Sections 
64 and 39(1) of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2000 and The Economic 
 100 
 
corruption in Nigeria, there is need to extend protection to every scope of employment in 
Nigeria (public and private firms and government employment).
160
 Currently, many 
employees remain silent in the face of wrongdoing in order to preserve their jobs in an 
economy rife with unemployment. 
 
Although there are several arguments against whistle-blowing, which range from breach of 
confidentiality and loyalty and malicious reporting,
161
 its merits far outweigh its demerits.
162
 
This is more so in Nigeria where regulators face many limitations. 
163
 Encouraging insiders to 
release vital information will limit the impunity and recklessness with which managers of the 
NPI, and operators violate the laws of the country. For instance, a whistleblower was 
responsible for the 2004 conviction of Nigeria’s former Inspector General of Police, Tafa 
Balogun for theft of over $150 million of public funds.
164
 The conviction would have been 
almost impossible by conventional means, given the high office of Tafa Balogun as head of 
Nigeria’s police. The extent, to which other jurisdictions have enacted laws to protect 
whistleblowers, will be considered in the next segment.  
 
3.9.2  WHISTLE-BLOWER PROTECTION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS  
 
The United Kingdom  
                                                                                                                                                        
and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004 , S 12 (1a (iv) of the FOIA 2011 respectively, 
provide for the protection of the identity of the informants are protected, although no protection from 
victimization at work or outside is offered. 
160
 About 23.9 per cent of Nigeria’s population is currently unemployed, see ‘Nigeria’s High Unemployment 
Rate’ Thisday (18 September 2013)<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-s-high-rate-of-
unemployment/159317/ >Linda Eroke, ‘20.3m Nigerians Currently Unemployed, Statistics Reveal’ Thisday (8 
October 2012) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/20-3m-nigerians-currently-unemployed-statistics-
reveal/127112/> accessed 1 May 2013 
161
 Rachel Beller, ‘Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can it really reduce Corporate 
Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures Whistleblower Protection 
Legislation in the USA and China’ (2011)  
7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 873 
162
 See generally Robert G. Vaughn and others ‘The Whistleblower Statute Prepared for the Organisation of 
American States and the Global Legal Revolution Protecting Whistleblowers’ (2003) 35 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. 
Rev. 857  
163Chineme Okafor, ‘ Concerns over Hydrocarbon Metering Technology’ Thisday (20 August 2012 ) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/concerns-over-hydrocarbon-metering-technology/122802/> accessed 26 
April 2013 
164Tobs Agbaegbu and Joseph Onyekwere ‘Tafa goes to Jail’ ( 29 
November2005)<http://www.newswatchngr.com/editorial/allaccess/nigeria/11129203353.htm> 
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The United Kingdom’s Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 1998, confers protection on 
employees who make qualifying disclosures. A qualifying disclosure under the PIDA is one 
that is made in the reasonable belief of a worker, tending to show that there has been, is being 
or is likely to be, the commission of an offence. It also includes the breach of a legal 
obligation, a miscarriage of justice, or damage to the environment, or the endangering of the 
safety of an individual, or information as regards the deliberate concealment of any of the 
above.
165
  
 
The United States of America 
 
Investigations after the Enron and WorldCom financial scandals showed that the inadequate 
protection for insiders prevented disclosure of information which could have arrested 
monumental fraud.
166
 Consequently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) 2010 were enacted. Section 806 
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act confers protection on employees of listed firms who provide 
information or assist in investigations regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably 
believes constitutes an offence or fraud. Such employees are protected from demotion, threats 
of suspension, harassments, or any form of discrimination, and where such occurs, are 
entitled to be reinstated, compensated and paid their entitlements, with interest. 
 
Similarly section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act)
167
 confers protection and financial rewards on whistleblowers in deserving 
cases.  Under that section, employees can be awarded between 10 to 30 per cent of monetary 
                                                 
165
 S 1 of PIDA which amends section 43 of the Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996 by inserting section 43B. 
See also Ss 2 and 3 which in amending S47B of the ERA provides that ‘A worker has the right not to be 
subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that 
the worker has made a protected disclosure,’ and confer on the worker the right to complain to the Employment 
Tribunal that he has been subject to unfair treatment. S 5 which inserts S 103 A of the ERA 
166
 See Rachel Beller, ‘Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can it Really Reduce 
Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of Whistleblower 
Protection Legislation in the US and China’ (2011) 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus 876. Section 806 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act confers civil remedy on employees who are victimized for releasing information to regulators about 
acts of corruption 
167
 H. R. 4173, 2010  
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sanctions imposed on defaulting companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission, or 
other regulatory agencies, if the sanctions are up to $1 million.  
In order to qualify for reward under the Dodd Frank Act, a disclosure must be made on a 
reasonable belief that a possible violation of a federal securities law has occurred, is 
occurring or is likely to occur. The Act further protects the identities of whistleblowers from 
disclosures under the USA Freedom of Information Act 1967. It also gives employees direct 
access to SEC without necessarily exhausting internal disclosure procedures.
168
 The strategy 
has generated some success in the regulation of corporate firms, as whistleblowers reportedly 
helped in the detection 18.3 per cent of corporate fraud cases from 1996-2004.
169
  
 
It is proposed that Nigeria enact a whistleblower law which imposes significant deterrent 
fines in order to protect employees from unjust victimisation, and such employees should be 
duly compensated. It is further proposed that Nigeria should seek to reward whistleblowers if 
their disclosures result in positive and significant economic impact. This may include money, 
promotion, and national honours, where necessary.
170
 A 2012 report on occupational fraud 
noted that companies that reward whistleblowers and implement other fraud protection 
strategies, detected fraud twice as faster than those that did not.
171
  
 
3.9.3  HARNESSING THE REGUL ATORY POTENTIAL OF L ITIGATION FOR A 
BETTER NPI  
 
Regulatory gaps in the NPI can be further filled by regulatory litigation. Private citizens, 
independent government prosecutors, and non government organisations can institute actions 
to enforce a substantive law or address wrongdoing in the industry. Where such litigation 
alters behaviour, it becomes regulatory, even if action was not motivated by a desire to 
                                                 
168
 S 922. See also Barry Scholl and Kevin Timken, ‘Blow the Whistle: The Dodd-Frank Act Creates New 
Incentives for Whistleblowers –and Compliance Issues for Utah Businesses (2012) 25 Utah Bar Journal 36 
169
 Alexander Dyck and others ‘Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?’ (2010) 65 The Journal of  Finance  
170
 See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, ‘The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, 
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality’ (2010) 88 Texas Law Review  
171
 Report to the Nations, On Occupational Fraud and Abuse, ‘2012 Global Fraud Study’ (2012) 
<http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2012-report-to-nations.pdf> accessed 28 
March 2014, 37 
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regulate behaviour.
172
 For example a court may award substantial punitive damages against 
an oil company which may deter future recklessness or negligence, compensate victims of the 
spill and at the same time complement administrative regulation.
173
  
 
Regulatory litigation can also come in the form of suits which may be used to challenge 
government policy, or seek to enforce a substantive law. For instance a litigant may seek 
declaratory or injunctive reliefs, or to enforce some fundamental rights. In March 2013, a 
Federal High Court banned the FGN from deregulating the downstream petroleum sector in a 
suit filed by Mr Bamidele Aturu.
174
 The outcome of this suit and its far reaching implications 
can regulate government behaviour in respects to the deregulation of the petroleum sector. 
 
In the USA, private lawyers have been referred to as ‘private attorneys general’ because of 
the resonating impact of their actions on the polity.
175
 In the same vein, administrative 
regulation of the environment from petroleum pollution is complemented in Brazil by 
independent public prosecutors,
176
 private individuals, and not for profit organisations.
177
  
 
Private-citizen public interest litigation can be filed in lieu of regulatory complacency or 
complicity. For example, although gas flaring is illegal in Nigeria, it continues unabated due 
to regulatory complacency for political and economic considerations, despite inimical impact 
                                                 
172
 Some actions are instituted in order to seek compensation for damages, while others may seek the disclosure 
of vital information to the public and others may seek an injunction against the government. See Patrick Luff, ‘ 
Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation ‘ (2011) 64 Rutgers L. Rev. 73, 87, see also Sean Farhang , Public 
Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the US (Princeton 2010)  at 8 
173
 See Farhang (ibid) 32-54. For instance in 2012, NOSDRA filed an action against the PPMC, for failing to 
clean up spills which occurred between 2009-2011, in Delta State, following which a 64.2 million naira fine was 
imposed on PPMC.  Nnena Ezeah, ‘Oil Spill: Court Imposes N62.5m fine on PPMC’ Vanguard (10 April 2012) 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/oil-spill-court-imposes-n62-5m-fine-on-ppmc/> accessed 12 October 
2012 
174Ikechukwu Nnochiri. ‘ Court declares Deregulation of Downstream Sector Illegal’ Vanguard < 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/court-declares-deregulation-of-downstream-sector-illegal/> accessed 30 
April 2013  
175
 Carl W Hittinger and Jarod M Bona, ‘The Diminishing Role of the Private Attorney General in Antitrust and 
Securities Class Action Cases Aided by the Supreme Court’ (2009) 1  Journal of Business and Technology Law 
,168 
176
 Leslie K. McAllister, Making Law Matter, Environmental  Protection and Legal Institutions in Brazil ( 
Stanford University Press 2008) 
177
 See Antonio Gidi, ‘Class actions in Brazil: a Model for Civil Law Countries’ (2003) Vol 51  American 
Journal of Comparative Law.   311-408. 
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on the environment. Government laxity and complicity in continued gas flaring necessitated 
the institution of Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited and two 
others.
178
 In that case, the applicant sought, and obtained, a perpetual injunction from the 
Federal High Court which restrained Shell from flaring associated gas within the applicant’s 
community on the ground that it contravened the 1999 Constitution of the FRN, and the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights Ratification and Enforcement Act 1983. 
  
In Oronto Douglas v. Shell Petroleum Development Company Limited and 3 others, 
179
 the 
applicant challenged the commissioning of the NLNG project in Bonny Rivers State Nigeria. 
The ground for the action was an alleged failure to comply with the 1992 Environmental 
Impact Assessment Act’s requirement for an environmental impact assessment, before the 
project could commence. The Oronto’s case was dismissed by the trial court on procedural 
grounds. The appeal court overturned the judgement of the trial court and ordered a retrial, 
but by this time, the NLNG plant had been commissioned, and was overtaken by events.  
 
Had Oronto been successful, it would have set a precedent for future operations in the Niger 
Delta and to that extent would have been regulatory. Gbembre and Oronto illustrate the 
yearnings of the Niger Delta people to address regulatory complacency and complicity 
through litigation. It is a fact that regulatory impact of litigation in Nigeria has been minimal 
in comparison to the USA. This is due in part to the absence of a comprehensive class action 
procedure, and a rigid application by the courts, of the locus standi rule, in addition to 
adherence to conservative principles of statutory interpretation by the Nigerian courts. 
180
  
 
There is need therefore, to confer substantive rights on citizens to complement regulatory 
activity in the NPI since regulatory litigation is dependent on such rights. For instance, 
                                                 
178
 Heard in the Federal High Court of Nigeria, Benin Judicial Division, Suit No. FHC/B/C/153/05 delivered on 
14 November, 2005. For an incisive commentary on the case, see Kaniye Ebeku, ‘Human Rights Approaches To 
Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre V. Shell Revisited’ (2007)16 REICEL 312  
179
 Suit No. FHC/2CS/ 573. 
180
 See Okere B. Obinna, ‘Judicial Activism or Passivity in Interpreting the Nigerian Constitution (1987) Vol 
36(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, see also K.S.A. Ebeku, ‘Locus Standi in Environmental 
Nuisance Actions: A Perspective from the Commonwealth’ (2005) 17 ELM 14, and K.S.A. Ebeku, ‘Judicial 
Attitudes to Redress for Oil-Related Environmental Damage in Nigeria’ (2003) 12 RECIEL,199 
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although oil spills are very injurious to human life and the environment,
181
 victims of such 
spills in the Niger Delta Region (NDR) are often required to rely on the codified version of 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher,
182
 in their quest for compensation for injurious affection to 
their lands by oil spills.
183
 With a barrage of exceptions to the rule however, PEPCs easily 
escape liability in Nigeria, and G.J Frynas observes that in the past, oil companies in Nigeria 
have used false claims of sabotage to avoid compensation payments.
184
 A more balanced 
substantive right which provides for adequate compensation for oil spills, will encourage 
class actions in cases of negligence and recklessness on the part of PEPCs. If such actions are 
successful and instituted frequently, they are likely to compel operators to apply more careful 
procedures for environmental protection, or face possible liquidation.  
 
Currently however, litigation in Nigeria against petroleum firms faces many limitations from 
locus standi issues, inordinate delays, and conservative award of damages. These challenges 
have led to a trend where claimants file environmental actions against IOCs in English, Dutch 
and American courts in the belief that their chances for justice are higher. A comprehensive 
class action procedure and a revision of the locus standi rule are therefore required in Nigeria, 
to align with modern trends. Class actions and their regulatory potential will be considered 
next.  
 
                                                 
181
 In 2011 a UNEP report established that fifty years after Shell began exploring for oil in Ogoni land,  the 
environment has become so devastated that it would take between 25-30 years of deliberate effort to restore the 
environment. The report also found that the Nisisioken Ogale community was at an immediate risk since the 
well water they drank was contaminated with benzene, a known carcinogen,181 at levels over 900 times above 
the World Health Organisation guideline. The report found that Shell’s standards in oil and gas exploration was 
far below what was expected while its remediation efforts were ineffective. Shell and the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria were blamed for the devastation of Ogoni land , and noted that an estimated one billion dollars will be 
required to restore Ogoni land UNEP, ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland’ (2011) 
<http://www.unep.org/nigeria/> accessed 12/04/12 
182
 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 
183
 See Damfebo Derri, ‘Legal Basis for Compensation for Oil and Gas Operations in Nigeria’ in Festus Emiri 
and Gowon Deinduomo (eds) Law, Oil and Contemporary Development Issues in Nigeria  Essays in Honour of 
Late Honourable Justice Emmanuel Joel Igoniwari (Malthouse 2008) 77. By providing for the defence of 
negligence, section 11(5) OPA has placed a burden on the citizens of the NDR to prove the fault of IOCs in 
cases of oil spills from their pipelines, but this is inconsistent since a claim for compensation is not a claim for 
damages and the fault issue need not arise. All the plaintiff should be required to prove should be that he has 
suffered injury.  
184
 Frynas JG, 'Legal Change in Africa: Evidence from Oil-Related Litigation in Nigeria ' (1999) 43 Journal of 
African Law 121. One report said that in some cases,  Shell apparently alleged sabotage as the cause of spills, 
even before carrying out investigation on the site.184 A United States Non-Governmental Delegation Trip 
Report, ‘Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the 
Niger Delta’ (1999) <http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/Final_Report.pdf> accessed 8 September 2013 
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3.9.4  HARNESSING THE REGUL ATORY POTENTIAL OF C LASS ACTIONS IN 
THE NPI  
 
Class actions have been said to ‘present an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries 
unaddressed by the regulatory action of government’.185 A class action is a suit that is filed by 
a number of plaintiffs in pursuit of a common or similar cause.
186
 Their regulatory potential 
stems from the fact that in the event of success, the amount of damages awarded can be 
significant enough to alter behaviour.
187
 Class actions have been successfully exploited in the 
USA in environmental and tort cases, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Civil Procedure 
Rules 2010.
188
 The concept of class actions is however virtually absent from Nigeria’s civil 
procedure.
189
 Lawyers seeking to file class actions often have to rely on ingenious 
interpretations of the rules of court. But whether a class action will be allowed to proceed in a 
particular court is largely dependent on the disposition of the trial judge.
190
  
 
The closest the Nigerian civil procedure rules have to a class action is the representative 
action but this is limited in scope and more technical in nature. Under the representative 
action, all the representees must be ascertained and expressly consent to the action being filed 
in their interest.
191
 On the other hand, class actions in the USA can be filed even where all the 
parties are not ascertainable and even if the action will bar further litigation from other 
                                                 
185
 Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper (1980) 445 U.S. 326, 339 
186
 Jenna G. Farleigh, ‘Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class Certification’ (2011) 64 Vand. L. Rev. 
1585. Some class actions are also public interests litigation. For instance, in 2012 a PIR was filed by the oil 
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 See S.I. Strong, ‘Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New 
Analogue’ (2012) 88 Notre Dame L. Rev, see also Deborah Hensler, How Economic Globalisation is Helping to 
Construct a Private Transnational Legal Order, in Sam Muller and others (eds) in  The Law of the Future and the 
Future of the Law 250-59 (2011) ; George A. Bermann, ‘ US. Class Actions and the "Global Class’ (2009) 19 
Kan. J.L. & Pub . POL'Y  336, Luff at 113 . 
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  (As amended to December 1, 2010)  
189
 Order 9 Rules 1-4 of Nigeria’s Federal Civil Procedure Rules 2009 , contains some provision on class actions 
but limits it to intellectual property, Order 9 Rules 1-4 4,  See also Tochukwu Onyiuke  ‘ Class Action lawsuits: 
A global trend for accountability & better service delivery (2)’ Business Day (3 November 2010)< 
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/component/content/article/133-insight-from-outside/15955-
class-action-lawsuits-a-global-trend-for-accountability-a-better-service-delivery-2 > 
190
 Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, ‘ Communique on the Roundtable on Class Action Litigation 
in Nigeria’ ( March 2013)< nials-nigeria.org/text/n_comm.aspx> accessed 20 April 2013 
191
 See for instance Order 13 Rule 13 Bayelsa State High Court Civil Procedure Rules, and Order 13 Rule 13 of 
the Rivers State High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2010, which are similar to the rules applicable in other states 
of the federation.  
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members of the class. And while parties to a representative action must all have exactly the 
same interest in the issue, class actions can be filed even if the interests of the different 
parties are not exactly the same. 
 
Litigants who sue or defend a suit as a class in the USA have to establish that separate 
individual actions are impracticable, that the claims or defences of the representative parties 
are typical of the class, and that the action is meant to protect the interests of the class.
192
 
Generally, a US judge will grant leave for a class action after considering whether the time 
and money to be saved by the action, outweighs the cost of forfeiting personal rights to sue in 
the future.
193
  
 
In the light of risks posed to life, the Nigerian economy and the human environment by 
petroleum operations, there is need for a clearer regime for class actions. This is more so as 
Nigeria has significant regulatory gaps. Such a regime should seek not only to compensate, 
but equally importantly, to regulate and deter. Class actions are easier to institute than 
individual actions because the cost implications are often lesser since parties contribute 
proportionally. The cost of prosecuting individual actions against giant oil corporations is 
often monumental. This is more so as the Niger Delta region is one of the poorest in the 
country.
194
 Many individual actions have been defeated because oil corporations often 
harness the best legal representation and import experts from any part of the world. 
 
Currently, the poverty limitation of oil bearing communities is sometimes alleviated by rich 
lawyers who fund and prosecute individual and representative actions, under contingency 
arrangements. An example of such actions is Isaac Agbaro v Shell and 3 others, where a 
federal high court awarded the sum of 15.4 billion naira (about £150 million) against Shell 
for environmental pollution.  The plaintiffs had claimed compensation in respect of a 1970 oil 
spill from a field operated by Shell which affected about 256 hectares of land and water areas 
                                                 
192
 Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, ‘ Communique on the Roundtable on Class Action Litigation 
in Nigeria’ ( March 2013)< nials-nigeria.org/text/n_comm.aspx> accessed 20 April 2013 
193
 Rule 23 
194
 DE Abiboa B Maiangwa , ‘Corruption and the Underdevelopment of the Niger Delta in Nigeria’ (2012)  5 (8) 
Journal of Pan African Studies 
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in the Ejama-Ebubu community in Tai Eleme Local Government area of Rivers State of 
Nigeria.
195
 But this action was successful because the claimants were able to retain the 
counsel of Lucius Nwosu, a senior advocate of Nigeria under contingency arrangements. A 
sound class action regime similar to Rule 23 of the USA will motivate litigants to secure the 
best representation, hire experts, and prosecute claims against giant corporations which 
pollute the environment in breach of Nigeria’s laws. The outcome of such actions is likely to 
regulate operational behaviour in the NPI and complement government activity. 
 
3.9.5  THE REGULATORY POTENTIAL OF PUBLIC INTER EST LITIGATION 
  
A public interest litigation (PIL) can also be filed in order to obtain injunctive reliefs or 
obtain a positive order through an order of mandamus. It has great potential in promoting 
accountability in the management of petroleum revenues in Nigeria, as issues of corruption in 
the management of Nigeria’s petroleum revenues are endless.  
 
In February 2014, the CBN governor Lamido Sanusi, was suspended by the president of 
Nigeria on allegations of financial misconduct. Some observers however believe his 
suspension is not unconnected to his allegation that $20 billion of petroleum revenues have 
not be remitted to the Federation Account, by NNPC.
196
 In response to outcries against 
corruption in the NPI, many committees have been set up to investigate and audit various 
accounts, but the reports and recommendations are hardly ever published and 
implemented.
197
 To that extent, a PIL can be filed either under the freedom of information 
Act (FOIA) 2011or any other similar Act in order to compel the publication of such reports, 
in essence promoting transparency and accountability. PILs can also be used to address 
environmental violations, prosecute public nuisance, oil spills, and gas flaring as the Oronto 
case illustrates.  
 
                                                 
195
 Innocent Anaba, ‘Oil spill: Shell to pay N15.4bn’ (July 6 2010) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/07/oil-
spill-shell-to-pay-n15-4bn/> accessed 7 March 2014 
196
 ‘Trouble at Nigeria’s Central Bank’ The Economist (21 February 2014) 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/02/trouble-nigerias-central-bank> accessed 28 March 2014  
197
Numerous reports include the Pius Okigbo audit of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 1994,  KPMG audit of 
NNPC between 2007-2009, and recently, the Nuhu Ribadu report of 2012.  
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One major limitation to the effectiveness of PILs in Nigeria has been a conservative 
interpretation of the locus standi rule. The locus standi rule was established to regulate access 
to the courts in order to shut the door of the courts from the antics of professional litigants 
and meddlesome interlopers.
198
 It requires litigants to show from their pleadings that their 
actions are justifiable, and to prove the existence of a dispute between them and the 
defendant.
199
 Under this rule, an applicant who applies for a declaratory order is required to 
prove the breach of a legal interest which transcend that of the larger community and that 
they have suffered damages more than any other person.
200
 This is somewhat similar to the 
English public nuisance action.
201
 It is however not easy to cross the procedural hurdles 
posed by a conservative application of the locus standi rule and this has diminished the 
potential of regulatory litigation in Nigeria. 
 
In 2012, a PIL was instituted to compel the Attorney General of Nigeria, Central Bank of 
Nigeria and the former Military ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida. The applicants were a 
coalition of six civil society groups led by the Socio-Economic and Accountability Project 
(SERAP), which demanded an accounting by the respondents for $12.5 billion petroleum 
revenues received by the Nigerian government between 1988 and 1994. The claim was 
grounded on a 1994 report allegedly submitted to the Nigerian government by the Pius 
Okigbo panel. Relying on the locus standi principle however, the FGN challenged the 
claimant’s right to institute the action. The High Court judge agreed with the FGN, and 
dismissed the action for failure on the part of the applicants to establish by admissible 
evidence that they had a right to file the action.
202
  
 
The bar of the locus standi rule means that most PILs in the NPI remain at the domain of the 
federal attorney general, who also doubles as the minister of justice. As minister, he is a 
politician and is often subject to political and economic undercurrents. This explains why the 
office of the attorney general is not always disposed to pursue certain courses of action which 
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can result in environmental protection and industry regulation. There have been calls in 
Nigeria for the separation of both offices, but these have not been implemented so far.
203
 
Thus public interest litigation by the government remains subject to political considerations 
and this has implications for regulatory quality. In contrast to Nigeria, Brazil has independent 
public prosecutors who are able to institute actions against the Brazilian government, 
Petrobras, and private firms for environmental pollution.
204
 
 
To address the limitations to PILs in Nigeria, there is need for clear, extensive and 
substantive rules which can empower private citizens to institute PILs. Some effort in this 
regard was made in 2011 with the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
under which Nigerians can seek the publication of information held by the government.  
 
Although the FOIA has not been tested significantly in the courts, it has been observed that it 
is often replete with a barrage of exceptions which may be used to frustrate its ends in 
practice.
205
 Another limitation of the FOIA regime is that it is not applicable to private firms, 
unless those in which the FGN is controlling shareholder.
206
 It is proposed that the scope of 
the FOIA should be extended to IOCs since the FGN has over 55 per cent of the concessions 
they operate. This would make such firms liable to disclose the contents of agreements and 
payments made to and with the FGN, and further protect transparency and accountability in 
the NPI. 
  
3.10 CONCLUSION: ALL REGULATORY OPTIONS SHOULD BE 
EMPLOYED IN THE NPI 
 
                                                 
203
 One Office, Dual Responsibilities’ Thisday (16 July 2013) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/one-office-
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It can be safely asserted that the best managed petroleum industries, are also adequately 
regulated. Any meaningful reform in the NPI should therefore seek to improve regulation. 
For example, Norway has significant mechanisms that enhance transparency through a set of 
criteria for reporting on ‘concession terms and project incomes. For example, there is public 
information on the tax payments from individual businesses operating in the Norwegian 
continental shelf. Furthermore, model contract terms are accessible to the public.
207
 Good 
regulation therefore blocks loopholes for corruption and provides funds that can be 
effectively applied for the benefit of the people. Thus Nigeria needs to employ all options in 
order to promote effective regulation of the NPI. From the financial aspects, there should be 
adequate publication of payments made by PEPCs to the FGN, and the processes should be 
transparent and rigid enough to reduce opportunities for corruption.  
 
Chapter five explores the proposed privatisation of NNPC through the Petroleum Industry 
Bill 2012. A privatised NOC will be imbued with a stronger commercial orientation and will 
be more distanced from the FGN. Such a firm will therefore require strict regulation in order 
to ensure it operates properly and in line with the law. Effective regulation will be imperative 
to check the operations of the proposed NOC, and of the industry as a whole. The allegation 
that NNPC withheld $20 billion from the federation account is not good for any country. 
Nigeria needs to do more, and the PIB does not go far enough to confer independence on 
regulators, or to limit the powers of the president or minister over the industry. And in 
practice, it is hard for an employee to effectively regulate his employer.  
 
Viable regulation is required for all the sectors of the NPI, ranging from local content, 
monitoring of operations and revenues, and environmental protection. In fact the success of 
the reform programme as contained in the PIB, is heavily dependent on viable regulation on 
the one hand, and a functional NOC, on the other. This requires improvement in regulatory 
quality, by enlisting the help of the private sector as a complementary regulatory strategy. On 
the part of administrative regulation, there is need to shore up much needed capacity, 
independence, funding, and a properly defined legal framework.  
 
                                                 
207
 See Productivity Commission (n 17 chapter 3) 315 
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One aspect where effective regulation can help the NPI is in local content development. For 
without viable regulation, a local content regime can be easily circumvented by self dealing 
individuals and their foreign collaborators. The limits and potential of a local content regime 
however needs closer investigation, and this will be done in chapter four.
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4  C H A P T E R  F O U R :  T O W A R D S  A  S I G N I F I C A N T  
N I G E R I A N  C O N T E N T  I N  T H E  N I G E R I A N  
P E T R O L E U M  I N D U S T R Y :  A N  A N A L Y S I S  O F  
N I G E R I A ’ S  R E F O R M  S T R A T E G I E S ,  
L E G I S L A T I O N ,  A N D  C U R R E N T  C H A L L E N G E S  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER  
 
In chapter two, it was argued that a significant local content is a valid criterion for measuring 
how functional a country’s petroleum industry is. It was also shown that the Nigerian content 
is relatively weak, when compared with that of Norway and Brazil. This chapter seeks to 
determine the extent to which legislative, contractual and institutional reforms can be utilised 
in developing local content in the NPI. And to that extent, it will analyse the Nigerian content 
policy as embodied in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 
(NOGICDA) 2010 and will compare same with the Norwegian and Brazilian local content 
regimes. 
 
This chapter argues that a country’s local content regulation can be for either a protectionist, 
or a developmental purposes. A protectionist approach is required where a country already 
has some level of industrial capacity to protect, while the developmental approach can be 
resorted to where a country has weak industrial capacity and needs to develop same. It argues 
that the regulatory strategies required in a country that needs to protect its local content, 
should not be the same as those of a country that seeks to develop its local content. And that 
as NOGICDA is protectionist in nature, it may be unsuited to Nigeria’s developmental needs. 
To that extent the chapter argues that Nigeria may need to amend NOGICDA in line with its 
developmental needs. 
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4.2 WEAK LOCAL CONTENT IN PETROLEUM PRODUCING 
COUNTRIES  
 
Local content within the context of this thesis refers to the extent to which a country is 
directly or indirectly involved in its domestic petroleum industry.
1
 Section 106 of NOGICDA 
defines it as the ‘quantum of value added to or created in the Nigerian economy by a 
systematic development of capacity and capabilities through the deliberate utilization of 
Nigerian human, material resources and services in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry’.2 
 
It is a fact that many petroleum producing countries (PPCs) rely on American and European 
based IOCs to manage, extract and develop their petroleum resources.
3
 And until recently, 
most were content with the corporate taxes and minor social initiatives provided by these 
firms. While some PPCs have increased state participation in their petroleum industries,
4
 
dependence on IOCs remains high in developing countries, when compared to western 
countries like Norway and Canada.
5
  
 
Many IOCs operating in developing countries like Nigeria and Angola, in turn patronise 
foreign oil service firms to execute petroleum related contracts. This patronage is due in part 
to the highly technology intensive nature of petroleum operations, and to financial incapacity 
of most home based firms.
6
 But the outsourcing of relevant and crucial contracts deprives 
many PPCs of much needed funds, experience, employment, and opportunities for transfer of 
technology. For example, it is estimated that of the $18 billion spent annually for petroleum 
                                                 
1
 See Accenture, ‘Developing Local Content Programs’ (Accenture 2009) 
<http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture_Energy_Developing_Local_Content_Pro
grams_EiaB5.pdf> accessed 9 January 2013 
2
 No 2 of 2010
 
3
 OPEC, ‘ OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves by 2011’ 
(2011)<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm> accessed 12 November 2012 
4 Charles McPherson , ‘State Participation in the Natural Resource Sectors: Evolution, Issues and Outlook’ 
(2008) IMF Conference on Taxing Natural Resources: New  Challenges, New Perspectives’ 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2008/taxnatural/pdf/mcpherson.pdf>  accessed 19 March 2013 
5
 Some of these countries include Nigeria, Algeria, Venezuela, Mexico, Iraq, and Kuwait.  
6
 A company is in production if it is awarded contracts for exploration and production, as against service 
companies which are involved in various stages of the production process like seismic operations, pipelines 
fabrication, construction of storage facilities and tank farms, etc. See generally, Martin S. Raymond, William L. 
Leffler, Oil & Gas Production in Nontechnical Language, (3rd edn Penwell Books 2006) 
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contracts in Nigeria, less than 20 per cent is retained internally.
7
 It was also shown earlier that 
Nigeria lost $380 billion to capital flight due to absence of a viable local content in the 
petroleum industry, from 1956-2006.
8
 
 
Retaining a significant portion of petroleum related jobs internally has many benefits for a 
national economy.
9
 Manufacturing sectors are likely to benefit from the linkages that exist 
with the petroleum industry, which includes investment in research, and transfer of 
technology.
10
 Other sectors that stand to benefit include shipping, transportation, insurance, 
banking and construction besides tax benefits for a government.
11
 A significant local 
content
12
 will also result in the establishment of viable indigenous PEPCs and local oil 
service firms (LOSFs), a pool from which industry regulators and policy makers with hands 
on experience can be sourced. This will in turn address regulatory gaps, which were 
identified in chapter three to include inexperienced regulatory personnel.
13
  
 
It is the position of this chapter, and which experience in some countries has proved, that 
there exists a direct link between the extent to which a country directly participates in its 
petroleum industry, and the management and regulation of that industry. For instance, 
Norway and Brazil which have significant local content also have better regulatory and 
management records.
14
 In Nigeria, a weak local content may indirectly have impacted 
Nigeria’s regulatory quality, and the general benefits Nigeria derives from the industry. 
                                                 
7
 See Jean Balouga , ‘Nigerian Local Content: Challenges and Prospects’ (2012)International Association of 
Energy Economics   www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=176 accessed 11 November 2012   
8
 See chapter 2, para 2.8.1. See also ‘Nigerian Content Act: Stakeholders Share their Experience 3 Years On’ 
(2012) NCDMB <http://www.ncdmb.gov.ng/index.php/public-relations/news-updates/134-nigerian-content-act-
stakeholders-share-experience-3years-on> accessed 21 November 2012  
9
 For purposes of this work, a significant Local Content in the petroleum industry is that which is able to capture 
at least 50% of the annual expenditure in the industry.  
10 Shirley Neff, ‘Memorandum on International Best Practice in Development of Local  Content in the Energy 
Sector’ (2005)Presented to the Nigeria National Stakeholders Working Group  
<http://www.neiti.org.ng/sites/default/files/page/uploads/local-content-5-9-051.pdf> 
11
 See Jesse Salah Ovadia, ‘The Making of Oil-backed Indigenous Capitalism in Nigeria’ (2012)  Vol 18 New 
Political Economy at 19 
12
 In this thesis, a significant Local Content for any country will be pegged at 50 per cent.  
13
 See chapter two, para 3.6.2. See also Chika Amanze-Nwachukwu, ‘Why DPR Cant Efficiently Regulate Oil 
Industry’ Thisday (Abuja, 13 December 2012 ) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/why-dpr-can-t-efficiently-
regulate-oil-sector/104909/> accessed 16 September 2012 
14
 See Mark Thurber and others' ‘Exporting the Norwegian Model’ (n 21 chapter 2), 5366-5378, where Norway, 
Malaysia and Brazil, countries which relatively high Local Content were shown to have better managed their 
petroleum industries; and Nigeria, Angola and Algeria, countries with weak Local Content were also shown to 
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A growing discontent with minor social initiatives of IOCs has led to increased clamour for a 
greater ‘chunk’ of the petroleum industry by many petroleum exporting countries. And this 
has resulted in the formulation of local content policies which are implemented through 
various strategies. For instance, some countries rely on NOCs to spearhead their local content 
development, while others stipulate a minimum local content requirement for all PEPCs and 
establish regulators to monitor compliance.
15
 Others endeavour to create an enabling 
environment for the domiciliation of foreign subsidiaries by IOCs and service firms, while 
granting them huge tax incentives for the patronage of local goods and services.
16
 And still 
other countries seek to encourage local content by awarding petroleum exploration contracts 
to indigenous firms, on liberal and favourable terms.
17
  
 
The remainder of this chapter will analyse the reasons behind Nigeria’s weak local content, 
and the legal and non legal initiatives Nigeria has erected to improve and develop same. In 
the light of the analysis and comparison from other jurisdictions, this chapter will enquire if 
Nigeria is on track to developing a significant local content, and the implications of same for 
the wider petroleum industry.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
have either weak or poor management of their petroleum industries. See also Paul Stevens, ‘ Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC) : an Enterprise in Gridlock’ in David G. Victor and others (eds) (n 22 chapter 2), at 334 and 
David R. Hults ‘ Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (DDVSA): from Independence to Subservience’ , in David G. 
Victor (n 22 chapter 2 ), 418  
15
 Chineme Okafor, ‘FG Insists on Nigerian Content for Oil Bid Rounds, Licences’, Thisday (Abuja, 25 June 
2012 )<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/fg-insists-on-nigerian-content-for-oil-bid-rounds-licences/118677/> 
accessed 19 November 2012  
16
 All member states of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have established NOCs, See 
OPEC, ‘Member Countries’ < http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm> accessed 8 November 2012 
Others non OPEC members that have NOCs include : include Norway, Malaysia, Brazil and Mexico. See also 
Accenture (n. 19) . See also Kingson, Jeorge, ‘Towards An Effective Local Content Law’ (GhanaWeb , 4 
October 2012) http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=252121 accessed 12 
November 2012.   Ghana aspires to a 90 per cent local   by 2020. See See Van Gyampo and Ransford Edward, 
‘Saving Ghana from Its Oil: A Critical Assessment of Preparations so Far Made’(2011) Vol. 57 (4) Africa 
Today, pp.49-69, See also Joseph Nwaokoro, ‘Beyond Legislation: A Contract Alternative to Legislating Local 
Content in Nigeria’ (2009) 18 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 42  
17
 S. 48 NOGICDA 
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4.3 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF LOCAL CONTENT IN THE 
NIGERIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY  
 
The NPI has largely remained dominated by IOCs for the past five decades of Nigeria’s foray 
into petroleum production. This is largely because Nigeria did not assert its authority 
significantly other than to seek to promote employment for its citizens, and to collect minor 
taxes from petroleum firms. For instance, the Mineral Oils Act of 1914 which was Nigeria’s 
first local content legislative initiative only required concessionaires to train Nigerian 
technicians and craftsmen, and to recruit Nigerians within a reasonable time, as supervisors 
and senior managers.
18
 The Act did not however require IOCs to domesticate their operations 
in-country or patronise local firms. Like its predecessor, the Petroleum Act of 1969 also 
focused on employment and training of Nigerians, with only slight improvements to the 
Mineral Oils Ordinance. Under paragraph 38 (a) i of the first schedule to the Act, the grantee 
of an oil mining lease is required to have 75 per cent representation in managerial, 
professional and supervisory grades in connection with their concessions. Paragraphs 38(a) ii 
provides that Nigerians in any particular job group must not be less than 60 per cent of the 
total number of employees, while sub paragraph provides that all skilled, semi skilled, and 
unskilled workers are required to come from Nigeria. Regulation 26 of the Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969 requires holders of oil prospecting licences to 
submit a detailed programme for the recruitment and training of Nigerians for the approval of 
the Minister, within 12 months of the grant of their concessions.  
 
That Nigeria focused on securing employment for Nigerians in the NPI, rather than to 
develop indigenous PEPCs as was the case in Norway and Brazil, perhaps explains why the 
first indigenous concessions were awarded only in 1991, more than 30 years after the 
industry began.
19
 This is in contrast again to Norway, where indigenously owned Norsk 
Hydro began to play significant roles in the North Sea as far back as the early 1970s, just a 
few years after the Norwegian petroleum industry began in earnest.
20
 In fact prior to its 
                                                 
18
 See Clause 17(1) of OML 92, see also . Ike Oguine, ‘Nigerian Content in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry: 
Legal and Policy Issues’ (2011) Vol. 29, JENRL at 408 
19
 They include Dubri Oil, Con Oil and Solgas Nigeria Limited. 
20
 NorskHydro ‘A History of Innovation’ (2014) <http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Our-history/> 
accessed 13 March 2014 
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merger with Statoil, Norsk Hydro developed its capacity to a level where it could compete 
with Statoil and other IOCs in the North Sea.
21
 In addition to indigenous PEPCs, Norway was 
able to develop some of the best service firms in the world, a factor that contributed to the 
significant growth of its local content in the North Sea. 
  
Other legislative initiatives that had a bearing on local content include regulation 2(3) of the 
Oil and Gas Pipelines Regulation 1995. The regulation provided that licences for the 
construction of pipelines are not to be awarded to bidding firms unless a list of construction 
companies to be considered for the work have been submitted to, and approved by the DPR. 
Also section 5 (1) (h) of the NNPC Act mandates NNPC to generally engage in activities that 
would enhance the petroleum industry in the overall interest of Nigeria. Item 5 of the 
guidelines for the oil and gas industry of the National Insurance Commission also contains 
provisions geared towards encouraging insurers in the petroleum industry. In order to develop 
viable human resources, Nigeria enacted the Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF) by 
Act No. 25 of 1973.
22
 Over the past four decades, the PTDF has been able to train thousands 
of Nigerians in various aspects of the petroleum industry by granting scholarships, and 
collaborating with research institutions.
23
 
 
When eventually Nigeria began to assert some authority over the NPI, it focused more on 
revenue collection and sharing rather than local content. It established the Nigerian National 
Oil Corporation (NNOC) in 1971 via a decree No 18, and the NNPC via decree No 33 of 
1977 as successor to NNOC. Through NNOC and later NNPC, Nigeria acquired majority 
stakes in concessions operated by IOCs, and thus had unique and greater opportunities to 
increase its local content, but this was not the case. It will be recalled that Statoil developed 
by utilising similar opportunities when it was conferred with 50 per cent stakes in all 
concessions operated by IOCs in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS).
24
 With its unique 
position, Statoil was able to pursue Norway’s local content policies and to enable the 
                                                 
21
 Hydro, ‘1969: Ekofisk - a Christmas surprise’ (2014) <http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Our-
history/1946---1977/1969-Ekofisk---a-Christmas-surprise/>accessed 30 March 2014 
22
 Ch P.14 LFN 2004, see PTDF, ‘History’ (2012)  
<http://www.ptdf.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40&Itemid=54> accessed 13 
November 2012  
23
 PTDF, ‘Local and Overseas Scholarship Scheme’ (2013) 
<http://www.ptdf.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105> accessed 18 March 2013 
24
 See chapter two, para 2.7.1 
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development of local businesses in the NCS. As majority holder of all concessions operated 
by IOCs, NNPC was thus in a position to require its IOC partners to execute some contracts 
within Nigeria through local subsidiaries, and to patronise Nigerians in other respects.
25
 This 
was not done however, perhaps due in part to infrastructural and capacity challenges, and in 
part to the absence of visionary leadership. 
 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR WEAK 
NIGERIAN CONTENT IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY  
 
The Nigerian content is considered low when compared to those of Norway and Brazil which 
began producing petroleum about the same period as Nigeria. In fact as at 2002, the Nigerian 
content was estimated at being less than 5 per cent.
26
 And while recent legislative initiatives 
have resulted in some increase, most industry observers currently agree that the Nigeria 
content currently hovers between 12 to 18 per cent. 
27
 This is largely because while a 
reasonable number of Nigerians are employed in the industry, IOCs and their foreign partners 
still dominate about 90 per cent of the petroleum produced in Nigeria.
28
 The various reasons 
why this situation has continued will be examined next. 
 
4.4.1   THE ABSENCE OF A COM PREHENSIVE LOCAL CONTENT POLICY PRE 
1999 
                                                 
25Ike Oguine ‘Nigerian Content  (n 18) 
26
 See Jean Balouga , ‘Nigerian Local Content: Challenges and Prospects’ (2012)International Association of 
Energy Economics   www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=176 accessed 11 November 2012 ,  Per 
Heum and others, ‘Enhancement of Local Content in the upstream Oil and Gas Industry In Nigeria’ (2003) SNF 
Report NO 25/03, SNF : Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration 
<http://brage.bibsys.no/nhh/handle/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_21973> accessed 12 November 2012 which 
puts Nigerian content development at 25 per cent in 2003 while the Nigerian Content Division put it at 20 per 
cent in 2005. See Ike Oguine  , ‘Nigerian Content in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry: Legal and Policy Issues’ 
(n. 18) at  
NCDMB, ‘Nigeria Content Support Fund  Hits $100’ (October 9 2012 ) 
<http://www.ncdmb.gov.ng/index.php/public-relations/news-updates/127-nigeria-content-support-fund-hits-
100-million> accessed 19 November 2012 
27
 Ejiofor Alike, ‘Nwapa: Nigerian Content in Oil Industry Hovers around 18% 5 June 2012’ Thisday (Abuja 5 
June 2012) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nwapa-nigerian-content-in-oil-industryhovers around-18-
/117302/> accessed 15 November 2012  
28
 See Segun Adeniyi, ‘Real Ownership of Oil Blocks Revealed’ Thisday (14 March 2013) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/real-ownership-of-indigenous-oil-blocks-revealed/142113/> accessed 14 
March 2013 
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It was demonstrated earlier that while Norway and Brazil had strategic petroleum industry 
policies geared towards resource nationalism, Nigeria lacked a similar policy or objective.
29
 
In order to encourage the development of indigenous PEPCs Norway developed a strategy of 
awarding a single petroleum concession to two and sometimes three firms. These firms were 
thus able to pool resources in order to develop their offshore concessions.
30
 A lack of viable 
policies, coupled with the virtual absence of in-country capacity, may have informed why 
Nigeria’s earliest local content legislations which as demonstrated earlier, were focused on 
job creation, rather than on a viable NOC, or indigenous PEPCs.
31
 
 
4.4.2  THE ABSENCE OF A VIB RANT NATIONAL OIL COMPANY AND 
INDIGENOUS PRIVATE P EPCS  
 
A consequence of the absence of a viable Nigerian content policy was the lack of a vibrant 
and operational NOC in the mould of Statoil, Petronas, or Petrobras. NNPC’s upstream 
subsidiary, the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) produces only about 130 
barrels of crude oil daily (about 5.65 per cent of Nigeria’s daily crude oil production), and is 
not in a position to influence local content development from a practical standpoint. Vibrant 
and functional NOCs generate billions of dollars for their home countries and are able to fund 
technological research, patronise local industry, and monitor IOCs in order to ensure they 
comply with local content stipulations.
32
 For example, Petrobras of Brazil which controls 
over 90 per cent of Brazil’s crude oil production, is in a position to support the 
implementation of Brazil’s local content policies by monitoring the operations of its IOC 
partners.
33
  
 
                                                 
29
 See para 2.8 
30
 See Helge Ryggvik, The Norwegian Oil Experience: A Toolbox for Managing Resources?’ (2010) 
<http://www.sv.uio.no/tik/forskning/publikasjoner/tik-artikkelserie/Ryggvik.pdf?> accessed 13  March 2014 
31
 See para 4.3 
32
 Petrobras has invested billions in research and development. Currently,  Petronas has a technology based 
university in Malaysia. See ‘University Tekhnologi Petronas’ <http://www.utp.edu.my/> accessed 18 March 
2013 
33
 Rodrigo Orihuela & Peter Millard, ‘Petrobras First Female CEO Is Rousseff’s Response to Delayed Oil’ 
Bloomberg (2012)  <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-01/petrobras-first-female-ceo-is-rousseff-s-
response-to-delayed-oil.html>  accessed 19 March 2013 
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That a viable NOC can significantly protect a country’s local content can be seen in 
Malaysia’s Petronas, which also executes regulatory functions in the Malaysian upstream. 
Petronas monitors its PSC partners in order to ensure compliance with local content 
regulations. Thus from its vantage position, it is able to require its PSC partners to ‘comply 
with the national objective of maximizing Malaysian participation in the use of local 
equipment, facilities, goods, materials, supplies and services in petroleum operations.’34 In 
that regard, it is able to insist that Malaysian firms are given priority in procurements, 
supplies, and services. Actually, contracts can only be awarded to foreign firms where there 
are no Malaysian firms available to execute such jobs. Furthermore, any firm desirous of 
executive oil servicing contracts in Malaysia must be licensed by Petronas and fulfil specified 
requirements.
35
 
 
Closely related to the absence of a vibrant NOC in Nigeria, was the absence of vibrant 
indigenous PEPCs and oil servicing firms of international reckoning. Local content requires 
viable indigenous petroleum operators and service firms to develop to execute incidental jobs 
like drilling, construction, and design. Firms like Halliburton and Schlumberger are examples 
of oil servicing firms of international reckoning which are able to develop offshore and 
onshore infrastructure for the petroleum industry.  
 
4.4.3  NIGERIA’S WEAK MANUF ACTURING SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON 
LOCAL CONTENT DEVELO PMENT 
 
Local content in Nigeria suffered in no small measure from a weak manufacturing sector in 
Nigeria. The petroleum industry is technology and skill intensive. This explains why highly 
industrialised countries like the UK and Canada, still require input from foreign firms to 
develop their petroleum fields. Nigeria however is not an industrialised nation. As at 2003, 
manufacturing accounted for less than 5 per cent of its exports,
36
 and by 2013 it accounted for 
                                                 
34
 Bank Pembangunan, ‘Report On Malaysia Oil and Gas Exploration and Production’ 
(2011)<http://www.bpmb.com.my/GUI/pdf/annual_report/2011/20.pdf > 63 
35
 Ibid, 64 
36
 See Per Heum and others, ‘Enhancement of Local Content (n 58, chapter 2), 11 
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10 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP.37 For a country with over 160 million people, Nigeria’s overall 
industrial steel consumption is about 10 kilogrammes, below the world average of 150 
kilogrammes.
38
 A strong manufacturing base is required for fabrication, construction, and the 
execution of other contracts in the NPI.
39
 Weak manufacturing is often used by IOCs to 
justify why they outsource jobs to foreign firms.
 
  
4.4.4  WEAK INFRASTRUCTURAL  BASE  
 
Closely allied to weak manufacturing is a weak infrastructural base. Nigeria’s road, rail, and 
water transport systems are all in need of refurbishment. Vital infrastructure like power and 
communication, which are required for the development of a vibrant manufacturing sector, 
are considered very low.
40
 Currently only about 26.5 per cent of Nigerians have access to the 
internet,
41
 and Nigeria’s internet connection is one of the slowest in the world.42 And 
although home to just 50 million people as against Nigeria’s 160 million, South Africans 
consume 55 per cent more electricity than Nigerians.
43
 These limitations have invariably 
impacted Nigeria’s local content, since infrastructure is the base upon which indigenous 
PEPCs can develop.   
 
4.4.5  FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS OF LOCAL OPERATORS  
 
                                                 
37
 National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Manufacturing’ (2013) 
<http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/sectorstat/sectors/Manufacturing> accessed 25 April 2014 
38
 Ruth T. Nastha, ‘Poor Funding, Bane Of Steel Sector’s Growth’ The Nation (Abuja, 6 October 2012)  
<http://www.leadership.ng/nga/articles/36663/2012/10/06/poor_funding_bane_steel_sectors_growth.html?quick
tabs_3=1> accessed 20 November 2012  
39
 Examples: steel pipes, FPSOS, tank farms, etc.  
40
 Roads, water and rail are all moribund. See Adibe Emenyonu, ‘Business Growth: W’Bank Identifies Poor 
Infrastructure as Bane’ Thisday (11 August 2011) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/business-growth-w-
bank-identifies-poor-infrastructure-as-bane/96433/> accessed 17 March 2013, See also Familoni, K.A. (2006), 
“The Role of Economic and Social Infrastructure in Economic Development: A Global view’ (2006) Vol 6(4) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11-32 
41
 Everest Amaefule, ‘Nigeria Joins top  20 Internet Nations’ punch (6 may 2012)  
<http://www.punchng.com/business/nigeria-joins-top-20-internet-nations/> accessed 17 March 2013  
42
 Alexander Chejina, ‘How Poor, Slow Connections Torment Nigerian Internet Users’  Business Day (28 
February 2011) <http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/analysis/features/18539-how-poor-slow-
connections-torment-nigerian-internet-users> accessed             17 March 2013 
43
 Electricity in Nigeria: Let there be Light’ Economist (Abuja, )  <http://www.economist.com/node/17312103> 
accessed 18 March 2013 
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Difficulty in accessing financial facility on the part of indigenous PEPCs and LOSFs is 
currently one of the biggest impediments to the development of local content in Nigeria.
44
 
The petroleum industry is capital intensive and entails more than the average business risk. 
Banks therefore demand higher interest rates and sureties before granting loans to the 
industry.
45
 Funding is however not just a Nigerian problem, for even Brazil also liberalised its 
petroleum industry primarily to tackle funding challenges.
46
 In 1986, a study in the 
University of Aberdeen indicated that of the over 1000 petroleum-related firms in Aberdeen, 
many were subsidiaries, or affiliates of American firms. The study also noted that most of the 
British owned firms in Aberdeen were involved in insurance and catering, and not in core 
petroleum operations. 
47
 Commenting on the study, Wade notes that it demonstrated that  
‘…the barriers to entry for local firms in such a capital-intensive (and more recently, 
technologically intensive) industry are significant, even with an aggressive local preference 
policy and a significant pool of producing facilities.’48 
 
Besides charging high interest rates, few Nigerian banks have the capacity to fund major 
projects in the NPI, when compared to their Western counterparts. In some instances, 
entrepreneurs have had to rely on syndicated loans to fund certain projects in the Nigerian 
economy.
49
 For example, in Nigeria’s ongoing power sector privatization, successful bidders 
of Nigeria’s 11 distribution companies have struggled to meet financial requirements of the 
Bureau of Public Enterprises.
50
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and Gas Financing’ (1995) Vol. 23 Energy Policy,  991-1000 
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 See Yanko Marcius De Alencar Xavier , ‘Energy for the Future: Brazilian Law and Policy’ in Donald N. 
Zillman and others (eds),  Beyond the Carbon Economy: Energy Law in Transition (Oxford 2008)at 399 
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50
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March 2013) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/investors-struggle-to-raise-funds-for-acquisition-of-power-
assets/141821/> accessed 9 March 2013, See also Terje I. Vaaland1 and others, ‘Local Content and Struggling 
 124 
 
 
There have however been certain initiatives established to address the funding challenge and 
to encourage local contractors. In 2012, Shell partnered with some Nigerian banks to 
establish a $5 billion to support local oil and gas firms.
51
 And in 2013, the NLNG also set up 
a $1 billion fund to support its local contractors in the industry.
52
 The FGN also established a 
Nigerian Content Development Fund in pursuance to NOGICDA. The Fund is supported 
mainly by PEPCs which are required to contribute 1 per cent of their profit to it.
53
 Currently 
the fund is valued at $350 million.
54
  
 
4.4.6   INADEQUATE HUMAN CAPACITY  
 
Although Nigeria has a sizeable number of engineers and geologists in the petroleum 
industry, it still struggles with a shortage of skilled manpower. Institutions of learning are the 
source for recruitment of manpower to meet the local content targets. And although Nigeria 
has an appreciable number of universities and polytechnics offering engineering, geology, 
technical and science based courses, the level of education is relatively weak.
55
 With frequent 
strikes, poor funding, weak infrastructure, and corruption, Nigeria’s universities are 
consistently rated low among global universities.
56
 And this decline in education is reflected 
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in the petroleum industry, where Nigerian graduates are unable to meet requirements in the 
industry, a situation that further justifies IOCs’ employment of foreign expatriates.57  
 
4.5 ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA’S POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE 
INITIATIVES FOR LOCAL CONTENT DEVELOPMENT  
 
In 2001 the FGN commissioned a study on the extent of local content in the NPI. Another 
study was undertaken by a Norwegian firm, INTSOK in 2003. The recommendations from 
both studies formed the basis of Nigeria’s local content policy. The policy was first embodied 
in the Nigerian Content Development Bill 2003. Pending the enactment of the Nigerian 
Content Development Bill 2003, NNPC took a proactive stance by establishing a Nigerian 
Content Division (NCD). 
 The NCD published local content guidelines in 2006 and sought to monitor compliance by 
its JVs/PSC partners.
58
  Commenting on the guidelines, Atsegbua notes that although they  
‘…did not have the force of law, it had far reaching effects with NNPC as senior partner in 
most oil and gas projects, and aimed to increase local content value in the provision of 
materials, services and equipment to the local oil and gas industry to 70 per cent by 2010. It 
therefore required compliance by tenderers seeking to execute contracts with NNPC 
participation.’59  
 
Seven years after the Nigerian Content Bill 2003 was submitted to the National Assembly, it 
was passed into law and renamed the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.webometrics.info/en/search/Rankings/university%20of%20lagos%20type%3Amundial> accessed 
17 March 2013 
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2013 
58
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Act (NOGICDA) 2010. The contents of NOGICDA, it strengths, weaknesses, and prospects 
for local content development will be analysed next.’ 
 
4.5.1  NOGICDA: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND PROSPECTS FOR LOCAL 
CONTENT DEVELOPMENT  
 
NOGICDA is Nigeria’s first comprehensive legal framework for local content in Nigeria.60 
Among other things, it established the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring board 
(NCDMB) as local content regulator.
61
 The Act requires all PEPCs operating in Nigeria to 
give first consideration to Nigerian firms in their award of contracts relating to the NPI.
62
 
There are provisions relating to technology transfer,
63
 and requirements for operators to 
patronise Nigerian lawyers, banks, insurers and media practitioners.
64
 Under NOGICDA, the 
submission of a Nigerian content to the NCDMB is a pre-condition for the award of 
petroleum contracts.
65
  
 
Under NOGICDA a petroleum contract is required to be awarded to Nigerian firms if the sum 
in their contract bid does not exceed the lowest bid of foreign firms, by 10 per cent.
66
 It gives 
                                                 
60 By virtue of s 1 of NOGICDA, the Act supersedes all prior legal provisions relating to Local Content in the 
petroleum industry. See also Ayodele Oni, ‘ Nigerian Local Content Act: A Status Report’ BusinessDay (28 
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content-act-a-status-report> accessed 7 August 2013 
61
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62
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63
 Ss 43, 45 and 46.  
64
 Ss 49, 51 and 52. Jean Balouga notes that ‘Even the local media has been denied the much desired 
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prospects > accessed 21 November 2012  
65
 Ss 8 and 69 
66
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Nigerians the first option in employment,
67
 and requires all PEPCs to submit ‘employment 
and training’ plans within a given time frame.68 Furthermore, the Act authorises the minister 
of petroleum to require PEPCs to invest in, or set up facilities, factories, and production units. 
The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that such firms manufacture services otherwise 
imported into Nigeria, and to provide for tax incentives to compliant firms.
69
 NOGICDA also 
requires PEPCs to establish project offices at places where project and procurement decisions 
are to be made.
70
 
 
NOGICDA further requires operators to comply with minimum specifications for Nigerian 
content as listed in the schedule to the Act.
71
 And to ensure compliance, PEPCs are required 
to submit annual performance reports to the NCDMB, detailing the extent of compliance.
72
 
Under the Act, defaulting firms will pay a fine of five per cent of the contract sum in which 
the breach occurred.
73
 In order to encourage the employment of Nigerians in the industry, 
section 34 of NOGICDA provides that ‘all projects or contracts whose total budget exceeds 
$100 million (USD) shall contain a "Labour Clause" mandating the use of a minimum 
percentage of Nigerian labour in specific cadres as may be stipulated by the board.’74 But 
while section 11(1) and (3) of NOGICDA requires all operators to comply with the minimum 
Nigerian content, sections 32 and 33 provide for a five per cent expatriate work force to cater 
for shareholders’ interests.75 
 
Without doubt, NOGICDA’s provisions are extensive and in-depth and provide ‘…great 
opportunities for growth and expansion of Nigerian companies involved in the oil and gas 
industry,’ and it is set ‘to ensure skills development and capacity building within the Nigerian 
oil and gas sector.’76  
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In addition to NOGICDA, the Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA) 1959 disallows PEPCs 
from claiming capital allowances for the importation of certain goods which could have been 
purchased in Nigeria.
77
 And PIB proposes to prohibit concessionaires from commencing 
operations without an approved Nigerian content plan.
78
 The PIB also seeks to encourage 
indigenous PEPCs. It provides that the FGN shall not have the right to participate in 
concessions owned by Nigerian firms, where daily crude oil production or its natural gas 
equivalent, is less than twenty five thousand barrels per day.
79
  
 
Without doubt, NOGICDA is a landmark step towards local content development in the NPI. 
As elaborate as NOGICDA is however, it is at its infancy stage and requires time for a more 
elaborate evaluation of its impact on the industry and the economy. The next segment will 
however seek to determine if there has been any significant impact since NOGICDA, its 
challenges, and the way forward. 
 
4.5.2  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF NOGICDA ON  THE NIGERIAN 
CONTENT 
 
Without doubt Nigeria has recorded some improvement in local content since NOGICDA, 
even though it is often difficult to ascertain the extent of the impact of the Act. Since 
NOGICDA, Nigeria has however sought to develop in-country value addition by seeking to 
create value from activities in the NPI. The Act has promoted the use of local resources and 
has shifted from the revenue focused option under which goods and services were obtained 
from Europe and America off the shelf.  As administrator of NOGICDA, the NCDMB has 
aimed to ensure that all projects executed in the NPI leave behind a ‘…big legacy, a 
fabrication yard, an integration yard or an asset that will continue to run even after the project 
is completed.’80 Ernest Nwapa, the chief executive of the NCDMB observed recently that 
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about 90 per cent engineering in the NPI is done in Nigeria, and fabrication of all field 
development facilities now has 50 per cent of the tonnage done in Nigeria. 
81
 
 
 In 2012 Ernest Nwapa had noted that $4 billion out of the estimated $20 billion for 2012, 
was retained in Nigeria.
82
 In its website, the NCDMB notes that the implementation of 
NOGICDA has led to a rise of Nigeria’s local content, from five per cent in 2004 to 35 per 
cent in 2010.
83
 The NCDMB also claims that between 2010 when NOGICDA was enacted 
and 2012, about 2.8 billion dollars have been invested in the NPI.
84
 In February 2013, the 
minster for petroleum resources who also doubles as chairperson of NCDMB told journalists 
that implementation of NOGICDA has led to the creation of 30,862 jobs in the NPI, 
increasing the man-hours performed by Nigerians by 350 per cent.
85
 While the reports from 
the NCDMB and the government appear to reflect a positive outlook in the development of 
the Nigerian content, other industry argue that that NOGICDA has not had significant impact 
on local content, citing frequent breaches of the Act by IOCs.
86
  
One major contribution to Nigeria’s local content development is that it has placed the onus 
on Nigerians to innovate and develop capacity in order to qualify for jobs in the NPI. And 
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guarantees qualified Nigerians that they would be awarded jobs provided they are able to rise 
to the occasion. Also it now requires PEPCs, to comply, not negotiate, as was the case with 
NNPC and its joint venture partners. The removal of the negotiation element may lead to 
inflexible impositions of local content requirements, even where compliance may not be easy. 
This option may however be preferable to the option of leaving such an important aspect of 
the economy at the hands of NNPC, given its peculiar challenges. 
 
With NOGICDA, the NCDMB has become the first independent and separate regulator and 
monitor of the Nigerian content, a strategy that has some merits.  The NCDMB on the other 
hand has defined terms of reference, a wide jurisdiction over the petroleum industry, and 
operates with some level of independence from the industry. Beyond the administration of 
NOGCIDA, NCDMB is also responsible for developing initiatives aimed at local content 
development in Nigeria and assessing Nigeria’s capacity needs. Therefore it is able to focus 
on monitoring local content compliance in order to prevent breaches and loss of revenues for 
the Nigerian economy. The NCDMB is also able to impose sanctions on defaulting firms and 
where necessary, ban some firms from operating in Nigeria, where such firms flagrantly 
breach NOGICDA.
87
 The establishment of NCDMB also frees DPR and NNPC to focus on 
their core objectives.   
 
It will be recalled that even though the NCD partnered with DPR and National Insurance 
Commission (NAICOM) in local content promotion, it did so without any direct legal 
backing. And although the NCD could be arguably said to have midwifed the NCDMB, its 
jurisdiction did not extend to indigenous PEPCs, oil service firms and other IOCs which did 
not did not execute PSCs or JVs. It will also be recalled that DPR was already struggling with 
a shortage of personnel and funding in the execution of its core mandate of monitoring 
petroleum operations.  
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In terms of industry exposure, there have also been some improvements locally and some oil 
servicing firms in Nigeria are beginning to make their mark in the industry, but they still 
appear few, and far between. In 2013, a local content feat was achieved when Niger Dock, 
and Dorman Long Engineering Limited
88
 (both indigenous firms), fabricated two major well 
heads for Mobile Producing Nigeria. This project is a land mark achievement as it is the 
largest fabrication contract executed in-country for Nigeria’s joint venture operations. 89 Also 
Fenog Limited which was named the ‘indigenous oil and gas company of the year’ has made 
significant strides in drilling and the use of world class technology.
90
  
 
It is intended to consider certain aspects of NOGICDA which deserves special attention.  
 
4.5.3  CHALLENGES TO THE IM PLEMENTATION OF NOGICDA 
 
A careful analysis of NOGICDA indicates that its requirements are quite ambitious, this is 
more so in the light of prevalent challenges to local content development in the NPI.
91
 This 
may be a direct response to the unacceptably low Nigerian content, 57 years after the NPI 
began in earnest. This is in contrast to the more flexible and collaborative approaches adopted 
by Norway and the UK in the 1970s. The Norwegian and UK approaches may have been 
informed by the fact that their petroleum industries in were in infancy and required a more 
collaborative rather than rigid approach. But how can NOGICDA be successfully 
implemented without being a hurdle in way of progress has been the concern of many 
commentators.
92
 For instance, section 41(2) of the Act requires IOCs working through their 
Nigerian subsidiaries to demonstrate that a minimum of 50 per cent of the equipment 
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deployed for execution of work are owned by their Nigerian subsidiaries. And section 11(4) 
provides that:  
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, where there is inadequate 
capacity to any of the targets in the Schedule to this Act, the Minister may authorize the 
continued importation of the relevant items and such approval by the Minister shall not 
exceed 3 years from the commencement of this Act.’93 
 
A strict application of the above provision would imply that the powers of the minster to 
grant waivers ended in 2013. Many observers acknowledge however that satisfying the 
requirements of NOGICDA which on the average is 67 per cent Nigerian content would be 
difficult to attain.
94 Nwaokoro notes that NOGICDA  ignores Nigeria’s lack of capacity, and 
its  requirement that PEPCs use Nigerian financial and insurance services ‘…ignores 
systemic problems in Nigerian banks.’95 
 
 It will be recalled that an industrialised country like the UK depended heavily on American 
firms in order to exploit petroleum on its side of the North Sea. And even with significant 
technological advancement, Norway and Brazil still require the input of British, Dutch and 
American firms in order to exploit their petroleum fields.  
 
It is either that the framers of NOGICDA ignored Nigeria’s unique challenges, or were very 
optimistic that they could be addressed within a very short period. This however has not been 
the case, as Nigeria’s infrastructural reforms are still ongoing. And although there are 
prospects that reform will lead to a higher Nigerian content over time, the three year 
requirement appears unrealistic. To that extent, there may therefore be need to amend section 
11(4) of NOGICDA, or for the government to refuse to apply the section strictly, if doing so 
would hinder the progress of the industry.   
                                                 
93
 Emphasis supplied  
94
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extent of local capacity and expertise. See also Lawrence A. Atsegbua,  (60) at 491 
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 Joseph E .Nwaokoro, ‘Signed, Sealed but will it Deliver? (n 59) 56 
 133 
 
 
An ambitious piece of legislation is acceptable provided there are sufficient inbuilt 
mechanisms to prevent rigidity and ensure smoothness of operations. Nigeria may therefore 
need to temper ambition with reality. Between local content and development. As Nigeria 
seeks to develop its petroleum industry after other functional models like Norway and Brazil, 
it is also important to appreciate the difference between local content protection and local 
content development. For an appreciation of the circumstances that distinguish both 
strategies, is important for an informed local content strategy.  
 
Local content protection is required where a country’s industries are threatened by foreign 
competition. Some countries have been known to mass produce and to flood the markets of 
other countries with cheap products. As such dumping can cripple local industries a country 
may ban or restrict foreign services or goods by imposing prohibitive taxes on imported 
products. Alternatively, it may grant tax reliefs and subsidies for locally produced goods and 
services etc. But such a strategy is used on the premise that there is local capacity that is 
threatened. For example Brazil adopted a protectionist local content regime to limit foreign 
competition, which arose after the liberalisation of the petroleum industry in 1997. But this 
approach is justified on the basis that Brazil has developed in country capacity to a significant 
extent, and has a viable NOC.  
 
Like Brazil, Nigeria’s NOGICDA appears to reflect a protectionist regime, even though it is 
described as a developmental strategy in its long title. The question however is whether there 
is much to protect. A development strategy is resorted to where a country admits its lack of 
in-country capacity and technology, and seeks to develop same in order to address industry 
demands. In such case, the country will adopt a less aggressive and adversarial stance. It will 
seek to develop capacity though a gradual and slow process, by implementing policies that 
are geared towards that objective. For instance, a country may invest in technology research, 
award scholarships, sign agreements for technology transfer and ensure IOCs do not 
outsource jobs that can be locally performed.  
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The question is, can Nigeria afford to adopt a protectionist stance when it does not have 
adequate in-country capacity? It has been observed that Nigeria struggles with weak 
manufacturing, weak educational institutions, poor infrastructure and funding. These have 
meant that while it has made some strides in fabrication, it remains weak in manufacturing. In 
fact the few oil servicing firms that have made some mark in the industry still outsource most 
of their manufacturing jobs to foreign firms. For instance Fenog’s seven Horizontal 
Directional Drilling fleet were manufactured in Germany to the specifications of Fenog. 
Hence although Fenog was named indigenous company of the year for 2013, the truth 
remains that it was not the manufacturer of the product for which it was awarded. In the same 
vein, Ernest Nwapa also noted that Nigeria’s major limitation remains manufacturing.96  
 
Nigeria may therefore require a more developmental and gradual process similar to that of 
Norway in the North Sea, rather than an aggressive protectionist approach. But the question 
is: how gradual should this approach be, given that Nigeria has over 50 years of petroleum 
industry experience? It is conceded that Nigeria’s approach should not be as mild and 
collaborative as was the case with Norway, or is the case with new entrants to the petroleum 
industry like Ghana and Uganda. But neither can it take an approach which is too aggressive 
due to current limitations. Rather, Nigeria should seek a hybrid between protectionist and 
developmental approaches. On the one hand, NOGICDA should serve as a guide and catalyst 
at least in the interim, while on the background, Nigeria should seek to address the 
underlying issues of weak education, manufacturing, infrastructure and funding.  
 
Poor implementation of ambitious laws is a recurring challenge in Nigeria. Since 1999, 
Nigeria has enacted far reaching legislations in a bid to overturn nearly three decades of 
neglect, occasioned by military dictatorship. Laudable and promising as most of these laws 
are, implementation has been difficult due to capacity challenges. Unless Nigeria creates the 
right atmosphere for a successful implementation of NOGICDA, the Act may be obeyed 
more in breach. Some of such ambitious laws with weak impact and implementation will be 
considered next. 
 
                                                 
96
 See Emma Okonji (n 81)  
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4.5.4  ASSOCIATED GAS RE -INJECTION ACT (AGRA)  1979  
 
AGRA is an example of an ambitious legislation which was enacted without creating a 
proportional atmosphere for its successful implementation. When enacted in 1979, it 
stipulated 1984 as the year in which all gas flaring would become illegal in Nigeria, but 35 
years on, gas flaring continues in Nigeria, almost unabated.
97
  
 
Currently, 1.4 billion cubic feet worth of gas, estimated at $4.9 million, is flared daily.
98
 IOCs 
which together flare more than ninety percent of Nigeria’s associated gas, have repeatedly 
indicated their willingness to invest in trapping or utilizing same should the FGN provide a 
viable market for same. It is estimated that between 1961 and 1998 about 704,461.6 million 
cubic meters of associated gas was produced in Nigeria representing an average of 82.02 per 
cent of the total production.
99
 
 
AGRA however provided for adequate waivers until such a time as Nigeria develops 
adequate infrastructure and a gas market to support the eradication of gas flaring. The 
waivers ensured that the Act did not hinder petroleum production.
100
 It may be argued on the 
one hand that the AGRA waivers may have actually hindered the abolition of gas flaring in 
Nigeria. It is possible that without them, the FGN and IOCs may have forged a strategy to 
eradicate gas flaring, which poses a serious threat to the Nigerian environment. On the other 
hand, without these waivers, AGRA may have posed a stumbling block to economic 
development in the face of weak infrastructure.  
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March 2014  
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 Okoh RN (ed), ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Gas Production in Nigeria  (Ibadan, 2001). (Natural Resource Use, 
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Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria. ' (2006) 24/4 JERNL, Law 574  
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AGRA has however portrayed that legislation alone, without the necessary commitment to 
implementation and the availability of the relevant resources for implementation, cannot 
produce desired results. Therefore while there is need to ensure NOGICDA is not obeyed 
more in breach, as has been the case with AGRA, waivers should be grantable in deserving 
cases.  
 
4.5.5  THE COASTAL AND INLA ND SHIPPING CABOTAGE  ACT 2003 
 
In response to a dismally low Nigerian content in the shipping industry, Nigeria enacted the 
Coastal and Inland Shipping Cabotage Act (Cabotage Act) 2003. The Cabotage Act 
established the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and made 
far reaching provisions for the development of a significant Nigerian content in the shipping 
industry.
101
 Many Nigerians were hopeful the Act would usher in a new era of ship building, 
create employment and improve economic performance. The difficulty with the Cabotage Act 
however, came with implementation and enforcement as section 3 requires all cabotage 
vessels to be built in Nigeria. This requirement has been almost impossible to comply with 
since Nigeria is not a ship building nation, and lacks sufficient human capacity to man all 
internally used vessels.
102 
 
Eleven years after the Cabotage Act was enacted, it is now widely acknowledged that its 
impact has been negligible.
103
 According to Louis Mbanefo, a senior advocate of Nigeria, the 
Cabotage Act has failed for being   
“…badly thought out and fundamentally flawed. Whilst the object may be laudable, the 
foundation of the Act was faulty… As a policy statement of future aspiration it is fine but to 
make it applicable with almost immediate effect was most ill-advised. The Act then provides 
                                                 
101
 See Lazarus O. Ukpere and Wilfred I Ukpere, ‘A Strategic Reposition of the Maritime Industry for Economic 
Recovery and Sustainability: "The Cabotage Act"’ (2011) Vol 5(14) African Journal of Business Management, 
5658-5663. See also Damachi, B. B and Zhaosheng, Yang, ‘The Nigerian Shipping Industry and 
Indigenous Shipping Companies’ (2005) Vol. 32 Maritime Policy & Management, 2005, p.31-38 
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 S 23, Cabotage Act 2003 
103Samson Echenim, ‘Success Of The Cabotage Act, Still A Major Concern To NIMASA —Zailani’ Leadership  
(18 May 2012) 
<http://www.leadership.ng/nga/articles/25024/2012/05/18/success_cabotage_act_still_major_concern_nimasa_z
ailani.html> accessed 12 November 2012 
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that waivers may be granted by the Minister to foreigners to operate cabotage vessels and 
foreigners continue to operate as before by virtue of waivers. It seems to me that the 
reasoning is flawed. You set targets that Nigerians cannot reach and then you grant foreigners 
the waivers to continue to operate! I think a radical restructuring is called for, not cosmetic 
amendments.” 
 
Nigeria still relies largely on foreign ships and vessels even though this violates the 
requirements of the Cabotage Act. That the Act has largely failed to meet its objectives was 
recently acknowledged by Ibrahim Zailani, executive director of Maritime Labour and 
Cabotage Services in NIMASA. Zailani, who was a member of the National Assembly when 
Cabotage Act was enacted into law, noted that:  
‘Now that I am in charge of implementing Cabotage, I have seen the practical difficulties of 
implementing the Act
104
. The Cabotage Act, I will say, was virtually built on almost nothing; 
and, to me, you cannot build on nothing.’ 105  
In order to remove obstacles to progress which the Act represents, NIMASA recently tabled a 
draft bill for its amendment in order to bring it in line with current realities.
106
 
 
4.5.6  NIGERIAN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARE NCY INITIATIVE 
(NEITI)  ACT 2007  
 
When the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act was enacted in 
2007, its transparency and disclosure requirements exceeded those of the global Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
107
 The NEITI Act raised expectations that decades 
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 Emphasis supplied 
105
 Samson Echenim (n 106)  
106
 The essence of the amendment Bill which has passed the second reading at the National Assembly, is to 
amend certain provision of the Cabotage Act and ‘expand its scope to cover all offshore operations in the 
Nigerian coastal and inland shipping waters.’ The amendment will also address some gaps in the Cabotage Act 
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e+Turning+Good+Or+Bad> accessed 23 April 2014 
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 See also, Nicholas Shaxson, ‘Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Just a Glorious Audit?’ 
(2009)  Chatam House , Royal Institute of International Affairs, < http://eiti.org/document to amend Cabotage 
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of secrecy and corruption in the NPI would soon be over and that there would be 
transparency and accountability. Some industry observers however cautioned against over 
excitement, and waited to see the extent to which the Act would and could be implemented.  
 
The NEITI board initially showed some promise by publishing in 2006 the first and most 
comprehensive audit of the industry at the time which covered the period from 1999-2004. 
The NEITI report exposed for the first time the intricate workings of the industry and revenue 
flows between the government and PEPCs and was greeted with zest and enthusiasm. The 
initial zest of the board and its impact on the NPI has however slowed down, partly due to a 
lack of political patronage, funding problems and capacity problems, and internal 
corruption.
108 
  
Today the NEITI board is regarded by many Nigerians as a dog that barks but cannot bite.  
Corruption, lack of accountability and secrecy in petroleum revenues remains a challenge. 
Summing up their findings on the impact assessment of the NEITI Act, Osaretin and 
Atsegbua noted that although the Nigerian government introduced the NEITI reform with 
zeal and enthusiasm, there has been a ‘…lack of will power to implement them to a logical 
conclusion.’ The effect is that ‘…reform measures introduced through these legal provisions 
have not had any substantial impact in curbing corruption in the respective sectors covered by 
them.’109 There is therefore need to ensure that NOGICDA does not go the way of the 
AGRA, NEITI, or Cabotage Acts. And this will require erection of structures that make 
implementation realisable.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Act’ Thisday (28 January 2012 http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/yuguda-denies-links-with-sect/108027/ 
accessed /shaxson-neiti-glorious-audit> accessed 20 November 2012  
108
 In November 2012, a petroleum revenue special task force submitted its report which noted that  unethical 
practices may have cost Nigeria over $29 billion in gas deals while over $180 million paid as signature bonuses 
by oil companies was unaccounted for. See  
Ademola Adeyemo ‘Ribadu Panel’s Controversial Report’ Thisday (Abuja, 6 November 2012) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ribadu-panel-s-controversial-report/129753/> accessed 22 November 
2012, but see NLNG Press Release, ‘Ribadu’s Report on NLNG is Inaccurate’ (6 November 2012) 
<http://www.nlng.com/pressreleases.aspx?id> accessed 18 March 2013 
109
 See Osaretin Aigbovo, ‘Nigerian Anti-corruption Statutes: an Impact Assessment’(2013) 62  
 Journal of Money Laundering Control, 1 
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Without doubt, NOGICDA’s 67 per cent Nigerian content requirement is high. How to attain 
this objective though, is the current challenge of the NCDMB, in the face of current 
challenges in the industry in terms of capacity. It is therefore important that policy makers 
consider other equally important factors necessary for the successful implementation of 
Nigeria’s local content policy as law making is entirely different from application. It may be 
conceded that a viable Nigerian content is essential for a functional NPI, but care should be 
taken to avoid NOGICDA going the way of past laudable but ineffective legislative efforts 
.Nigeria requires in-country capacity to meet the demands of the NPI, but till then high 
foreign input will still be required for some time.  
 
From another perspective, an ambitious local content target may spur development and to that 
degree, NOGICDA itself could be viewed as a challenge to Nigeria’s developmental 
endeavours.
110
 For example Brazil’s Law 2004/1953 which excluded foreign input in the 
Brazilian petroleum industry spurred the development of Petrobras. This was due however to 
correlative and aggressive investment in the development of Petrobras which was thus 
enabled to rise to the challenge. But when the needs of the growing industry could not be met 
solely by local capacity, the BPI was liberalised to make room for foreign participation. 
 
4.5.7  BETWEEN CONTRACTUAL AND LEGISLATIVE APPR OACHES TO LOCAL 
CONTENT DEVELOPMENT  
 
Most countries combine contractual and legislative approaches to local content development. 
For instance Brazil relies mainly on ANP’s local content regulations, and combines same 
with clauses in contracts executed with PEPCs. Norway relied more on collaboration and 
contracts than it did on legislation. The success of that approach is premised on regulatory 
capacity and integrity.  
 
                                                 
110
 See Ss 3, 19, 11 and 34 of NOGICDA. Front End Engineering Design (FEED) and Detailed engineering on 
Onshore facilities 90%, Terminal/Oil Movement Systems 80%, Utilities module/packages, 50% , Fire and Gas 
Protection System Services 50%, depending on the type of service to be performed.  
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The current Nigerian approach is legislative, although in the past, reliance was placed more 
on contractual clauses executed with NNPC’s JV/PSC partners. The latter approach however 
resulted in violations of local content agreements which actually occurred with the consent of 
NNPC.
111
 This may have necessitated the current legislative approach in the form of 
NOGICDA, and the establishment of a local content independent regulator with a defined 
scope and terms of reference. The advantage of the legislative approach is that it is open, 
binding and applicable to all PEPCs in the NPI, local or foreign. Additionally, the local 
content regulator may be compelled by the courts to implement the contents of the Act in 
certain cases.
112
 Legislation is permanent until repealed while contracts are variable, and 
company specific. 
113
 
 
Nigeria needs a hybrid between the contractual and legislative approach. Regulators should 
require PEPCs to comply with the Nigerian content, but within a framework that allows for 
flexible negotiations. This will ensure that foreign input can be utilised in order to address 
gaps that are identified in-country. It is however proposed that local content legislation 
should be made by the regulator and not the National Assembly, in keeping with the tradition 
of the Petroleum Act.
114
 The advantage of this approach, which Brazil also adopts, is that 
regulations can be easily amended where they become ‘impossible’ to enforce.  
 
4.6 LESSONS FROM BRAZILIAN, NORWEGIAN, AND BRITISH 
APPROACHES TO LOCAL CONTENT DEVELOPMENT  
 
4.6.1  BRAZIL 
 
                                                 
111
 See Joseph N.E. Nwaokoro, ‘Nigeria’s National Content Bill: The Hype, the Hope and the Reality’ (2011) 
Volume 55 / Issue 01 Journal of African Law, 128 at 155. See also Joseph Nwaokoro, ‘Beyond Legislation: a 
Contractual Alternative to Legislation Local Content in Nigeria’ (2009) Vol 18 Currents: Int’l Trade L.J  42  
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 S.143 of the constitution 
113
 See Jill Rutter and William Knigton, ‘ Legislated Policy Targets’ (2012)  Institute for Government  < 
www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/.../...> accessed 20 November 2012  
114
 The Petroleum Act authorizes the Minister of petroleum to makes regulations for the functioning of the 
industry. Ss 9 and 12 
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As home to Petrobras, a globally recognised NOC, and a host of other indigenous PEPCs, 
Brazil has been able to develop a sizeable level of infrastructural and technological capacity. 
Prior to the liberalisation of the BPI in 1997, scant attention was paid to local content 
regulation given that there was a virtual absence of foreign competition/participation in 
Brazil. 
  
Brazil’s approach to the development of its natural resources has always been strict and 
protectionist. Even with limited internal capacity, Brazil closed its petroleum industry to 
foreign participation.
115
 But this may have been realisable in 1953 when Brazil only had 15 
million barrels of oil and Petrobras produced only 2700 barrels of oil per day.
116
 The same 
approach would have been almost impossible for Norway, where the 1969 Ekofisk field 
accounted for billions of crude oil. Consequently, reliance on foreign input was inevitable for 
Norway which sought to develop indigenous content in the face of vast petroleum reserves 
while Brazil could afford to dispense with same since its reserves were small at the time.
117
  
 
It has been noted that clause 20 of ANP’s model contract requires PEPCs to recognise and 
comply with Brazil’s local content targets which averages about 65 per cent.118 The minimum 
local content required from firms in the BPI is 70 per cent for onshore operations, and 51 for 
offshore and shallow waters of up to 100 metres, and 37 per cent for deep water operations, 
of 100 and 400 metres depth. During the development phase, the minimum local content 
required is 77 per cent for onshore, 63 per cent for offshore in shallow water of up to 100 
metres and 55 per cent for deep water between 100 and 400 metres.
119
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 In the 1960s Brazil proceeded to close most of the downstream in addition to the upstream aspects of its 
petroleum industry. Oliveira Adilson De Oliveira, ‘Brazil’s Petrobras: Strategy and Performance’  in  David G. 
Victor (eds) (n 22, chapter 2), 525 
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118 See
 chapter two, para 2.6.1. See also André Magnabosco, ANP, ‘The Local Content Reg for 
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119Scottish Development International ‘Doing Business in Brazil: Oil and Gas/Subsea Focus’  
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Brazil’s ANP has a methodology for measuring local content compliance, and is authorised to 
impose fines on defaulting firms.
120
 The fines vary from firm to firm, depending on the 
contract amount, the level of local content compliance expected from a firm, and the extent of 
compliance.
121
 In 2011, ANP fined state controlled Petrobras, the sum of $18 million for 
breaching local content in its development of 44 concessions.
122
 
Despite Brazil’s infrastructural and technological feats in the petroleum industry, its 
indigenous capacity has been unable to satisfy the demands of an industry whose potential 
and size has more than doubled with discoveries at the pre-salt.
123
 Brazil has a dearth of 
manpower, in view of which Petrobras required ANP to relax minimum local content 
requirements, as production targets could not be accomplished without external input.
124
 And 
although ANP’s strict local content requirements may slow the pace of exploration, few 
observers doubt the capacity of Petrobras and other Brazilian firms to meet a reasonable 
amount of the needs of the industry.
125
  
 
4.6.2  NORWAY  
 
Norway’s local content strategy in the North Sea during the 1970s was developmental. It 
focused on creating an environment for Statoil and other local firms to gradually develop 
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capacity to compete with foreign elements in the NCS. This perhaps explains why less 
reliance was placed on legislation as Statoil partnered with IOCs, understudied their 
operations and acquired much needed capacity. And although it had local content guidelines, 
Norway did not stipulate minimum local content targets. By the mid-1980s, its local content 
had developed significantly for a protectionist approach to be adopted, but Norway’s 
membership of the EEA in 1994 made any pretence at protectionism illegal and impossible. 
 
4.6.3  UNITED KINGDOM  
 
In response to a study in the 1970s which indicated that UK firms were being side-lined by 
American firms in the UK side of the North Sea, the Offshore Supplies Office was 
established in order to promote the participation of UK firms in the petroleum industry
126
 The 
OSO monitored and audited purchasing procedures of PEPCs in the North Sea, and required 
firms to submit quarterly reports of significant contracts they intended to award, along with a 
list of contractors used, and of firms which applied but were not chosen.
127
 The OSO was 
thus able to determine if UK firms were side-lined in the contracting process. It also 
evaluated the UK local content and encouraged capacity building programmes to address 
perceived deficiencies. Through its efforts, the participation of UK firms in the North Sea 
grew from about 20 per cent prior to over 60 per cent in 1977 and 87 per cent by 1988.
128
 The 
UK therefore used a more flexible approach to develop its local content and promote the 
interests of UK firms.
129
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to analyse Nigeria’s framework for local content development in the 
petroleum industry. This is in view of the fact that local content is inextricably tied to the 
development of the industry as a whole, given its linkages to employment, regulation, and 
taxation. A strong local content is imperative for a growing economy, and necessary if the 
NPI is to stand on its own with limited external input. Currently, an industry which is 
virtually in the ‘hands’ of IOCs, can hardly be said to be effectively managed. IOCs 
divestment and withdrawal can significantly halt petroleum productions, with negative 
consequences for the economy.  
 
There is however need for a carefully planned approach to developing local content. This 
requires a careful application of NOGICDA, taking into consideration Nigeria’s strengths, 
potentials, and weaknesses. The truth is that for some time coming, foreign input cannot be 
dispensed with, as the case of Britain and Brazil indicated. What is rather required is to 
ensure that Nigerian content is protected, and developed overtime, as Nigeria shores up its 
industrial and infrastructural base. 
 
Given that Nigeria is a developing country however, there is need for it to pursue its local 
content programme through an NOC rather than rely entirely on private indigenous PEPCs 
and on legislation. Nigeria cannot afford to toe the path of America and Canada which did 
not establish NOCs. Rather, it should explore the potentials of a viable NOC in local content 
development after the Brazilian and Norwegian models. A three pronged approach should be 
used: a viable NOC and indigenous PEPCs, an independent and capable regulator, and extra 
legal government initiatives. 
 
Structurally, this is the approach Nigeria adopts subject however to a weak and non 
functional NNPC. For had NNPC been functionally operational as an upstream operator, 
Nigeria’s local content would have benefited immensely. The restructure of NNPC into a 
viable and functional NOC, along with a regulatory strategy as represented by the NCDMB 
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should be the focus of policy makers in the industry. It is to that extent that chapter five will 
seek to analyse the reform structure Nigeria should adopt with its NOC if the firm is to 
operate in the mould of the best NOCs as a partial regulator, local content developer, and 
revenue generator.  
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5  C H A P T E R  F I V E :  I N  S E A R C H  O F  A  N A T I O N A L  
C H A M P I O N :  A N  A N A L Y S I S  O F  T H E  P I B  
P R O P O S A L S  F O R  T H E  R E S T R U C T U R I N G  O F  
N I G E R I A ’ S  N A T I O N A L  O I L  C O M P A N Y  A N D  I T S  
L I K E L Y  I M P A C T  O N  T H E  R E F O R M  P R O C E S S   
 
Introduction  
This chapter will analyse the proposed reform of Nigeria’s NOC as enshrined in the PIB 
2012, and the extent to which it can impact the fortunes of the Nigerian petroleum industry 
(NPI). Drawing comparisons from other NOCs like Statoil, Petrobras, Petronas, it will 
analyse the proposed privatization model of NNPC in order to determine what instruments of 
law can be employed to restrain and limit post privatization external interference in the firm’s 
management. The chapter will in essence seek to determine the extent to which company law 
and capital market law can be employed to restrain undue external interference, while 
simultaneously entrenching accountability in the management in a post privatised era?  
 
5.1 NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES: CHARACTERISTICS, 
PERFORMANCE, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES  
 
Globally NOCs control approximately 90 per cent of hydrocarbon reserves and 75 per cent of 
daily crude oil production.
1
 The establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in 1971 positioned NOCs to play a dominant role in the global petroleum 
industry, an industry that had been previously dominated by international oil companies 
IOCs).
2
 
                                                 
1
 See Silvana Tordo and others, ‘NOCs and Value Creation ‘ (2011) World Bank Working Paper 218                  
<http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/topics/extogmc/0,,contentMDK:21991336~pagePK:148956~piPK:2
16618~theSitePK:336930,00.html> accessed 2 January 2013 ; Stacy L. Eller and others, ‘Empirical Evidence on 
the Operational Efficiency 
of National Oil Companies’ (2007) The Changing Role of NOCs in International Energy Markets,  James A. 
Baker Rice III Institute for Public Policy 
2
 Wajid Rasheed, notes that prior to 1971, IOCs controlled over 70 per cent of the world’s petroleum resources. 
This figure changed when OPEC was created, as NOCs began to dominate the industry and dominated over 79 
per cent of the world’s petroleum. See Wajid Rasheed,  ‘ The Oil Curtain and the Evolution  of National Oil 
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Although there are commercial aspects of the operations of a typical and traditional NOC, 
many NOCs however focus primarily on implementing the petroleum industry policies of 
their home states.
3
 Many NOCs seek to maximise ‘the net present value of economic rents 
from production of petroleum, inter-temporal equity, the promotion of backward and forward 
linkages, the promotion of bilateral trade, energy security and supplies.’4 And this often 
entails prioritising socio-economic objectives over commercial objectives.  
 
Many developing countries use the traditional NOC as an agent of direct participation in the 
petroleum industry,
5
 and in some cases, as regulators and policy makers.
6
 The typical 
challenge however of many traditional NOCs is that they are often beset with board 
instability, and politicisation of their corporate decisions. There also issues of inadequate 
managerial autonomy and professionalism, corruption, and operational inefficiency brought 
about by their non commercial objectives.
7
 Weak NOC corporate structures often engender 
lack of transparency in management.
8
 
A major constraint in implementing national objectives through NOCs is that government 
pressure on their funds, limits their ability to operate competitively, expand their reserves, 
raise funds and operate in an efficient manner.
9
 A 2007 study noted that fully state owned 
NOCs which sell petroleum products at subsidized prices operate at a 35 per cent efficiency 
level when compared with their private counterparts who operate without such obligations.
10
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Companies’ (2009) Journal of Petroleum Technology 
<http://www.spe.org/jpt/print/archives/2009/02/JPT2009_02_11Management.pdf> accessed 26 March 2013 
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4
 Silvana Tordo (n 1) at 2 
5
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Conclusions’ (2007) James A. Amy Baker Rice III Institute for Public Policy  
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KeyFindings.pdf> accessed 20 March  
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10
 Ibid at 15 
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Tordo, Tracy and Arfaa also note that traditional NOCs ‘exhibit lower labour and capital 
efficiency, generate lower revenue, are less profitable, and produce a significantly lower 
annual percentage of their upstream reserves than private oil companies (POCs)’.11 It is not 
surprising therefore that many NOCs only operate within the geographical boundaries of their 
home states, and depend largely on the finance and technology of private oil companies 
(POCs) to operate most of their concessions.
12
 And while POCs can easily raise funds from 
equity or debt financing, to meet expansion requirements, NOCs are often restricted by laws 
and bureaucracy from raising funds internationally to fund their operations. 
 
The more modern non-traditional NOC however strives to operate more like POCs rather 
than a purely statutory establishment. And although they still cater for national objectives, 
their strong commercial and competitive orientation often results in better market 
performance, and good corporate governance.
13
 Perhaps the most notable non traditional 
NOCs are Statoil of Norway, Petrobras of Brazil, and Petronas of Malaysia. 
 
Recent studies have concluded that in order to optimize NOC performance, reforms should 
seek to balance the need for social welfare with that of profit maximization. This view argues 
that although NOCs should be owned by governments, they should as much as is reasonably 
possible, be managed along the lines of a privately owned company.
14
 It advocates that 
competition in the home industry, and in international exploration and refining will motivate 
NOCs to operate in a more transparent and efficient manner.
15
 This strategy will require a 
synchronisation between some benefits of the private sector and of the public sector. Some 
other propositions for effective NOC performance include introduction of strict accounting 
and financial practices, partial privatization and board autonomy.
16
 
 
                                                 
11
 Silvana Tordo and others (n 1) 38 
12
 Nontraditional NOCs like Petronas of Malaysia, Petrobras  and Statoil, currently operate outside their home 
states.  
13 Of this group, Norway’s Statoil, Brazil’s Petrobras and Malaysia’s Petronas are regularly cited as being 
relatively successful. See generally  Mark C. Thurber and others, ‘Exporting the Norwegian Model’ (n 2, 
chapter 2) 
14 
Amy Myers (n 6) 16-18 
15 
Ibid at 18 
16 
Ibid at 16 
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 Desirous to enhance NOC performance, some PPCs have resorted to internal restructuring 
and others to privatization and commercialisation. Mexico and Nigeria are among those 
proposing to adopt the privatization strategy for enhanced NOC performance. Nigeria’s NOC 
will be analysed next with emphasis placed on its history, performance and challenges.  
 
5.2 THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION: 
HISTORY, CHALLENGES AND PERFORMANCE  
 
In the years following its independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria’s role in the petroleum 
industry remained limited to minor regulation and collection of taxes.
17
 But Nigeria began to 
assert its authority in the industry when it enacted the Petroleum Act in 1969. This Act which 
positioned Nigeria to directly participate in the operations of IOCs
18
 was given greater 
impetus following Nigeria’s 1971 membership of OPEC. OPEC made the establishment of 
NOCs by its member states imperative. To that extent Nigeria established the Nigerian 
National Oil Company (NNOC) in pursuance to decree 18 of 1971. In addition to the NNOC 
which was to implement Nigeria’s petroleum industry policies, Nigeria also established the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) in 1970 to act as industry regulator.  
 
In order to ensure greater operational efficiency and maximise limited human resources, 
Decree No 33 of 1977, merged DPR with NNOC into a newly formed Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).  Following its establishment, NNPC combined the roles of 
regulator, policy formulator and petroleum company, and became the dominant institution in 
the NPI. 
 
                                                 
17
 Etikenrentse (n 76) 17 
18
 See paragraph 35 of the first schedule to the Petroleum Act, through which Nigeria embarked on joint venture 
agreements with international oil companies.  Recent trends in Nigeria indicate a favouring of production 
sharing contracts (PSCs) as the contractual mode of engagement with IOCs. See Madaiki  Ameh, ‘The Shift 
from Joint Operating Agreements to Production Sharing Contracts in the Nigerian Oil Industry’s: Any Benefit 
for the Players?’ <www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/.../CAR10_ARTICLE32.PDF>  accessed 3 June 2012 
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Although established as a vertically integrated petroleum company, NNPC continued with the 
operational pattern of its predecessor by partnering with IOCs through joint venture 
arrangements (‘JVs’), production sharing contracts (PSCs) and risk service contracts (RSCs). 
While there are some differences between them, essentially PSCs, RSCs and JVs are 
arrangements under which IOCs produce petroleum under concessions granted exclusively to 
NNPC, or to both NNPC and IOCs.
19
  All the parties to these collaborations contribute to 
production expenses proportionally, and share profits proportionally, after payment of tax.
20
 
Currently these collaborations account for about 90 per cent of Nigeria’s daily petroleum 
production and are therefore the most concrete means of producing petroleum in Nigeria.
21
 
5.2.1  THE STRUCTURE OF NNPC AND ITS PERFORMANC E WITHIN THE 
GLOBAL CONTEXT  
 
At the top of the NPI is the president of the federal republic of Nigeria who co-ordinates the 
affairs of NNPC, the ministry of petroleum resources (the ‘Ministry’), and DPR, through the 
office of the minister of petroleum resources (the minister). DPR is the principal regulator of 
the NPI, while the Ministry is responsible for the formulation of industry policies and NNPC 
functioning as the corporate and operational arm. Structurally therefore the Nigerian model is 
very similar to the Norwegian and Brazilian models, but the similarity exists only in form, 
since in practice there is hardly any functional distinction between the three institutional 
arms.   
 
The NNPC board consists of the minister as chairperson, a group managing director, and six 
group executive directors who oversee six directorates.
22
 NNPC has eleven subsidiaries, each 
                                                 
19 
See Gidado M ‘Petroleum Development Contracts with Multinational Oil Corporations : Focus on the 
Nigerian Oil Industry’, (PhD Thesis University of Warwick 2009) University of Warwick Publications Service 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/4320/> accessed 19 June 2013
 
20 
The PSCs and RSCs are somewhat different from JVs in that NNPC does not contribute financially to the 
operations, although the operators are entitled to deduct their costs of running such operations before profits are 
shared among the parties.
  
21
 The remainder is produced by NNPC’s upstream subsidiary, the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company 
(NPDC), new IOCs from Asia, Europe and Brazil, and indigenous petroleum companies (indigenous PEPCs).  
See Jean Balouga , ‘Nigerian Local Content: Challenges and Prospects’ (2012)International Association of 
Energy Economics   www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=176 accessed 11 November 2012 , at 
24. See also Soala Ariweriokuma, The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Africa: the case of Nigeria ( Taylor 
and Francis 2009) 64  
22
 Namely: exploration and production, refineries and petrochemicals, finance and accounts, commercial and 
investment, corporate services and gas and power .  
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headed by a managing director.
23
 It is also part owner of the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas 
Company (NLNG),
24
 and is further subdivided into 17 divisions headed by group general 
managers.  
 
In terms of performance, NNPC has struggled with upstream and downstream operations, 
corporate governance, and financial accountability. Compared to most of its NOC 
counterparts, there is a general consensus among commentators that NNPC has performed 
below average, in the upstream and downstream sectors of the NPI.
25
 It relies almost entirely 
on its IOC partners to explore and operate JVAs/PSCs/RSAs and the impact of its upstream 
subsidiary the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) has been minimal. 
Currently NPDC accounts for only about 5.6 per cent of Nigeria’s daily crude production of 
over 2 million barrels of crude oil. This is in stark contrast to Brazil, whose Petrobras controls 
over 90 per cent of daily crude production,
26
 and Norway, whose Statoil controls over 80 per 
cent of production in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS).
27
 
 
In the downstream NNPC has not fared well either. Its refineries currently produce at about 
25 per cent of their 450,000 daily capacity,
28
 and were recently adjudged the worst managed 
among 42 refineries surveyed in Africa.
29
 Billions of dollars, spent on turn around 
                                                 
23 
They Include Duke Oil, Hyson, National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS), Integrated 
Data Services Limited (IDSL) , Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Company (KRPC) , National Engineering 
and Technical Company (NETCO), Nigerian Gas Company (NGC), NPDC, NAPIMS, Port Harcourt Refining 
Company (PHRC), Pipelines and Products Marketing Company (PPMC) , and Warri Refining & Petrochemical 
Company Limited (WRPC) , NNPC, Website , Corporate Info.  
<http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBUSINESS/Subsidiaries.aspx> accessed 12 December 2012  
24 Ugo Nwokeji ‘The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the Development of the Nigerian Oil and 
Gas Industry: History, Strategies and Current Directions’ (2007) James Baker Rice 111 Institute for Public 
Policy < www.bakerinstitute.org/.../publications/energy.../NOC_NNPC_Ugo.p..> accessed 16 October 2012 at 7 
25
 See generally Ugo Nwokeji ibid,  Mark C. Thurber and others , ‘NNPC and Nigeria’s Oil Patronage 
Ecosystem’, in  David G. Victor and others (eds) Oil and Governance State-owned Enterprises and the World 
Energy Supply (Cambridge 2012) 701 , Alexandra Gilles, ‘Oil Sector Reform in Africa: The Case of Nigeria’ 
(PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 2010) 
26
 Dayo Oketola, ‘ NPDC Daily Crude Production now 138,000 Barrels’ Punch (30 April 
2013)<http://www.punchng.com/business/business-economy/npdc-daily-crude-production-now-138000-
barrels/> accessed 1 May 2013 
27
 US Energy Information Administration, ‘Norway’ (2012) <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=no> 
accessed 7 July 2013  
28 Fidelis Soriwei, ‘Two of Nigeria’s Refineries Pack up …others Produce at 25% of Installed Capacity’ Punch 
(7 July 2012) <http://www.punchng.com/news/two-of-nigerias-refineries-pack-up-others-produce-at-25-of-
installed-capacity/> accessed 3 January 2012  
29
The survey was conducted on behalf of the Nigerian government by the National Refineries Special Task 
Force (NRSTF). Chineme Okafor, ‘Nigerian Refineries Rated Worst Amongst 42 African Refineries’ Thisday 
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maintenance, have failed to have significant impact in the fortunes of the refineries.
30
 The 
result is that Nigeria imports most of its refined crude products and suffers almost incessantly 
from fuel scarcity.
31
  
 
Through its asset management subsidiary, the National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services (NAPIMS), NNPC partly regulates IOCs by approving budgets, work programmes, 
schedules etc. This is to ensure that Nigeria derives maximum benefit from its upstream 
investments. NAPIMS has however struggled to monitor IOCs effectively, especially as 
regards their expenditures incurred in the course of production. Although NNPC and IOCs 
are jointly responsible for the funding of all collaborations, NNPC has consistently defaulted 
in meeting its joint venture obligations. This means that IOCs bear the cost of production in 
most cases, and recoup their investments after the sale of crude oil.
32
 The PSC and RSC are 
also conducted along similar arrangements. IOC funding however gives them a stronger 
leverage over NNPC, and has weakened NAPIMS’ strength, or justification to monitor 
production expenditures. The result has been that concerns have been raised in many quarters 
that Nigeria loses billions of dollars annually to creative accounting practices of IOCs.
33
 
There is also the widely made claim, that there are no verifiable data on the amount of crude 
oil produced in Nigeria daily.
34
 
 
Another area of regulatory lapse on the part of NNPC is in the promotion of Nigeria’s local 
content. Chapter three noted that NNPC has struggled to properly monitor IOCs in order to 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Abuja, 13 November 2012) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigerian-refineries-rated-worst-amongst-42-
african-refineries/130439/> accessed 18 December 2012  
30
 Ismaila Badmus and others , ‘A Review of Performance Appraisals of Nigerian Federal Government-Owned 
Refineries’ (2012) Energy and Power Engineering, 2012, 4, 47-52 
31
 Furore over Petroleum Products Importation from  Niger’ Thisday (14 august 2012 ) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/furore-over-petroleum-products-importation-from-niger/122318/> 
accessed 18 December 2012  
32
 Etikenrentse (n 77, chapter 2) 44-46 
33
 See chapter three, para 3.6.3 See NEITI, ‘NEITI Urges Agencies to Recover 9.8 Billion Dollars from 
Companies ‘ (2012  
<http://www.neiti.org.ng/news/2012/09/24/neiti-urges-agencies-recover-98-billion-dollars-companies> accessed 
19  October 2012. See also Musa Abutudu and Dauda Garuba, ‘Natural Resource Governance and Eiti 
Implementation in Nigeria’(2011) Current African Issues 47, 
34
 ‘2006-2008 Reports – Final’ ( January 30, 2012) <http://www.neiti.org.ng/documents/neiti-2006-2008-
reports-final-january-30-2012> accessed 11 October 2012 , see also Jacob Segun Olatunji and Kolawole Daniel, 
‘ No Proper Record of Crude Oil Production – CBN Gov’ Nigerian Tribune (Abuja 4 October 2012 
<http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/lead-stories/48646-no-proper-record-of-crude-oil-production-cbn-gov> 
accessed 18 October 2012 
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ensure a significant representation of local content in JVs and PSCs.
35
 This was despite the 
fact that NNPC was the majority holder of such concessions operated by IOCs. 
 
In addition to or because of weak performance in the upstream, downstream and as part 
industry regulator, NNPC has been unable to attain financial sufficiency. In fact Nwokeji and 
Thurber observe that among its 11 subsidiaries only the Nigerian Engineering Technical 
Company (NETCO) and the Integrated Designs Systems Limited (IDSL) have shown some 
promise. The rest depend almost entirely on government subsidies and subventions to be kept 
afloat.
36 
Its inability to operate profitably is partly responsible for its indebtedness to local and 
foreign financial firms to an extent of near insolvency.
37
 In addition to the above challenges, 
NNPC also has a reputation of suffers from withholding funds from Nigeria’s consolidation 
revenue funds, and suffers from internal mismanagement and corruption. In 2012 there was a 
report that NNPC withheld over 6 trillion naira from the consolidated revenue fund, as 
required by the Nigerian constitution, even though the NLNG has strongly denied the 
authenticity of the report.
38
 On the heels of that allegation is another allegation from the 
immediate past governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank, Lamido Sanusi, that NNPC withheld $20 
billion from Nigeria’s consolidation revenues account. 39 
Notwithstanding the above, there are some positive sides to NNPC. It is responsible for the 
procurement of petroleum to Nigerians at a highly subsidised rate, and is the owner of a 
sophisticated network of pipelines which crisscross the length and breadth of Nigeria and its 
11 subsidiaries provide employment for thousands of Nigerians. The firm is also the main 
foreign income earner for the Nigerian government through its sale of petroleum products on 
the international market. But when compared with other non-traditional NOCs like Petrobras, 
                                                 
35
 See para 3.6.3 
36
 See Nwokeji (n 9) 40. See also Mark C. Thurber and others , ‘NNPC and Nigeria’s Oil Patronage Ecosystem’ 
(n 35). 
37
 NNPC commodity trading houses, including Glencore and Mercuria, about $3.5 billion in unpaid fuel supply 
<bills. See, ‘Nigeria State Oil Firm NNPC Insolvent, says Minister’ (13 July 2010) BBC  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10624427 13>accessed 2 October 2012 . The federal government however 
debunked the assertion of NNPC’s insolvency, see Sufuyan  Ojeifo, ‘NNPC Not Bankrupt, says FG’ Thisday 
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January 2013, see also Chika Amanze-Nwachuku in Lagos and Chineme Okafor, ‘NNPC Gets Presidential Nod 
on $1.5 billion Loan’ Thisday (Abuja, 9 January 2012) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nnpc-gets-
presidential-nod-on-1-5-billion-loan/135806/> accessed 9 January 2013 
38
 See NLNG, ‘Ribadu's Report on NLNG is Inaccurate’ (6 November 2012) 
<http://www.nlng.com/pressreleases.aspx?id=> accessed 29 November 2012 
39
 ‘Trouble at Nigeria’s Central Bank’ The Economist (21 February 2014)  
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/02/trouble-nigerias-central-bank> accessed 28 March 2014  
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Petronas, and Statoil, or even Angola’s Sonangol, the weaknesses in NNPC become more 
apparent, and make reform imperative. 
 
5.3 FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR NNPC’S WEAK 
PERFORMANCE 
 
This segment will highlight lack of operational focus, transparency and financial corruption, 
and undue government interference as the main reasons why NNPC has struggled to perform 
optimally. It will however argue that the first two are in reality symptoms of the third. To that 
extent, any reform initiative should focus at the root of the problem rather than treat the 
symptoms.  
 
5.3.1  UNDUE GOVERNMENT INT ERFERENCE AND A LACK  OF MANAGERIAL 
AUTONOMY  
 
The NNPC Act subjects NNPC to absolute government control. This may be understandable 
in a certain sense, since the firm is fully government owned and funded, and manages an 
asset that is vital to the economic stability of Nigeria. Its board is appointed by the National 
Council of Ministers (NCM) and is chaired by the minister who answers directly to the 
president.
40
 With the NCM exercising supervision over its finances and the National 
Assembly approving its annual budgets, NNPC lacks financial autonomy.
41
 And although the 
Act authorises NNPC to raise funds from external sources, government control has limited 
this option, resulting partly in NNPC’s inability to fund expansion.42  
 
Where government interference cripples managerial innovation and autonomy, such 
interference can be said to be undue. The positive side to it is that government interference 
means that NNPC, like most NOCs, enjoys state patronage in the forms of bank guarantees, 
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 Ss 2 and 3  
41
 Ss 7, 8 and 9  
42
 S8 
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petroleum contracts, and the allocation of incidental assets.
43
 The NOC can also enjoy 
protection which other private firms are not entitled to. For example under section 12 of the 
NNPC Act, an intending claimant must serve a pre-action notice to the firm,
44
 and there is 
some restriction to the attachment of NNPC’s assets through the court process.45 Finally 
section 16 of the Act protects NNPC’s pipelines and installations from being taxed as 
hereditaments and tenements of local governments and states.
46
  
 
The drawback to state protection and interference is that where care is not taken, such 
privileges justify more interference which can negatively impact the firm’s operational 
efficiency, managerial autonomy and professionalism. For instance a lack of managerial 
autonomy in NNPC has stifled innovation and creativity and enshrined nepotism, mediocrity 
and underperformance. Thus in the absence of discipline and vibrant checks and balances, a 
lucrative NOC can become a cesspool for corruption, patronage, and rent seeking activities.
47
  
NOCs which enjoy some level of autonomy are in a better position to operate competitively. 
For instance Petrobras of Brazil enjoyed autonomy from the government even during Brazil’s 
military years, even though it was fully government owned. In fact when in 1969, Ernesto 
Geisel was requested to take over the reins of the firm, he made autonomy from the industry 
regulator a precondition to his assumption of office.
48
 This novel and radical approach of 
granting autonomy to Petrobras was later proved to be a wise decision as it insulated the firm 
from Brazil’s decades of political uncertainty and military dictatorship.49 
 
Like Petrobras, Statoil of Norway also enjoyed some autonomy from the Norwegian 
government and exploited this to develop into a competitive operator in the Norwegian 
continental shelf (NCS).  Thus Statoil combined autonomy with a strong commercial 
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 Petronas, Petrobras, and Statoil (until Norway’s membership of the EEA in 1994) all developed with the help 
of state patronage. 
44
 S. 12, see also Amadi v NNPC (2002) 10 NWLR, (Pt 674) 76 
45
 S. 14 NNPC Act.  
46
 See also Etikenrentse (n 76) at 46 
47
  Sonatrach of Algeria, NNPC of Nigeria and PDVSA of Venezuela. See also Mark Thurber and others, ‘ 
Exporting the Norwegian Model’ (n 21, chapter 2). 
48Adilson De Oliveira, ‘Brazil’s Petrobras: Strategy and Performance’  in  David G. Victor (eds) (n 22, chapter 
2) 515, See also J Surrey , ‘Petroleum Development in Brazil: The Strategic Role of a National Oil Company’ 
(1987) Vol. 15(1) Energy Policy  
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 See Adilson De Oliveira, ‘Brazil’s Petrobras: Strategy and Performance’  in  David G. Victor (eds (n 22, 
chapter 2) 521 
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orientation, given that it was not a statutory corporation, but was incorporated to operate as a 
private company subject to company law. 
  
NNPC’s loss of autonomy has been blamed on internal corporate failures which justified 
government interference. It is arguable that one reason why Statoil and Petrobras continued to 
enjoy managerial autonomy while NNPC did not was because they earned such autonomy by 
commitment to good practice. Nwokeji notes that a scandal involving $4 billion in the late 
1970s occurred at a time when NNPC had relative board autonomy.
50
 The scandal in fact 
justified the erosion of NNPC’s autonomy, as the government sought to assert greater control 
over the firm in order to prevent such fraud.  
 
Similarly, when in 1993, the minister’s office was excised from the chairmanship of NNPC, 
Nwokeji observes that an internal corruption scandal amounting to $41 million justified 
military interference in the firm’s board, and in so doing, again eroded managerial autonomy, 
a vital component for good management of an NOC.
51
 The result was that NNPC became 
more like a government bureaucracy or public service department, in sharp contrast from its 
original mandate. Lack of autonomy has manifested itself in frequent leadership changes in 
NNPC, since each government administration constitutes new boards that are agreeable to its 
policy or susceptible to its whims.
52
 
 
It is generally agreed that government interference in NNPC peaked during the military era of 
Nigeria.
53
 Ariweriokuma blames military interference in NNPC for the breakdown of its 
refineries, and the erosion of the professional clout of NNPC.
54
 But while civilian rule offers 
brighter hopes for improved managerial autonomy, not much has changed with Nigeria’s 
return to democracy. NNPC’s funds have allegedly been diverted by corrupt government 
officials and, and its discretion to grant petroleum importation licences and to award 
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 Nwokeji (n 97, chapter 2) 17 
51
 Nwokeji (n 97, chapter 2), 20 
52 
Victoria Ahuma -Young, ‘Oil Workers Lament Incessant Leadership Change in NNPC’ Vanguard (2 July 
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accessed 7 March 2013  
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54
 Soala  Ariweriokuma, (n 101, chapter 2) at 64 
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turnaround maintenance contracts has been frequently used to gratify various political 
interests.
55
 Few Nigerians were surprised therefore when NNPC, which is widely seen as an 
appendage of the presidency, was alleged to have spent $14 million in the purchase of a 
presidential helicopter.
56
 
 
There is a closely knit relationship between the management of NNPC and Nigeria’s political 
leadership and this has resulted in back hand deals that are shrouded in secrecy, and a 
complex interchange of monies and obligations, legally and illegally. For instance, although 
NNPC is said to owe the Nigerian government billions of naira, the government is also said 
to be heavily indebted to the firm.
57
 The intermeddling of the government in NNPC’s affairs 
coupled with other factors means that the firm is unable to meet its cash call obligations 
which are required to fund its operations, nor is able to maintain its infrastructures. According 
to Nwokeji, the 
‘Nigerian political class and senior civil service have historically viewed the oil industry as 
too important a source of patronage…to be left in the hands of independent managers. This 
tendency has always had to contend with NNPC’s natural desire for autonomy and with the 
interests of the presidency of the day in closely controlling the industry.’58 
 
5.3.2  CORRUPTION AND LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN NNPC 
 
Corruption in NNPC is legendary and taken for granted. This ‘disease’, which is partly a 
symptom of undue government interference, has had very negative effects on the firm, and on 
its international reputation. Currently NNPC is rated as one of the most corrupt NOCs in the 
world.
59
 It has been implicated in one corruption scandal after another, involving billions of 
                                                 
55  Thurber and others, ‘NNPC and Nigeria’s Oil Patronage Ecosystem’ (n 29) at 701-704 
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dollars.
 60 
From fuel subsidy fraud, to turn around maintenance of refineries, procurements of 
equipment, or to outright withholding of billions of naira belonging to the Federal 
Government, corruption in NNPC is now taken for granted in Nigeria.
61
 
 
Corruption has thrived in NNPC partly because of the secrecy with which its affairs are 
conducted.
62
 In 2012, a National Assembly probe of $6.8 billion subsidy fraud noted that 
NNPC is ‘accountable to no one’.63 Its accounts and activities are conducted with such 
secrecy that Nigerians are hardly aware of the movement of funds within it. And even where 
relevant information is made public, there is continued impunity and lack of respect for the 
rule of law with the effect that persons involved in wrongdoing are not brought to book.   
 
One may again argue that corruption has thrived in NNPC because of poverty and lack of 
structures that are erected to prevent abuse of office. In essence corruption in NNPC can be 
arguably said to be a product of people deficiency rather than structural deficiency. A 
deficiency heightened by undue external influence. For instance, Norway’s Statoil has not 
struggled with corruption like NNPC due in part to the fact that Norway has a culture of 
honesty, rule of law, and does not struggle with poverty like Nigeria. When Petrobras is 
brought into the picture however, this position seems untenable, given that Petrobras 
developed without struggling with serious corruption issues even though it operated under the 
military for most of its years, and at a time when the Brazilian economy was still developing. 
                                                                                                                                                        
have the lowest corruption index out of 44 countries surveyed. See David Cutler, ‘ Factbox Nigeria’s’ State Oil 
Company  NNPC ‘ (12 July 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/16/us-nigeria-oil-
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Similarly, while many state owned companies in Malaysia are often ‘associated with 
financial scandals and mismanagement, Petronas is held up as a sure-footed example of an 
integrated approach to natural resource management’.64  
 
With Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, there have been some efforts towards greater 
transparency in the petroleum industry, and the government published some information on 
oil revenues which were hitherto kept secret.
65
 The impact of these efforts has however been 
at best cosmetic, and the much needed transparency and accountability required to address 
corruption in the industry and particularly at NNPC, remains a mirage to most Nigerians. 
 
 In 2011, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2011 was enacted to guarantee Nigerians 
the right to government information. While many hoped the FOIA would herald an era of 
transparency in NNPC, the firm jolted the nation by declaring that it was not bound by the 
provisions of the Act.
66
 The extent of corruption in NNPC has made it virtually impossible 
for the firm to rise to the level of an internationally recognised NOC. It is to that extent 
submitted that any meaningful reform should address corruption in NNPC before it can be 
taken seriously. 
 
 
5.3.3  LACK OF OPERATIONAL FOCUS IN NNPC  
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others (eds) (n 22 chapter 2), 808. 
65
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2012  
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NNPC has struggled from a lack of operational focus which has made it difficult for it to 
meet its founding objective of being a vertically integrated petroleum firm. This is due in part 
to its diverse roles in the industry. For instance from 1977-1988, NNPC combined the roles 
of policy maker, regulator and a petroleum firm. In the late 1980s, its policy making and 
regulatory duties were excised from it, in order to give the firm operational focus as an 
upstream and downstream firm, but this has not been the case.
67
  
 
Statoil which was incorporated in 1972 had a definite mandate: to operate as a vertically 
operated NOC, not as a government department. Norway separated regulation from policy 
formulation and from industry regulation. This resulted in operational efficiency and focus 
which was harnessed to the benefit of the Norwegian people. Within 10 years of its 
incorporation, Statoil which partnered with IOCs in the NCS, began to operate sole 
concessions and developed its capacities as an upstream and deep water expert. Focus was 
thus integral to its performance. 
68
 
 
Similarly, Petronas was incorporated in 1974 under the Malaysian company law to operate as 
a petroleum firm. And while it also exercises some quasi regulatory functions, it has 
remained essentially what it was incorporated to do: a vertically integrated petroleum 
company. The same can be said for Petrobras of Brazil.  
 
In the case of NNPC there has been a (d)evolution from a promising upstream company in 
the 1970s to a more or less asset manager and petroleum sales firm.  It is often difficult to 
describe the separate roles of NNPC’s subsidiaries and multiple divisions. There is often 
overlap of functions as subsidiaries venture into operations that are far from what they were 
established to do. For example, although NPDC remains NNPC’s upstream subsidiary, asset 
managing NAPIMS is currently involved in upstream operations in Nigeria’s frontiers and 
                                                 
67
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inland basins;
69
 a role that has no bearing or semblance to that of an asset manager. In the 
same vein, it was shown in chapter three that although NOGICDA conferred local content 
regulation on the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring board (NCDMB), NNPC’s 
NCD still performs similar tasks.
70
  
 
It is arguable that rather than operate as a vertically integrated petroleum firm, NNPC is more 
akin to a government ministry with a semi corporate structure. The picture of NNPC that can 
be deduced from the NNPC Act is currently very far from what it is in reality. In describing 
this lack of focus, and NNPC’s distorted corporate structure, Thurber, Emelife and Heller 
note that: 
` ‘despite its formal organization as a vertically-integrated oil company, NNPC is 
neither a real commercial entity nor a meaningful oil operator. It lacks control over the 
revenue it generates and thus is unable to set its own strategy. It relies on other firms to 
perform essentially all of the most complex functions that are hallmarks of operating oil 
companies. Yet unlike some NOCs it also fails to fit the profile of a government agency: Its 
portfolio of activities is too diverse, incoherent, and beyond the reach of government control 
for it to function as a government policymaking instrument.’71 
 
NNPC however remains very relevant to Nigeria not because it operates refineries or operates 
as an upstream firm, but because of its management of Nigeria’s assets in JVA/PSCs. It is 
also relevant in that it manages Nigeria’s fuel imports and their distribution.  
 
Focus implies discipline, objectivity and planning. Petroleum firms like Statoil, Petrobras and 
Petronas have maintained their operational focus and have been able to venture into foreign 
waters which will make them relevant in the world stage long after petroleum resources are 
depleted in their home territories.  In fact most of Petronas’ concessions are currently outside 
of Malaysia, as it has ventured into other territories in its upstream and downstream 
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70
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operations.
72
 It is arguable that a focused NOC operating with a well defined focus, rather 
than a behemoth like NNPC would have been able to meet most of its objectives.  
 
It is posited that it is not the subsidiarisation of NNPC that have affected its focus, but rather 
its venturing away from core engineering and petroleum related operations, to operations that 
require little engineering and technical skills: asset management and sale of petroleum. These 
functions that can be conveniently performed by a government department, unlike drilling, 
design, production, and refining, which require technology, skills and capacity.  
 
The above analysis has shown that NNPC struggles from corruption, lack of operational 
focus, and undue interference, and argued that government interference is actually at the root 
of its challenges. If indeed undue government interference is the root cause of most of 
NNPC’s challenges, then in order to reinvent itself, Nigeria would need to devise and adopt a 
reform strategy that not only restrains undue interference, but in one fell swoop, addresses 
corruption and lack of operational focus in the firm. Tackling one without the other will not 
result in a significant impact, as they are so intertwined that they impact invariably on each 
other in the operations of the firm. The Nigerian government is not unaware of the challenges 
of NNPC, but has sought to restructure and reform the firm in the past, but to no significant 
avail.  
 
There was the commercialisation of NNPC in 1988 by the Babangida administration which 
also led to the division of the firm into 11 subsidiaries. In 1993, the short lived Ernest 
Shonekan administration (August 1993 –November 1993) also attempted to privatise 
NNPC’s refineries, but was overthrown in a military coup led by General Sani Abacha before 
it could complete the process.
73
 The Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) privatised the 
Eleme Petrochemicals, (which had been a subsidiary of NNPC) to Indorama in 2006, and in 
2007, the Kaduna and Port Harcourt refineries were sold off to Bluestar Consortium. 
However the Blusestar transaction was later cancelled by the administration of Umaru Musa 
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Yar Adua on grounds bordering on lack of transparency.
74
 Currently the PIB 2012 intends to 
introduce some far reaching reforms of NNPC, and it is the proposed reforms that will be 
analysed in the next segment of this chapter.  
 
5.4 TOWARDS A HOLISTIC RESTRUCTURING OF NNPC: THE 
PIB AND A POST PRIVATISED NNPC  
 
5.4.1   BACKGROUND TO THE PIB, AND THE PROPOSED PRIVATIZATION OF 
NNPC  
 
In 2000, the Obasanjo administration constituted the first Oil and Gas Sector Reform 
Implementation Committee (OGIC). Chaired by Dr Rilwanu Lukman, the OGIC was 
mandated to review the legislative and commercial framework for the petroleum industry, 
and in the light of international best practices, make recommendations for reform. In 2004, it 
published its first report which recommended a comprehensive reform of the industry, 
emphasising the need to separate policy making, regulation and the commercial aspects of the 
NPI.
75
 
 
The second OGIC which was inaugurated by President Umaru Musa Yar Adua in September 
2007 produced the first draft of the PIB which was submitted to the 6th National Assembly 
(2007-2011).
76
 The first PIB faced serious opposition from IOCs and other stakeholders, and 
could not be passed into law. The administration of President Goodluck Jonathan (2010- ) 
submitted a revised version of the PIB to the National Assembly in June 2012. 
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Among other things, the PIB seeks to unbundle NNPC into an asset management firm, a gas 
company, and an NOC.
77
 It seeks to privatize the gas firm and the NOC within a particular 
time frame while the asset managing firm will be fully state owned. The Bill which has 
scaled the second reading in the House of Representatives is at the committee stage in the 
Senate.
78
 It is intended to analyze the PIB provisions relating to NNPC and its prospects for 
impact in the NPI.  
5.4.2  PRIVATIZATION OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES:  PROSPECTS AND 
CHALLENGES 
 
Privatization is the deliberate sale of state owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors. It 
gained global momentum in the early 1980s, following the UK’s sale of its public utilities.79 
It is generally accepted that with few exceptions, privately managed firms are more 
efficiently and prudently managed than their public counterparts.
80
 It is for that reason that 
attainment of operational efficiency and profitability are amongst the most consistently cited 
reasons for privatization of SOEs.  
 
Governments embarking on privatization programmes have various options to choose from. 
An SOE can be totally or partially privatised. It may be sold to local investors or foreign 
investors, through either the stock market or directly to private investors.
81
 The privatization 
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model eventually adopted by a country will usually be informed by various factors which 
includes the extent of experience of the managers of the privatization programme. The object 
of the scheme, the financial and technological capacity of the country, and the level of 
performance of the firm to the sold, are also considered by many governments.  
 
Partial privatization may be resorted to where the market cannot absorb a total public 
offering, or where due to inadequate regulatory capacity, there is need for government control 
of a particular industry or firm, in the foreseeable future. In some other cases, states resort to 
partial rather than total privatization either because of the economic importance of the SOE, 
or its strategic importance to the country.
82
 Other reasons include a desire for a wider share 
ownership structure, wealth distribution, risk diversification, and an improved national 
prestige, if the firm’s performance improves.83  
 
The proposed partial privatization of NNPC is premised on the expectation that it will usher 
in a more disciplined, professional, and commercially oriented management.
84
 In that regard 
it promises Nigeria increased profitability due to the commercialisation, better human 
resources management, ease of raising of capital to fund projects, and better downstream 
integration. Privatisation may therefore result in more profits as the firm, rather than draining 
government resources, is expected to generate more revenues by a more stringent 
management of capital and human resources. It will also introduce greater flexibility and ease 
of taking decisions that can benefit the firm in the short and long term.  
 
5.4.3  OVERVIEW OF THE PIB PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE PROPOSED 
PRIVATIZATION OF NNPC 
 
The PIB seeks to establish an asset management company to manage Nigeria’s interests in 
the unincorporated joint ventures currently held by NNPC, and all other upstream assets as 
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the government may deem fit.
85
 This company will also offer administrative services to an 
asset management corporation to be established.
86
 And although the Bill is silent on the 
reasons for the proposed asset management company, it is possible however, that the 
government intends to corporatize the operations of the firm in order to give it some 
autonomy and bring it within the realm of company law.
87
 
 
Within three months after the commencement of the PIB, the minister is required to 
incorporate a national oil company and a national gas company with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC).
88
 The initial shares of both firms will be held by the FGN through 
nominees in ministries of petroleum resources, and finance.
89
 Within six years of their 
incorporation, thirty per cent of the NOC and forty nine per cent of the NGC will be divested 
to the public through the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE).
90
 The NOC will be the principal 
successor of the NNPC, inheriting all of its current assets and subsidiaries except interests in 
the unincorporated joint ventures and the Nigerian Gas Company.
91
 Both firms are to be 
governed by their memorandum and articles of association, and in addition will be subject to 
the governance rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
92
  
 
5.4.4  IMPORTANCE OF A VIABLE NOC TO NIGERIA  
 
That a viable and functional NOC is pivotal to the success of Nigeria’s overall reform agenda 
in the NPI is brought out from the fact that an NOC can impact local content, industry 
regulation, and implement national objectives, while generating revenues for the government. 
This role continues even after the firm is partially privatised as is the case in Brazil where 
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Petrobras continues to implement national priorities even at the expense of profitability in 
some cases.
93
 
 
 For a developing country like Nigeria, a viable NOC can also spearhead research and 
development in the NPI. This has been the case in Malaysia where Petronas’ University of 
Technology is at the forefront of developing petroleum technology which in turns develops 
the manpower needed to further Malaysia’s local content.94 It can sponsor research in 
petroleum technology and collaborate with universities to further deepen Nigeria’s industrial 
exposure and experience. This will in turn impact positively on Nigeria’s local content 
agenda which will in turn further impact the economy positively. 
 
For the reasons deduced above, a functional NOC can be said to be the spine of the NPI 
reform upon which all other reform initiatives hang on a balance. Thus an NOC, stands at the 
intersection between the industry and the government, and plays a role that is interwoven into 
the downstream, upstream and local content initiatives. The appellation ‘national champion’ 
for a functional NOC is therefore very apposite.  
 
To say the least, Nigeria is in dire need of a functional NOC, unlike developed countries like 
the UK and the US which dispensed with the need for an NOC. Nigeria cannot follow the 
British or American approach given that it lacks viable indigenous PEPCs which can cater for 
the interests of the nation adequately. It is for this reason that it is proposed that even on 
privatization, there may still be need to effectively monitor the operations of the NOC to 
ensure that it operates within the parameters of national priorities and goals. And to that 
extent, the proposals made in chapter three for an effective and adequately regulatory system, 
                                                 
93‘The Perils of Petrobras’ (Economist, 17 November 2012) 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21566645-how-gra%C3%A7a-foster-plans-get-brazils-oil-giant-
back-track-perils-petrobras accessed 9 January 2013  
94
 See Universiti Technologi Petronas, ‘About us’ (2014) < 
<http://www.utp.edu.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=1901> accessed 8 
March 2014 
 168 
 
apply with equal force, since the NOC will become subject to regulation, like other private 
firms.
95
 
 
 
5.4.5  BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERING  
 
It is the position of this thesis that a public offering may result in weak corporate governance 
of the NOC. It is conceded that a public offering will give all Nigerians the right to share in 
the firm rather than a few individuals and can help the firm raise much needed funds for its 
investment programmes. It may however erode the ability of dispersed minority shareholders’ 
to co-ordinate and monitor the NOC’s operations in order to limit the agency problem and 
restrain dominance by a controlling shareholder, or even a non-controlling shareholder whose 
shares are below 50 per cent. This is because in practice a holder of even 35 per cent can 
dominate a publicly listed company since many shareholders do not vote, and of those who 
vote, many side with the directors.
96
 Thus actual control is the yardstick for determining the 
control of a publicly traded firm. 
 
Studies have shown that there exists a nexus between dispersed ownership structures and 
weak corporate governance, as managers are likely to wield greater control, and may pursue 
interests at variance with those of shareholders.
97
 This challenge is more likely to play out in 
Nigeria which is confronted with mass illiteracy, poverty, and lacks mechanisms that can 
enable dispersed shareholders to harness voting provisions in CAMA. Thus rather than sell 
the NOC through a public offering as was the case with Statoil and Petrobras, Nigeria may 
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need to consider selling the firm to private investors, given that there is the added prospect of 
private input of experience, expertise, and technology. 
 
If the desire to distribute the wealth of the nation to a wider section of the public is behind the 
proposed offering of the firm’s shares, the FGN may consider selling firm to private 
institutional investors who themselves may represent the interests of the wider section of the 
Nigerian public. This option has the added advantage of transferring the responsibility for the 
monitoring of the affairs of the NOC from the hands of the ordinary Nigerian shareholder, to 
institutional investors which can dedicate time and resources to monitor the firm’s affairs.  
 
Again the impact of institutional investors in promoting good corporate governance is 
however doubtful, and may be dependent on their willingness to assert their rights to monitor 
the affairs of the firm. Research carried out in the UK has shown that rather than insist on 
good corporate governance, most institutional investors prefer a passive role, and divest 
where such firms operate poorly in the market.
98
 
 
Sale to private investors will however not be easy in Nigeria as corruption has engendered an 
innate lack of trust in the political class. There are often allegations than Nigeria’s 
privatization programme is aimed at selling off valuable assets to political companions at 
giveaway prices. Thus any prospect of alienating part of the NOC to strategic private 
investors is likely to be viewed with deep suspicion and may be resisted.  In fact, one of the 
conditions legislators from the Northern part of Nigeria have given for their continued 
support of the PIB, is that the shares of the firm should be sold to the public and not to some 
‘friend’ of the government. It was noted earlier that attempts to sell the Port Harcourt and 
Kaduna Refineries to Bluestar Corporation in 2006, were cancelled due mainly to allegations 
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that both firms were grossly undervalued in order to grant political favours to Aliko Dangote, 
chairman of Bluestar Corporation.
99
  
 
In order to address these justifiable concerns, there is need for fairness, transparency and 
goodwill in the on-going privatization programme. Should the government resolve to sell the 
firm to private investors, it should consider selling it to investors representing a broader 
spectrum of the Nigerian public. For instance, the NOC could be sold to Nigeria’s 36 
federating states on equal proportion, or to institutional investors representing a wider class of 
Nigerians. Hopefully, this will address issues of suspicion and mistrust between the North 
and the South, or among politicians and legislators. Another alternative is for the firm to be 
sold not to Nigerians, but to strategic foreign partners, or perhaps a combination of strategic 
private investors, and the Nigerian public.  
 
5.4.6  ANALYSIS OF THE PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES  OF A GOVERNMENT 
CONTROLLED PRIVATISED NOC  
 
Nigeria is currently privatising most of its moribund SOEs in line with a policy erected to 
address failures of publicly owned firms; firms that have become a drain on the Nigerian 
economy.
100
 To say the least, privatization holds greater prospects for greater transparency, 
better regulation and monitoring, and promises to bring the NOC within the corporate 
governance discourse, company law and capital market regime. This prospect for enhanced 
performance is related to the fact that private investors are largely concerned with profits 
generation. Some of these investors borrow from banks and other financial institutions and 
are often under pressure to ensure such investments perform optimally. This is in sharp 
contrast to the complacent attitudes of SOEs where directors are hardly under any pressure to 
perform optimally, and are more than content to keep such firms afloat and pay salaries to 
staff.  
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There is however need to structure Nigeria’s proposed NOC with a well defined mandate in 
order to ensure that while operating within the framework of company law, the FGN will still 
be able to use it to address issues that border on national priorities. Herein however lies the 
potential for conflict, for in the execution of national objectives, the NOC is likely to be 
subject to the interplays of politics and national governance which may compromise its 
independence and objectivity.  
 
While many welcome privatization of failed SOEs, there are routinely criticisms by socially 
inclined commentators that they pursue profits and ignore other vital needs of the national 
population. It will be recalled that petroleum resources are at the heart of the Nigerian 
economy, thus the government may naturally be inclined to monitor the operations of firms to 
ensure the availability of the product for local consumption, and to ensure firms work within 
a framework of specific national priorities. But privatised firms may pursue profits to the 
neglect of national objectives, and sack a large number of employees in their bid to 
restructure. These issues are however present in almost every privatization programme, and 
require detailed consultations and negotiations. This chapter is however concerned with the 
governance of the NOC post privatization in order to determine how it can avoid the mistakes 
of NNPC.  
 
5.4.7  LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVATIZATION AND CORPORATISATION  
 
Among the many benefits of privatization and listing is that it brings an SOE within the ambit 
of company law and its many provisions geared towards the protection of the assets of the 
firm, and of the interests of shareholders. Thus the firm will be subject to Nigeria’s company 
and capital market regimes as contained the in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA)
101
 and the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 2007 regimes, respectively. 
 
The company is today the dominant form among business organisations, mainly because the 
law confers upon it corporate personality, and limits the liability of its members to the 
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amount, if any, unpaid on the shares they hold.
102
 It can sue and be sued in its own name and 
in the same vein, own property, borrow money and enter into contracts.
103
 Unlike 
unregistered partnerships, a company can continue beyond the lifespan of its promoters since 
its shares are generally transferrable.
104
  
 
The full extent of the corporate personality of the company is brought out by the fact that 
courts have refused to treat it as an agent of its controlling shareholders.
105
 And its 
individuality and separateness has been upheld even where it is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
another firm.
106
 These features of the company as guaranteed by law can be harnessed by 
vigilant shareholders and managers in erecting a platform for enhanced managerial 
autonomy, transparency, and operational efficiency which were unavailable to fully owned 
SOEs. 
 
The NOC is likely to enjoy a greater amount of managerial and financial autonomy after 
privatisation because under CAMA, boards are answerable not to shareholders, but to the 
company.
107
 This means that a vibrant board can, at least in principle, design its strategic 
direction without being necessarily obliged to adhere to the directives of shareholders, 
provided such actions are done with due diligence and good faith.
108
 And by requiring that 
termination of directors comply strictly with CAMA, directors of the NOC will enjoy some 
security of tenure in contrast to what applies under the NNPC Act.
109
 NNPC has suffered 
from frequent leadership changes and in the past 10 years, has had 6 managing directors.
110
 
This is in contrasts to Petrobras where Sergio Gabriella was chief executive officer from 
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2005-2012. This kind of stability will inexorably lead to enhanced performance and 
continuity, if properly harnessed.   
 
Beyond the prospect of some level of managerial autonomy which privatization will confer 
on the board, minority shareholders will be able to monitor board performance and restrain 
external interference by relying on the provisions of CAMA.
111
 In this regard, the most 
prominent principle is the ultra vires doctrine. Under this principle, shareholders (and some 
classes of creditors),
112
 can challenge in a court of law, acts that violate the memorandum of 
the firm, even if consented to by the majority.
113
 The ultra vires doctrine which originated in 
the UK has been considerably whittled down in Nigeria, but is still applicable in Nigeria to 
some significant extent and holds promise for enhancing a more responsible management.
114
  
 
By separating the firm’s assets from its controlling shareholders, company law offers better 
protection for the NOC’s assets from external interference, a challenge that recurred in NNPC 
to its detriment.
115
 For company law generally prohibits firms from reducing or dissipating 
their assets and capital, while the firm remains a going concern.
116
 Thus it will be difficult for 
any shadow director or shareholder to use the assets of the firm in a way that is contrary to 
the law or the firm’s objects. Thus NNPC’s purchase of a presidential helicopters (unless the 
expected outcome is of course greater than the expense), would have been very difficult, if 
not out rightly illegal.  
 
In addition to all these, if the NOC is eventually listed as provided for in the PIB, it will be 
subjected to Nigeria’s limited whistleblower protection regime as contained in the Investment 
and Securities Act (ISA) 2007. This regime protects employees who expose wrongdoing in 
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good faith from victimisation while providing compensation for such treatment.
117
 Greater 
protection and compensation for unfair dismissal will hopefully motivate employees to 
expose wrongdoing in the NOC and strengthen its governance.
118
  
 
A strategic board is requisite for the success of the firm post privatization. And to that extent, 
there is need for the board to be properly equipped to execute its mandate, while being 
accountable for its actions and decisions. To ensure adequate experience and capacity in the 
board, it is proposed that Nigeria recruit some international directors who have served in 
boards of firms like Petrobras, Petronas or Statoil. The experiences of these persons can 
contribute significantly to the development of the NOC’s capacity to meet its strategic goals. 
It goes without saying that a proper mixture in the board has recently come to be recognised 
as a hallmark of good corporate governance.
119
 In fact the relative strides attained by the 
administration of President Goodluck Jonathan have been attributed to technocrats with 
international experience in his cabinet.
120
 
  
Privatisation also offers some informational advantages, given that the NOC will be required 
to make available access to information and to its accounts, which is a right of shareholders 
under CAMA.
121
 This will be complemented by the ISA, and SEC Rules’ on financial 
reporting and internal controls.
122
 With these regimes, the NOC’s accounts will be open to 
greater public scrutiny, and enhanced transparency, in contrast to NNPC, whose accounts 
have been for the most part shrouded in secrecy. With Nigeria as controlling shareholder, the 
NOC will also be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), section two of which 
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will makes access to information about the firm an entitlement not just to shareholders, but 
Nigerians in general.
123
 
 
The full implication of privatization of the NOC as proposed in the PIB will be to effectively 
bring the NOC within the corporate governance discourse. For example when listed, it will be 
required to comply with Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 2011 Code of 
Corporate Governance under which it will be required to comply with a higher standard of 
accountability. It will be recalled that most of the benefits of company law are not readily 
available to the NNPC as it is currently constituted. For instance NNPC’s assets are not 
legally protected from external interference, nor does it have control over its finances.  
5.5 GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND THE APPLICATION OF 
COMPANY LAW: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES  
 
The benefits which company law and capital market regimes bring to a privatised NOC are 
largely contingent on the ability of the non-government shareholders and management to 
harness the law in order to bring the firm within the framework of good corporate 
governance. In the absence of such checks, the impact of proposed reforms may be 
negligible. It is to that extent that the share structure of the proposed NOC is critical to its 
success, as will be shown below. This segment will therefore focus on the implications of 
government control in a post privatised NOC. 
 
5.5.1  BOARD AUTONOMY AND T HE AGENCY PROBLEM 
 
As desirable as board autonomy is for corporate performance, it can create a principal-agent 
problem, if the board pursues its own interests to the detriment of the firm and the interests of 
shareholders. This can result in fraud and mismanagement which will weaken the share value 
of the NOC. In order to prevent this from happening, care should be taken to ensure the board 
                                                 
123
 Bassey Udo, ‘ New Petroleum Industry Bill Outlaws Gas Flaring from December 2012, Abolishes Secrecy in 
Oil Business’ Premium Times (1 July 2012)  <http://premiumtimesng.com/mobile/business/6019- 
new_pib_outlaws_gas_flaring.html> accessed 24  July 2012 
 176 
 
of the firm operates within a framework of checks and balances erected first through 
company law, capital market regulations, and through contract law. Attaining that fine 
balance between board autonomy, and limiting the agency problem, will require skill and 
careful consideration of the firm’s ownership structure.  
 
The agency problem can be mitigated by ensuring that there are credible checks on the 
exercise of managerial powers, by shareholders and by regulators. The NOC should 
additionally be subject to a higher form of accountability and transparency, given its likely 
impact on the Nigerian economy. In this regard, it is worrisome that sections 149 and 160 of 
the PIB expressly exclude the NOC from Nigeria’s Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 2007 and 
the Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007, even though the firm will be ‘government 
controlled’.124 The extent however to which this exclusion will increase the tendency for 
corrupt self-dealings by the board of the firm is unknown.  
 
Suffice to observe that if the government is the controlling shareholder, then the NOC should 
not be excused from anti-corruption laws which are applicable to other government 
institutions. This will additionally ensure that it operates with a higher standard of 
accountability applicable to public officials. By virtue of the fact that section 2(7) of the 
FOIA 2011 makes government controlled firms subject to the FOIA regime, it is comforting 
that the NOC will be subject to that regime.  
5.5.2  TOWARDS THE DESIGN O F A STRATEGIC SHARE STRUCTURE FOR THE 
NOC  
 
There is clear need for Nigeria to devise a share structure for the NOC that is aimed at 
enabling the managers of the firm to avoid the current challenges of NNPC.
125
 Nigeria’s 
legislators should be well abreast with the current challenges and the circumstances which 
have made those challenges possible. To that extent, there should be a deliberate attempt at 
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reducing external interference in the management of the firm, subject to overall government 
supervision in some vital strategic directions. This would give room for the firm to operate 
competitively, with greater accountability and operational efficiency.  
 
What is therefore advocated for Nigeria is an effective separation of ownership from 
management, which is a key component of Nigerian company law. The benefits of the 
proposed privatization and corporatisation are dependent on a balanced ownership structure 
that makes shareholders dependent and responsible to each other.
126
  
 
For some time now Nigeria has made no pretence that it seeks to create an NOC whose 
impact and effectiveness will be similar to Petrobras of Brazil, Statoil of Norway and 
Petronas of Malaysia.
127
 Would the Petrobras/Statoil patter of state control work in Nigeria, 
given its unique dynamics? The following segment will briefly analyse the privatization 
models of Statoil and Petrobras and determine the merits or demerits of importing the same 
model into Nigeria.  
 
5.5.3  ARE THE STATOIL AND PETROBRAS MODELS SUITABLE FOR THE 
NIGERIAN CLIMATE?  
 
In 2000 and 2001, Petrobras and Norway were respectively privatised by the Brazilian and 
Norwegian governments on the New York Stock Exchange and on the Brazilian and Oslo 
stock exchanges respectively. The models adopted by both countries meant that Brazil and 
Norway retained over 50 per cent of the shares of Petrobras and Statoil respectively, while 
the rest were sold on the international capital market. Privatization brought Statoil and 
Petrobras within the international capital market regime, although Statoil, had operated 
within the EEA framework since 1992 when Norway joined the EEA. And Petrobras also has 
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some concessions abroad, which includes Nigeria. By virtue of operations abroad, both firms 
were already abreast with the international corporate governance framework. 
 
With privatization on the international scene has come increased scrutiny and greater 
transparency and although in the case of Petrobras, it has not necessarily separated the firm 
from the Brazilian government, but has given room for private participation which potentially 
can lead to a diminution of government interference. For sure however, privatization has 
increased the standing of both firms and their share values have increased after their 
floatation on the New York Stock Exchange.
128
 
 
The 70/30 per cent share structure proposed by the PIB is in many ways similar to the 
Statoil/Petrobras models of privatization. This model means the FGN will control the NOC’s 
board and strategic decisions. It is the position of this thesis that where the mischief a 
privatization programme seeks to address is fundamentally different from those of another 
firm or country, care should be taken before emulating the model of that country. Rather a 
customised model, tailored to improve the performance of Nigeria’s NOC within a national 
context, should be adopted.  
 
The Statoil/Petrobras privatisation model may not work in Nigeria for the following reasons. 
First neither Statoil nor Petrobras struggled with government interference, corruption or 
operational focus. They were privatised not necessarily to curb internal deficiencies, but to 
raise finance to fund expansion into foreign territories.
129
 And unlike Statoil and Petrobras 
however, the funding challenge in NNPC is not as pronounced as that of corruption, 
government interference, and operational inefficiency. With Nigeria’s current challenges it is 
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proposed that it is better for the NOC to ‘fall’ into the hands of entrepreneurs, subject to strict 
government regulation and oversight, than the hands of self dealing government officials.  
 
The FGN will have many opportunities to interfere if it has the power to hire and fire the 
board of the NOC without restraint and this may diminish governance. And apart from those 
few instances where CAMA requires a 75 per cent it can be asserted that the FGN will be 
able to take virtually any decision in the NOC without requiring the input of other 
shareholders. If this is the case, there will be a limit to the extent to which minority 
shareholders can rely on company law to bring in the much needed balance in the firm and to 
check board excesses. 
 
Should there be abuse of the powers of the government as controlling shareholder, it will 
impact negatively on the quality of the board, which will hold office at the mercy of the 
government. This is because the board may seek to please the government at the expense of 
the firm and this may result in inadequate managerial autonomy and professionalism, and 
may engender corruption and operational laxity. Government control may also result in an 
unstable board, as each administration may elect to appoint a new board loyal to its policies.  
The Delaware Corporation Law in the USA imposes a fiduciary duty of loyalty on controlling 
shareholders and subjects them to ‘an intricate set of doctrines that discourage and deter 
interested fiduciaries from exploiting their control for non-firm purposes’.130 The implication 
of this is that where a controlling shareholder exercises control over the firm’s decisions, he 
takes on the same duties of care that other fiduciaries have.
131
 Although CAMA contains 
some provisions geared at protecting minority shareholders, it does not extent to imposing a 
fiduciary duty on a controlling shareholder. It only subjects shadow directors to the same 
responsibilities as actual directors.
132
 The implication of this is that as controlling 
shareholder, the FGN will be unrestrained in its exercise of its powers, provided it does not 
extend to illegality.  
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Government control may negatively impact the NOC’s profitability if the firm is required to 
execute projects that are not commercially viable. For instance it may be required to sell 
petroleum at subsidised rates to the Nigerian public, or to build refineries at locations that 
may not be economically viable. Such requirements if unrestrained, can eventually affect the 
firm’s profitability and ability to fund its programmes.  
 
Many pundits are quick to note the above average performances of Statoil, Petrobras and 
Petronas, while deliberately ignoring Nigeria’s unique challenges which may require a more 
radical and localised approach. It is arguable further that Brazil and Norway could afford 
state controlled NOCs given the pedigree of these firms pre-privatization. Additionally the 
implication of a rich democratic culture in Norway (Brazil is developing in this regard), is 
that government officials are further held accountable to the people. Nigeria’s weak 
democratic experience, and the challenge of corruption and impunity however, does not lend 
itself to a government controlled NOC.  
 
If undue external interference is the root of internal corruption and operational inefficiency in 
NNPC, then Nigeria requires a deliberate shift from such scenario in its NOC in order to 
reduce to the barest minimum, opportunities for interference. To that extent, the share 
structure of the firm should be designed deliberately to restrain external interference. It will 
be preposterous to assume that government interference can be entirely stopped in an NOC, if 
not naïve. This is especially as the NPI remains the back bone of the economy. Interference 
post privatisation will therefore likely continue.  
 
The FGN often interferes in the affairs of IOCs in which it has zero equity ownership in order 
to attain the fragile balance that keeps the nation going.  It has often insisted that IOCs’ 
employment policies reflect Nigeria’s ‘Federal character’, while ensuring they give some 
extra allowance for the NDR in their contracts and employment policies. For instance, from 
2007-2008, the FGN encouraged Shell to apply a lower qualification criteria to the 
engineering graduates from the Niger Delta Region. This is because the region is 
educationally deficient when compared to the Eastern and Western regions of Nigeria. Also 
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the National Assembly has been known to direct IOCs to stay impending retrenchment of 
redundant employees, as this might increase the amount of unemployment in Nigeria.  
 
With such penchant for interference, one can safely assert that even if the FGN has 10 per 
cent equity in the proposed NOC, the firm’s board will often be subject to government 
interference. Rather than zero government interference, this thesis advocates that a reasonable 
restraint be placed on the extent to which the government can interfere in the firm’s 
operations. Such restraint is a sine qua non for board autonomy, and accountable corporate 
governance.  
 
That government control poses a risk for the NOC can be demonstrated by the case of 
Petrobras whose economic outlook has been negatively impacted by government 
interference. The privileges Petrobras enjoys under Law 12351 in the pre-salt region have 
justified increased government interference and control in the firm.
133
 Petrobras has often 
been required to execute national programmes which have been considered by some to be 
unprofitable from an economic perspective.
134
 For instance, the government capped the price 
of petroleum products in order to address inflationary issues, and to meet rising demand, 
Petrobras has been required to top up its production with imports, which it sells to the 
Brazilian public at a subsidised price which results in a financial loss.
135
 
 
Currently Gracias Foster, the chief executive of the Petrobras, is caught between satisfying 
the long term aspirations of the government and making profits for its minority 
shareholders.
136
 Petrobras acknowledges government interference as a business risk in its 
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annual report filed before the New York Stock Exchange in 2013.
137
 It is therefore not 
surprising that in 2012 Petrobras posted its first loss in thirteen years.
138
  
  
In truth a fledging NOC may be unable to survive without government patronage. In fact it 
was argued earlier that government patronage was strategic to Statoil’s growth in the early 
1970s and 1980s, and remains a key component in the continuous growth of Petrobras.
139
 If the FGN 
is to reduce its share ownership in the NOC, can it be expected in all sincerity to support the 
firm with concessions and other preferential treatments? Can government patronage be 
expected without interference? In fact it is posited that Statoil would have continued to enjoy 
heavy government patronage but for its obligations under the EEA agreement which requires 
Norway to grant all firms from EEA countries equal treatment and privileges.
140
  
 
It will be hard to expect the Nigerian government to completely alienate itself from the NOC 
for the following reasons. First as noted above, the firm will be integral to the implementation 
of Nigeria’s local content policies in ways similar to those of Norway and Brazil. Secondly 
given the importance of petroleum to the Nigerian economy, it may be inconceivable to leave 
such a strategic asset entirely in the hands of business men without some political oversight.  
This is moreso given that investors will be first of all concerned about profit and may not be 
inclined to consider other wider issues which policy framers and politicians are likely to 
consider in the management of the NOC.   
 
In the light of the above discussions, it is posited that Nigeria should not seek the 
Statoil/Petrobras model as that would give the government too much control. But control of 
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such a strategic asset remains necessary nonetheless and to that extent is a reality investors 
would have to live with. If control of the NOC’s strategic directions is behind the adoption of 
the Statoil/Petrobras model, it is posited that Nigeria can attain same by using other 
mechanisms which fall short of majority ownership in the firm’s shares. And it is those 
alternatives that will be considered in the paragraphs that follow. 
  
5.5.4  PRIVATIZATION ALTERNATIVES TO A GOVERNME NT CONTROLLED 
NOC  
 
 Reliance on regulatory agencies and ownership of petroleum concessions 
 
In principle, regulation should be the most viable ‘…instrument to safeguard the general 
interest and the public policy objectives.’141 But even with formal regulatory structures, 
Nigeria has struggled to effectively regulate NNPC and other IOCs that currently dominate 
the NPI. This is the more so as the regulator is ‘outside’ the firm and does not operate from 
within it. The ‘outside’ effect means that regulatory skills have to meet international standard, 
supported by co-operation from the management and whistleblowers if they are to be 
successful. 
 
 If regulation is weak in Nigeria the FGN can leverage on its ownership of petroleum 
concessions to extract commitment to national petroleum policies more so as the NOC will be 
heavily dependent on the FGN in its fledging years. This can be done through contracts or 
legislative provisions without necessarily holding majority of the firm’s shares. The next 
segment will consider other options through which the NOC can be controlled without 
making the FGN the controlling shareholder. 
 
NOC control through golden shares  
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Firstly the FGN can reserve special rights in the NOC (the so called ‘golden shares’) in order 
to ensure its management implements certain objectives that have a bearing on the Nigerian 
people. A golden share can be used to restrict or prevent takeovers or disposal of the firm’s 
assets, to ensure the government has a placement on the firm’s board, or to prevent the 
dominance of the firm by foreigners.
142
  
 
A golden share that is worth $10 is enough to protect certain vital aspects of the NPI, while 
leaving the day to day running of the firm in the hands of the board.
 
 The risk however is that 
the powers attached to those shares, if substantial, can be abused by politicians who may seek 
to interfere in the firm’s day to day affairs. To alleviate this possibility, the rights attached to 
those shares can be time locked or contingent on the happening of a particular event. In such 
cases the government will divest from the firm on the attainment of a particular objective, or 
in the process of time. 
 
5.5.5  THE NLNG OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: A MODEL WO RTHY OF 
EMULATION?  
 
It is proposed that Nigeria should privatise the NOC after a model that has worked relatively 
well within the NPI. It should seek a firm that has avoided the pitfalls of NNPC, made profits, 
operated within the corporate governance discourse, and is subjected to company law. What 
should be looked for are profitability, reduced government interference, greater operational 
efficiency, and minimal internal corruption. One such model, with respect, is the Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas Company Ltd (the ‘NLNG’). 
 
The NLNG is jointly owned by the government of Nigeria, Shell, Total and Agip. It was 
incorporated in 1989 as a private natural gas producing company.
143
 The NLNG has made 
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some notable financial and operational strides; it currently produces about 8 per cent of the 
world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG).144 The NLNG has 6 liquefied natural gas trains, with an 
overall capacity of 22 million tonnes per annum of LNG and 4 million tonnes per annum of 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Currently, it is building its 7
th 
gas train, which is expected to 
attract about $12 billion in foreign direct investment into Nigeria, and generate about $3 
billion for the government and 13,000 jobs.   
 
The NLNG has impacted the Nigerian environment favourably as its operations have 
contributed significantly to the reduction of gas flaring in Nigeria.
145
 Financially, the 
NLNG’s asset base is over $13 billion and the firm contributes to over 4 per cent of Nigeria’s 
GDP.
146
 In terms of corporate social responsibilities (CSR), the NLNG has trained over 
18,000 Nigerians through scholarship schemes since 1995, and over 500 sailing officers in 
Nigeria. Besides these, it has a relatively stable relationship with its host, the Bonny local 
government, supplying Bonny and Finima towns with uninterrupted power supply since 
1996.
147
 It is for these achievements that the NLNG has been described as one of the greatest 
success stories in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.
148
 
 
With only four strategic shareholders, the NLNG’s owners have maintained a vigilant watch 
over the conduct of its activities and employees, leading to enhanced corporate governance, 
efficiency and a very strict stance against corruption.
149
 Its policies include sustainable 
development, integrity, teamwork, excellence, trust, openness and professionalism, and that it 
is responsible to its shareholders, customers, employees, and to the society.
150
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NLNG’s share structure: lessons for Nigeria’s proposed NOC 
 
The corporatisation of the NLNG and its unique ownership structure are decisive factors 
behind its performance. This structure has made possible the application of principles of good 
corporate governance and company law in protecting the firm’s board while enabling it to 
focus on its corporate objectives. The implication of NLNG’s strategic share structure is that 
the FGN as majority shareholder is made to depend on the inputs of the minority, which 
together have a larger stake than the FGN. Restraint of external interference in the NLNG 
perhaps explains why unlike NNPC, the NLNG’s operational and financial decisions are 
taken by an independent board. The FGN cannot take unilateral decisions in the firm or sack 
its board at will, and this has resulted in board stability. Shepherd and Ball recount an 
unsuccessful attempt by a former minister for petroleum to sack the NLNG board. But this 
attempt was unsuccessful because Nigeria lacks complete control over the firm.
151
 
 
The NLNG share structure has also enhanced its corporate governance. This is because its 
shareholders have adequate capacity to maintain a watchful eye over its activities and assets 
in order to protect massive investments.
152
 And unlike NNPC which is often limited by 
bureaucratic bottlenecks, the NLNG is in a better position to finance its operations either by 
retaining funds internally rather than paying dividends to shareholders or by approaching 
local and international markets for funds.  
 
The NLNG model holds the promise for reducing employee fraud, and promoting innovation. 
Although the fraud risk cannot be entirely eliminated, it can be reduced by good corporate 
governance and internal control.
153
 To cater for the risk of complacency in the face of 
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 46 Rob Shepherd and James Ball ‘Liquefied Natural Gas from Trinidad and Tobago: the Atlantic LNG 
Project,’ in David G. Victor, Amy M. Jaffe, and Mark H. Hayes (eds) Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 
to 2040. (Cambridge University Press 2006) 46 
 NLNG, ‘ Our LNG’ <http://www.nlng.com/PageEngine.aspx?&id=37> Accessed 11 October 2012   
152
 To that extent the NLNG which projects a $12 billion profit in 2012, is expected to pay only half of that to 
shareholders, and retain the remainder. NLNG Train 7  
153
 Corporate scandals which occurred in WorldCom and Enron, and many others after that, increased demands 
for good corporate governance. In the wake of most these scandals, it was shown that directors increased their 
rewards even when companies they directed were making losses. In essence they relegated the interests of 
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government patronage, it is proposed that such patronage should be dependent on continued 
performance in order for the proposed NOC to innovate and operate profitably, or face 
liquidation.  
 
Operating strictly as a business venture, the NLNG board is able to operate professionally 
with a high standard of efficiency. Different members of the board are appointed to represent 
the various shareholder interests, and are therefore mandated not only to manage the firm, but 
also to ensure that the interests of specific shareholders are adequately protected. To that 
extent, Nigeria’s interests in the NLNG remain adequately protected by its board 
representative, who ensures that the interests and policies of the Nigerian government are not 
totally subsumed by profit making programmes. The NLNG is therefore able to integrate 
Nigeria’s gas policies into its operations while pursuing its objectives within a framework of 
corporate social responsibility. The NLNG’s strategic share structure has also guaranteed 
much needed technological and financial support from Shell, Total and Agip.  
 
For the above reasons, the NLNG remains a credible testimony of a viable partnership 
between the FGN and the private sector, and should be considered seriously as a privatization 
option for the NOC. This is more so as the Petrobras model may only lead to minimal 
improvement from the status quo, if the Nigerian government retains control over the affairs 
of the firm, post privatization. 
 
It is conceded however that the NLNG operates within a more confined space as a gas 
company and has had fewer challenges than NNPC whose 11 subsidiaries traverse the length 
and breadth of Nigeria. It is also arguable that its profitability is partly due to the many 
concessions and tax reliefs it enjoyed in its fledgling years.
154
 But the firm is nonetheless a 
model worthy of emulation given that it has worked in Nigeria, and can be adopted with 
some customised changes to suit the expectations of the FGN from the NOC.  
                                                                                                                                                        
shareholders and customers to the background. See Shripad G. Pendse, ‘Ethical Hazards: A Motive, Means, and 
Opportunity Approach to Curbing Corporate Unethical Behaviour’ (2012) 107 J Bus Ethics 265–279 
154
 These incentives were contained in the NLNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act of 1990. 
See also Sola Adepetun and Kemi Segun, ‘The Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Project’ (1996) 24 Energy 
Policy 595 
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5.6 CONCLUSION  
 
Privatization is no guarantee for success. Nigeria has had its own share of failed 
privatizations. The privatization of its steel corporation, the Ajaokuta Steel Company to 
Indian owned Global Infrastructure Holdings Limited (GIHL) failed and was later cancelled 
due to breaches of due process and lack of the requisite expertise and financial capacity on 
the part of the firm.
155
 Similarly the privatisation of its telecommunications giant NITEL to 
Transcorp has had minimal impact on the Nigerian people. The transaction was later 
cancelled.
156
 Much care is required if the proposed privatization of the NOC is to translate 
into a viable NOC comparable with Statoil and Petrobras. This will require commitment, 
integrity and expertise.  
 
If Nigeria is to build an NOC that will take its place among the viable NOCs in the world, 
then restraint of government interference should be a top priority. Minority shareholders and 
the board of the firm should be able to rely on provisions of CAMA in order to promote good 
corporate governance subject to regulatory supervision. Having ‘experimented’ with the 
NLNG model and found it to be successful, the same should be adopted for the NOC where 
the stakes are higher. 
 
Between a government controlled NOC with risks of corruption, interference and lack of 
good corporate governance, and a government majority but not controlled NOC, with 
prospects of  good governance and accountability and probity, it is proposed that Nigeria 
should chose the latter. A functional NOC is the spine on whom all of Nigeria’s reforms in 
the NPI will stand or fall. If the NOC is weak, regulation and local content will be weak and 
this will invariably affect the distribution of petroleum revenues. No viable local content 
policy can be pursued without NOC support and no NOC can support a viable local content 
policy if it has operational deficiencies. The mutual interdependency of these salient factors 
                                                 
155
 Matthew Green Nigeria ‘Nigeria Cancels Steel Plant Sale after Abuses Claim’ , Financial Times (April 4 
2008) < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/330e5de6-01e0 11dd-a323-000077b658.html> accessed 7 March2013. See 
also Odeh A. Mercy, ‘Privatization of Public Enterprises and Productivity: Nigeria’s Dilemma’ (2011) 2 Journal 
of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences 490-496 
156
 Paul Okolo, ‘TransCorp Urges Reversal of Nitel Sale Cancellation’ Bloomberg (5 June 2009) < 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aRGg1Ul2.3oI> accessed 1 April 2014 
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make a careful rethink of the PIB proposed strategy imperative, if Nigeria is to take its place 
among the comity of countries with viable NOCs.   
 
As Nigeria pushes for the reform of NNPC, there is also the subtle issue of utilisation of 
petroleum revenues for the benefit of Nigerians. For without an effective utilisation of 
petroleum revenues, a country can generate billions of petroleum dollars, yet its citizens will 
remain in poverty and impoverishment. This is the case with Angola whose NOC Sonangol 
has earned international reputation while most of Angolans reel in poverty. Ultimately, this 
neglect will catch up with the industry, since it cannot be excised from the people’s standard 
of living. This has informed the establishment of SWFs by many petroleum producing 
countries. For where petroleum revenues are mismanaged, and do not benefit the people, it 
may result in a revolution as the case of Libya demonstrated, or in sabotage of the industry, 
as has been the case with Nigeria in the last decade.  
 
The culmination therefore, of any petroleum industry reform should be the translation of 
revenues to the people, since neglect will eventually ‘haunt’ the industry. It is with that in 
mind that chapter six will be dedicated to analysing Nigeria’s strategies for managing 
petroleum revenues, and the challenges encountered so far.  
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6  C H A P T E R  S I X :  T O W A R D S  A N  E F F E C T I V E  A N D  
S U S T A I N A B L E  F R A M E W O R K  F O R  T H E  
M A N A G E M E N T  A N D  D I S T R I B U T I O N  O F  
P E T R O L E U M  R E V E N U E S  I N  N I G E R I A   
 
Aims and objectives  
This chapter will analyse why the billions of dollars earned from petroleum exploration have 
not benefited most Nigerians significantly. It will explore the problem of corruption, lack of 
transparency, and weak accountability in Nigeria’s petroleum revenues management. 
Furthermore it will seek to explore reform initiatives in the form of the NSIA Act, the NEITI 
Act, and in the PIB 2012. The chapter will focus on the Niger Delta and will assess the 
arguments for fiscal federalism and increased derivation, and the challenge of weak 
governance within the federating units of Nigeria. Finally, it will enquire into the role of 
PEPCs in the Niger Delta, and whether PEPCs can be used as proxy governments in 
petroleum host communities.  
 
6.1 THE PROBLEM OF WEAK MANAGEMENT OF NIGERIA’S 
PETROLEUM REVENUES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WIDER 
SOCIETY 
 
The constituent elements that make up the federal republic of Nigeria (FRN) are almost 
entirely funded by petroleum revenues generated by PEPCs from the Niger Delta.
1
Prudent 
management of petroleum revenues can lead to a significant improvement in living standards 
of the average Nigerian and fund infrastructural development like power, roads and rails. 
Petroleum revenues can also fund education, health care, and alleviate poverty significantly 
and positively impact other sectors of the economy. To that extent, the hilarious expectations 
                                                 
1
 See G.N. Ogbonna and Appah Ebimobowei, ‘Impact of Petroleu Revenue and the Economy of Nigeria’ (2012) 
7 Social Sciences, 405-411. See also Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘Economy of Oil and ‘Rebellion’ in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta’ (2010’ 39 Review of African Political Economy, 295-313.  
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of new petroleum exporting countries is not entirely out of sync with reality, even though 
there is still need to manage the expectations of the citizenry.
2
  
 
It will not be balanced to argue that petroleum revenues have not made any impact in Nigeria 
in the past fifty years. It is also worth stating that despite negative commentaries and reports, 
petroleum revenues have helped the development of Nigeria’s infrastructure, the funding of 
over 50 state universities, numerous polytechnics. Petroleum revenues sustain the budgets of 
Nigeria’s 36 states with a combined population of over 160 million people. Petroleum 
revenues have also been used to construct four refineries, countless road networks, Nigeria’s 
power and telecommunications infrastructure.
3
 
 
But while petroleum revenues have impacted Nigeria positively and in many ways, it is also a 
fact that much of Nigeria’s petroleum revenues have been either misappropriated, or 
mismanaged by public officials.
4
 This is largely due to nearly 30 years of military 
dictatorship which ended in 1999, and weak governance structures in a post military era.
5
 It is 
estimated that between 1960 and 2012, about $400 billion of Nigeria’s petroleum revenues 
were either mismanaged or misappropriated by the ruling class.
6
  
                                                 
2
 See John O. Kakonge, ‘ Challenges of Managing Expectations of Newly Emerging Oil and Gas Producers of 
the South’ (2011) Vol 4 J.W.E.L. & B 
3
 ee Soala Ariweriokuma,The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in African the Case of Nigeria (Routlege 2008) 
at 34 where the author discusses the impact of oil revenues on Nigeria 
4
 For an in-depth analysis of corruption in Nigeria’s petroleum industry see : Dev Kar and Devon Cartwright-
Smith, ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Africa:  Hidden Resource for Development’  (2010) Global Financial  
Integrity Program of the Center for International Policy, 
<http://www.gfintegrity.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=300&Itemid=75>  accessed  19 
January 2012  Marie Müller , ‘Revenue Transparency to Mitigate the Resource Curse in the  Niger Delta? 
Potential and reality of NEITI ‘ (2010) Bonn  International Centre for Conversion, 
<http://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/occasional_paper_V_06_10.pdf > accessed 19 January 2012  and 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala  and Philip Osafo-Kwaako, ‘Nigeria’s Economic Reforms:  Process and Challenges’, 
(2007)  Working Paper No. 6, Brookings Global Economic Development, Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution 
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/3/23globaleconomics%20okonjo%20iweala/200
70323okonjo_iweala.pdf > accessed  19 January 2012.  Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics indicated in its 
report February 2012 that over one hundred million Nigerians live on less than a dollar a day . Joe Brock, 
’Nigeria Poverty Rising Despite Economic Growth’ Reuters (Abuja, 13 February 2012) < 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-nigeria-poverty-idUSTRE81C0KR20120213> accessed 1st 
August 2012, A Gillies, ‘Reforming Corruption out of Nigerian Oil?’ (2009)  U4 Brief no. 2. U4 Anti-
Corruption Resource Centre. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen. 
5
 Soala  Ariweriokuma (n 101, chapter 2) at 64  
6
 Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare, ‘When Corruption fights back: Democracy and Elite interest in 
Nigeria's Anti-corruption War’ (2011) 49 The  Journal of Modern African Studies ,185-213 
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Misgovernance of the petroleum industry affects the broader society in many ways. First it 
weakens the democratic culture by creating a rentier effect under which government officials 
and political office holders are able to patronise the opposition with significant petroleum 
contracts.  Secondly, an undue reliance on petroleum revenues dispenses with the need to 
fund government machinery through internally generated revenues. While this may be 
welcomed by a tax adverse population, it imposes on them a lax attitude and reduced 
expectations from the political class. Thus the populace in such countries are not motivated to 
demand better governance and accountability from political office holders. In many cases 
also, political actors have used state power to suppress political opposition because of the 
incentives they derive from getting into power.  
 
From an economic perspective, mismanagement of petroleum revenues can lead to inflation, 
and adversely impact other sectors of an economy, as reliance on ‘easy petroleum revenues’, 
may lead to the abandonment of other equally important sectors of the economy.
7
 For 
instance, increasing petroleum dependence correlates to the decline of Nigeria’s 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors.
8
 
  
Attaining an effective management and application of petroleum revenues may in fact be the 
hardest part of the reform of the NPI. The successes with which Norway’s petroleum industry 
is hailed cannot be divorced from the fact that the industry yields have been translated into a 
higher standard of living for Norwegians.
9
 Similarly, prior to its discovery of petroleum, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were relatively unknown desert countries in the Middle 
East. Today, these countries are international financial hubs, due mainly to their prudent 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 Xavier Sala-i-Martina and Arvind Subramanian, ‘ Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration 
from Nigeria’ (2012) Vol. 22 Journal of African Economies, pp. 570, 596 
See also J.A Robinson and others, ‘Political Foundations of the Resource Curse’ (2006) Journal of Development 
Economics 79, 447–468 
8
 See Cyril Obi, ‘The Petroleum Industry: A Paradox or (Sp)oiler of Development?’ (2010) Vol.28(4)  
Journal of Contemporary African Studies p.443-45 
9
 See Erling Røed Larsen, ‘Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway 
Caught Up with and Forged Ahead of Its Neighbours’ (2006) 65 The American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology  
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application of petroleum revenues for the development of infrastructure in very harsh 
terrains.
10
 
 
Without blocking holes for mismanagement and misapplication of petroleum revenues, it is 
very likely that only few Nigerians will positively benefit from other reforms in the NPI. The 
true test of the effectiveness of reforms in the NPI should not be the smoothness with which 
the industry operates, or accolades from the international community. Rather it should be the 
ordinary Nigerian test, whose life is positively impacted by outcomes from the industry, 
especially those whose lives are affected by the industry every day.  
 
Until the industry impacts the ordinary Nigerian, ongoing reforms may end up as a cosmetic 
exercise, since it is likely to be negatively impacted by misgovernance in the wider context.  
The rise of militancy in the Niger Delta which resulted in the sabotage of petroleum 
infrastructure and severe environmental consequences, petroleum thefts,
11
 kidnap of oil 
workers, and insecurity, has largely been blamed on years of neglect of the region by 
successive Nigerian governments.
12
 Similarly recent divestments of Shell, Chevron and 
Total, from Nigeria’s onshore have been blamed on increasing sabotage and insecurity.  
 
If misapplication of petroleum revenues has resulted in societal ills in Nigeria, then the need 
to address them cannot be a side issue but must become a critical component of any reform 
programme if such programme is to be sustainable. Ironically, it appears that the effective 
application of petroleum revenues receives little attention in the PIB.
13
 Rather the focus of the 
reforms appears to be towards generating more revenues for the Nigerian government. But 
what good will such funds do, if they are not properly managed? This is because if petroleum 
                                                 
10
 See Gerard Butt, ‘Oil and Gas in the UAE’ in Ibrahim Al Abed, and Peter Hellyer (eds)  United Arab 
Emirates: A New Perspective. (Trindent Press 2nd edn, 2001) 231-248 
11
 The theft of petroleum which is called illegal bunkering, has grown from being a trade of some poor 
disgruntled youths, into an international criminal business, which currently costs the Nation billions of dollars 
annually. The NEITI 2009-2011 annual audit of the NPI noted that Nigeria lost $10.9 billion to crude oil theft in 
two years., see also Chineme Okafor, ‘NEITI: $10.9 billion Lost to Crude Oil Theft in 2 Years’ Thisday (30 July 
2013) 1 
12
 For a detailed treatment on the Niger Delta issue, see Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou, (n 1)  
13 The PIB seeks to impose a higher fiscal terms for IOCs operating in Nigeria, has been strongly opposed for 
being a disincentive. See Omololu Ogunmade and Chineme Okafor, ‘PIB, a Killer’ Thisday (19 Jul 2013) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/pib-a-killer-say-iocs/153774/> accessed 23 February 2013 
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revenues do not reach the people, those increased revenues may simply exacerbate the 
present tensions. 
 
Admittedly it is not easy to monitor the application of revenues that are decentralised to over 
700 local government areas. And it may in fact be argued that governance in the wider 
context is outside the purview of the NPI and so should be separated from ongoing reforms. 
In part this is true, to some extent, but where happenings outside the industry have direct 
ripple effects on the performance of the NPI, then such happenings should be integrated into 
the reforms, if they are to be impactful. In this regard, the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) notes that: 
‘…we share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important 
engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and 
poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative economic and social 
impacts.’14  
 
Part one of this chapter will seek to analyse the role of transparency in petroleum industry 
management, and analyse Nigeria’s transparency initiatives, in the light of the EITI 
framework. The second part will analyse Nigeria’s recent attempts to manage its petroleum 
revenues by the establishment of Nigeria’s Sovereign wealth fund (NSWF). It will focus on 
governance framework of the NSWF in the light of the Santiago principles 2008. Part three 
will focus on the Niger Delta Region which produces over 90 per cent of Nigeria’s 
petroleum, and their agitation for better treatment from the federal government. It will 
analyse their argument for a return to fiscal federalism, increased derivation, and explore the 
case for specialised agencies, and increased corporate initiatives of PEPCs. 
 
6.2 ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA’S INITIATIVES FOR EFFECTIVE 
UTILISATION OF PETROLEUM REVENUES 
 
                                                 
14
 EITI principle 1 
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6.2.1  A SHORT DISCOURSE ON  TRANSPARENCY  
 
A system is transparent if it is open, and guarantees ease of access to information that is 
understandable, relevant, and reliable.
15
 Transparency is regarded by many as a vital 
component of good governance.
16
 It is a prerequisite ‘for establishing proper institutional and 
regulatory structures, and for creating the conditions in which abuses can be challenged’.17 
To that extent, it may be argued that transparency is anti corruption, at least in principle.
18
 
But it is also worth noting that increased transparency may itself stimulate corruption in 
certain cases.
19
 The converse is also the case, as there can be reduced corruption even in 
regimes that are not transparent. This chapter will however argue that the impact of a 
transparency regime is equally dependent on other factors.  
 
Although lack of transparency may not always indicate corrupt activity, it is now generally 
agreed that corruption thrives best in an untransparent system, since such a system creates 
greater opportunities for wronging by reducing the risk for such activity.
20
 An untransparent 
system also makes it harder to incentivise public officials and PEPCs to act rightly, and 
frustrates the selection of capable persons with adequate integrity and commitment. The 
absence of transparency breeds mistrust, undermines social norms, and creates informational 
advantages which create access to corrupt rents, while making cooperation more difficult to 
sustain.
21
 
 
6.2.2  BACKGROUND TO NIGERIA’S EITI PROGRAMME  
 
                                                 
15
 See Kaufmann, D. and Bellver, A, ‘Transparenting Transparency – Initial Empirics and Policy Applications, 
Presentation at the Pre-Conference on Institutional Change for Growth and Poverty Reduction in Low-Income 
Countries’ (2005) International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., July 6-7, 2005 
See also Richard W. Oliver, What is Transparency (McGraw Hill 2004) 
16
 Thomas G Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and actual 
Challenges’ (2000) Vol 21 (5)  Third World Quarterly, 795, 808  
17
 See Ivar Kolstad, Arne Wiig and Aled Williams, ‘ Tackling Corruption in Oil Rich Countries: The Role of 
Transparency’ (2008) CMI U4 Brief  
18
 A Brunetti and A Weder, ‘A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption’, (2003) 87 Journal of Public Economics, 
1801-1824. 
19
 For a discussion of some negative effects of transparency, see Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, ‘Is Transparency 
the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?’ (2009) World Development Vol, 525-526 
20
 Kolstad and Arne Wiig , ‘Is Transparency the Key’ (n 109, chapter 2) 524 
21
 Ibid, 523 
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In the late 1990s there were calls for multinational companies to publish what they paid to 
their host governments. This was later extended to require resource rich countries (RCC) to 
publish what they earned. This was done in the belief that with greater transparency, civil 
society and citizens of RRCs would be better positioned to influence government behaviour 
in the management of petroleum revenues. EITI was established in 2003 as a direct result of 
the ‘publish what you pay’ campaign.22  
 
EITI is a voluntary compliance mechanism geared towards promoting transparency and good 
governance of natural resources.
23
 The actors in the initiative include PEPCs, host 
governments and civil society. EITI promotes transparency by advocating that states establish 
processes for the verification of payments received from PEPCs,
24
 and the publication of 
reports based on a verification exercise.
25
 
 
The challenges and limitations also of Nigeria’s regulatory agencies in monitoring petroleum 
revenues from PEPCs were discussed in chapter three.
26
 Financial monitoring requires 
adequate regulatory capacity, and the requisite robust commitment of the petroleum industry 
is complex. The complexity is more where an NOC stands at the cross roads between IOCs, 
and its home government, and operates as the gatekeeper to the industry. This has been the 
case with NNPC.  
 
NNPC oversees Nigeria’s purchase of imported refined petroleum products which are sold at 
subsidized rates to the Nigerian public. It also receives Nigeria’s take from collaborations 
with IOCs, which it is expected to pay to the Nigerian federation account pursuant to section 
162 of Nigeria’s constitution. NNPC also retrieves monies owed to it by the federal 
government of Nigeria (FGN) for sale of petroleum to the public at subsidised rates. The 
                                                 
22
 James Von Alstine, ‘Transparency in Resource Governance: The Pitfalls and Potential of “New Oil” in Sub-
Saharan Africa (2014) Vol. 14 Global Environmental Politics, 20, 21 
23
 See Ivar Kolstad and others,  ‘ Tackling Corruption in Oil Rich Countries’ ( n 17)   
24
 Although the EITI framework extends to other extractive industries, for the purpose of this thesis, discussion 
will be limited to the petroleum industry, and to petroleum resources.  
25
 For a discussion on the workings of EITI, see Virginia H. Haufler , ‘Disclosure as Governance: The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Resource Management in the Developing World’ (2010) Vol 
10(3) Virginia Global Environmental Politics, 53-73 
26
 See para 3.6.3 
 197 
 
duties of NNPC therefore involve a complex accounting and book keeping, and in that regard 
some NNPC staff have been accused of self dealing in collaboration with other government 
officials to defraud the Nigerian public.
27
  
 
Prior to 2004, no comprehensive audit of the NPI had ever been made public, nor were 
payments and receipts in the industry accessible to the public. Most payments and the terms 
of contracts under which PEPCs operated were shrouded in secrecy and sequestered from the 
public view. This was done through the use of various confidentiality clauses which made 
access to such documents almost impossible.
28
 
 
The abuse of such secrecy to promote corruption and mismanagement of petroleum revenues 
made transparency imperative for Nigeria. To that extent there was need for a framework 
under which transparency of petroleum industry initiatives can be promoted and monitored. 
This required a capable entity with requisite independence and capacity to monitor payments 
of funds to the FGN by PEPCs, and the further distribution of such funds to other arms of 
government.   
 
From 1999 Nigeria began to introduce some transparency initiatives which, at least in 
principle, appear to be far reaching and extensive. The most impactful of these is the Nigerian 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI). These initiatives and their impact in 
promoting petroleum revenues management in Nigeria will be examined next. 
 
6.2.3  THE NIGERIAN EXTRACT IVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY IN ITIATIVE 
ACT 2007 AND OTHER T RANSPARENCY INITIATIVES  
 
                                                 
27
 See Alex Gboyega and others, (n 3, chapter 1), 28 
28
 For instance s 5 of the Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA) 1959 as amended in 2007, and regulation 58 of the 
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 provide for confidentiality of information related to the 
operations and payments of petroleum exploration and production companies. 
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Nigeria became one of the earliest subscribers to the EITI framework when it established 
NEITI 2003. In 2007, it enacted the NEITI Act in order to provide a legislative framework on 
NEITI.  NEITI is an autonomous self accounting body whose objectives include ensuring due 
process and transparency is observed in payments made to the FGN, by all companies 
operating in the extractive industry. Other objectives include the promotion of due process, 
and accountability in the prudent management of petroleum revenues in Nigeria. NEITI is 
also charged with ensuring that all payments due to the Federal Government from extractive 
industry companies including taxes, royalties, dividends, penalties, levies are duly paid.
29
 
 
By extending its obligations to the monitoring of the application of petroleum revenues, the 
NEITI framework actually exceeds EITI’s minimum standards.30 And while EITI is 
concerned with the validation of government receipts from PEPCs, NEITI’s audit processes 
also includes validation of payments, value for money audits, process audits and physical 
audits.
31
 The implication is that NEITI is authorised to monitor the utilisation and application 
of petroleum revenues in all the sectors of the FGN. For the most part however, NEITI has 
focused almost entirely on monitoring receipts within the NPI. So far NEITI publishing four 
audited reports on government receipts from the petroleum industry.
32
  
 
The status of NEITI straddles between that of an auditor and a quasi regulator. For by 
mandating NEITI to eradicate corruption and to monitor expenditures of petroleum revenues 
by other arms of government, Nigeria seemed to have conceived of NEITI as a regulator.
33
 
But lacking legal capacity to sanction defaulters, NEITI remains essentially a ‘watchdog’ 
with the mandate of a regulator since all it can do is to recommend that the president revoke 
concessions of defaulting PEPCs.
34
  
 
                                                 
29
 S 1(2) NEITI Act  
30
 S. 2 although NEITI’s mandate extends to the extractive industries in Nigeria, this thesis will limit discussion 
to the petroleum industry and thus reference to the extractive industry will from henceforth mean the petroleum 
industry.  
31
 Nicholas Shaxson, ‘Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Just a Glorious Audit?’ (2009)  
Chatam House , Royal Institute of International Affairs, < http://eiti.org/document/shaxson-neiti-glorious-audit> 
accessed 20 November 2012, 5 
32 Its reports cover the years 1999-2004, 2005, 2006-2008, 2009-2011 
33 S 1(2) c 
34
 S 16(4) NEITI Act  
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The EITI framework has been adopted mainly by developing countries, although many 
developed countries have also implemented EITI’s principles either by legislations, or 
through policy directives which reflect the spirit of the EITI framework.
35
 For instance in 
2010, the USA Congress enacted section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the ‘Dodd Frank’s Act 2010’). This section added section 13 (q) to 
the 1934 US Securities and Exchange Act (SEC Act), and authorises SEC to require 
American firms involved in the extractive industry (including petroleum), to publish 
payments made to the US federal government or to foreign governments, in excess of 
$100,000.
36
 One significant difference between the NEITI regime and the Dodd Frank regime 
however is that unlike NEITI, the US SEC can impose significant sanctions on defaulting 
companies.
37
  
 
Other transparency initiatives have equally been introduced in the NPI. They include monthly 
publication of receipts of states and local governments from Nigeria’s federation account. 
There is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2011 which entitles Nigerians to access 
government information.
38
 Others include the Fiscal Responsibility Commission Act 2007, 
and the Crude Oil Revenue Reconciliation Committee, and the PIB 2012.  
 
It will be recalled that under the Petroleum Act regime, petroleum contracts are awarded at 
the discretion of the Minister without an open bidding system.
39
 The PIB however aims to 
promote an orderly, fair, and competitive system with clear and effective legal and 
institutional frameworks for organising petroleum development activities and a fiscal regime 
that offers fair returns on investments while optimising benefits to the Nigerian people.
40
 To                
the extent that transparency is a core objective of the Bill, and it contains extensive provisions 
to that effect.
41
 For instance the Bill seeks to void all confidentiality clauses in production and 
                                                 
35
 There is the EU’s Accounting and Transparency Directive of 2013.   
36
 The Rules were finally issued by SEC in August 2012. There is also the European Union’s Transparency 
Requirements for Listed Companies contained in Directive 2004/109/EC 
37
 For a treatment of the SEC enforcement regime, see Rebecca Flies’ ‘SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright 
Disclosure and Cooperation really Matter?’ (2012) Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (2012) 353–374 
38
 Ss 1 and 3 FOIA 2011 
39
 S 2 (1) of the Petroleum Act  
40
 S 1 (c) 
41
 S1 (h) 
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exploration contracts,
42
 and makes information on such contracts accessible to the public.
43
 
The PIB additionally seeks to complement the NEITI Act by requiring that the management 
and allocation of petroleum resources be done in compliance with principles of good 
governance, transparency and sustainable development.
44
 And that NEITIs’ representatives 
are present in the award of all petroleum concessions in Nigeria.
45
  
 
As laudable as Nigeria’s initiatives have been in promotion of transparency, it is important to 
explore if these have translated into genuine transparency, and if so, whether such 
transparency has led to an improvement in petroleum revenue management. For without such 
impact, the end of the initiatives will be frustrated. The next segment will consider the impact 
of NEITI and other such transparency initiatives within the NPI, and outside it. 
 
6.2.4  IMPACT OF TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES IN THE NPI:  ASSESSING THE 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
In some quarters, NEITI is viewed as the epitome of the EITI initiative and this explains why 
NEITI won EITI’s award in 2013 for exceeding minimum transparency requirements.46  
While the extent of its impact on the current reform initiatives in the NPI is debatable, it is 
undisputed that NEITI has generated unprecedented access to information on government 
accruals from the NPI. Such information which is published on the NEITI website is useful to 
states and local governments. As beneficiaries from the Nigerian federation account, states 
are in a better position to take advantage of NEITIs’ publications in monitoring payments 
                                                 
42
 S 174 (1) 
43
 See 174(10) and (2). Information about proprietary industrial rights which are confidential are protected 
however. See also s 174 (3) and (6), under which the Upstream Petroleum Inspectorate (UPI) to publish annual 
summaries by Petroleum exploration and production companies of all revenues and costs on which payments are 
made in respect to royalties, bonus payments and taxes, along with the texts of all concessions and contracts 
with the proposed National Oil Company (NOC) and any side letters to them (which are currently confidential), 
to be published on the website of the UPI within one year after the commencement of the PIB. Where such 
information is not supplied to the UPI by a company, a ten thousand dollars default fine shall be paid for every 
day such information is not available 
44
 S 3 
45
 S 190 (6) 
46
 ‘The 2013 EITI Chair's Awards’ (2013) <http://eiti.org/sydney2013/awards> accessed 24 February 2014. See 
also David L. Goldwyn, ‘Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption: The Success of Nigeria Extractive 
IndustriesTransparncy Initiative ‘ (2006) 
<http://pwypdev.gn.apc.org/sites/pwypdev.gn.apc.org/files/goldwyntestimonyNigeria051706.pdf.> accessed 9 
July 2012  
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from the Federation account in order to ensure they get their due in accordance with section 
162 of the constitution.
47
 Other stakeholders like civil society, the academia and legislators, 
have also gotten a clearer view about the workings of the hitherto secretive industry.  
  
NEITI has also strengthened the capacity of the FGN to monitor payments from PEPCs, 
including NNPC. With legislative backing and a more focused approach, NEITI has been 
able to improve revenue transparency in Nigeria. By adopting a value for audit process to 
verify the claims of PEPCs operating in Nigeria, NEITI was able to detect that over 9 billion 
dollars were unpaid by PEPCs.
48
 It may be argued that NEITI may have also constrained 
PEPCs to comply with laws bordering on transparency, given that refusal to co-operate with 
NEITI’s audit processes, may, beyond incurring the risk of the revocation of their 
concessions, also portray PEPCs disfavourably in the eyes of the Nigerian people and the 
international community. 
 
Apart from anything else, the above accounts have shown that a premium is placed on 
transparency in the NPI, which is the first step in the chain of good governance factors. But to 
place such premium on transparency without more, is to create an impression that the lack of 
transparency is the sole bane of the NPI, or that greater transparency equals good governance. 
This however is not always the case, as a government may for reasons other than corruption, 
operate a closed door policy. For instance, the Israeli nuclear programme remains one of the 
most secretive in the world, even though corruption is generally very low in Israel.
49
 
Similarly, Kuwait has not been very transparent about its petroleum reserves, but that does 
not necessarily imply corruption.
50
 
 
                                                 
47
 Nicholas Shaxson, ‘Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Just a Glorious Audit?’ (2009) 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009 Chatham House 
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48
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 See Stephen Lendman, ‘Israel’s Secret Nuclear Program’ (31 January 2014) Global Research< 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/israels-secret-nuclear-program/5366851> accessed 24 February 2014 
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And although Nigeria has earned accolades abroad for its transparency initiatives, few 
Nigerians will readily agree that there is still a long way to go. Transparency is only valuable 
and impactful if it can translate to increased accountability and better governance of the 
sector, and the utilisation of the resources. For example it is noteworthy that transparency in 
itself may not motivate persons to act properly unless their actions can be called to account. 
The next segment of this chapter will therefore focus on the need to combine accountability 
structures with Nigeria’s transparency framework. 
 
6.2.5  FROM AUDITING TH E INDUSTRY TO MONITORING EXPENDITURES  
 
NEITI’s objectives remain inchoate until it can lead to accountability. To that extent, while 
NEITI is not a failure, it will be equally premature to label it a success, since transparency is 
not an end in itself but a means to an end.  Beyond a viable accountability framework and 
strong and independent agency regulators, there is also the need for a functional electoral 
process in Nigeria, through which the wider public can call leaders to account. It is proposed 
also that Nigeria should shift from ‘publish what you earn’, to ‘account for what you spend’. 
This is more, as a significant part of the problem in the NPI is not with the industry but with 
government expenditure and application of petroleum revenues.  
 
Even if NEITI saves funds for the Nigerian federation, there is no guarantee that these funds 
will be properly applied at the government level. And even if there is transparency in the 
utilisation of these funds by government officials, is there adequate capacity to enforce and 
prosecute corrupt government officials? There is therefore need, and urgently too, to monitor 
the utilisation and application of petroleum revenues in order to ensure that such funds get to 
the people of Nigeria, and are not misapplied. 
 
It is in recognition of the limitations of a transparency initiative that the NEITI Act requires 
NEITI to monitor the application of petroleum revenues by government officials, which 
would amount to progressing from transparency to accountability. Recently the FGN 
mandated NEITI to commence an audit of fiscal allocations and statutory disbursements. 
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Under the scheme, NEITI will begin by auditing the NDR states which have received 13 per 
cent of petroleum revenues, the Excess Crude Account, the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC), the Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF), and the FGN’s 
ecology and derivation account.  This audit which will be the first of its kind in Nigeria, will 
effect require states’ governments and other government institutions to ‘publish what they 
expend.’51 
 
Taking the NEITI initiative from the NPI to application of petroleum revenues, is a welcome 
development, as it will be the first time that governments will be called to account for their 
expenditures from a more independent regulator. Currently, states’ governments are 
constitutionally subject to scrutiny by their various states legislative arms, but states 
legislators have been unable to enforce their mandates due to lack of adequate capacity, 
complicity and a structure that gives state governors greater powers over legislators.  
 
The FGN mandate to NEITI to monitor the application of petroleum revenues by states 
governors however faces some constraints. First there is the risk that it may violate the 
Nigerian constitution, under which states legislators are empowered to monitor the acts of the 
executive.
52
 There may also be capacity constraints since NEITI may lack the manpower and 
skill for such a more comprehensive and complex audit, given that Nigeria  currently has over 
700 local governments and 36 states. That may explain why the scheme is to begin only with 
the Niger Delta States and some select federal government agencies. 
 
Monitoring revenues utilisation may be easier in smaller countries like Qatar and Norway 
which also have unitary constitutions, than in Nigeria. The truth however remains that while 
petroleum revenues has been the mainstay of the Nigerian economy for over four decades, a 
                                                 
51
 NEITI, ‘Fiscal Allocation and Statutory Disbursement Audit Commences’ (2013) 
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commences > accessed 9 December 2013  
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more prudent application of petroleum revenues would have impacted the Nigerian economy 
positively, a fact that is borne out from Norway’s experience in the North Sea.53 
 
It may be worth noting that the average Nigerian is not as concerned about greater 
transparency per se, but what such access to information holds: accountable and good 
governance in revenue utilisation. It is doubtful if most Nigerians would care much about 
confidentiality clauses and secret payments, if they could trust that their government was 
acting in their best interests.  
 
Even if improved transparency reduces corruption and enables a country to save much 
petroleum revenues, there is still no guarantee same would be properly managed. It is 
noteworthy that Norway is not only transparent, but also prudent. For instance Norway 
established a Petroleum Fund from petroleum revenues and a fiscal rule through which it was 
able to limit public expenditure. The Fund thus ‘created a buffer between net petroleum 
revenue and its use in the current national economy’ and enable Norway to pay off its 
national debt in 1995.
54
 This is in contrast to Nigeria where military president Yakubu 
Gowon was reported to have said that Nigeria had no financial problems, only how to spend 
it.
55
 It is therefore imperative that beyond seeking petroleum industry transparency, Nigeria 
should promote fiscal policies that will promote good management of excess petroleum 
revenues. To that extent, the next part of this chapter will analyse the initiatives Nigeria has 
enacted to promote better management of petroleum revenues. Focus will be placed on the 
sovereign wealth fund strategy which has come to play a key role in many PPCs.  
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6.3 TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK FOR 
NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM REVENUES: THE ROAD TO THE 
NIGERIAN SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT AUTHORITY ACT 
2011 
 
6.3.1  THE NIGERIAN APPROAC H TO PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT  
 
Petroleum revenues can be managed through various strategies. A country may allocate 
petroleum revenues to its different tiers to use as it deems fit, or may allocate a significant 
chunk to host states. It may use petroleum revenues for infrastructural or educational 
development, or to subsidise petroleum. In other cases, some countries save excess petroleum 
revenues, and invest same through pension funds, banks or through sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs).
56
  
 
The actual choice of strategy is not always easy especially where there are equally important 
demands from various segments of the society. For instance, a government cannot ignore 
current needs of its citizens because it wants to invest for future generations. And it may be 
difficult to pay too much attention to host communities while there are clearly present needs 
in other aspects of the country. Equity, justice and skill should guide policy makers who 
manage petroleum revenues.  
 
Nigeria adopts a multi faceted approach to petroleum revenue management. It distributes 
petroleum profits to the whole federation on the basis of its revenue allocation principles 
which considers need, derivation, population, and land mass.
57
 And recently it has adopted a 
savings and investment approach in the form of the Excess Crude Account, and the NSWF. 
The remaining segment of this chapter will analyse Nigeria’s foray into the SWF movement, 
and its savings mechanism. It will consider the legality of Nigeria’s SWF, its strengths, and 
                                                 
56
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governance frameworks in the light of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
(GAPPs) published in 2008 for SWFs in Santiago. 
 
6.3.2  A BRIEF DISCOURSE ON THE PURPOSES OF, AND  DEFINITION OF SWFS  
 
SWFs are government owned entities which invest in shares, bonds, real estate and other 
profit earning projects.
58
 Reasons for establishing SWFs are country specific, although 
economic stabilisation, infrastructural development and savings for future generations appear 
to be among the most consistent.
59
 Others include the need to address, and reduce 
opportunities for waste and misappropriation of excess funds. From the first SWF which was 
established by Kuwait in 1953, the value of SWFs has come to account for about $ 4 
trillion.
60
 
 
A country whose economy is heavily dependent on petroleum resources is vulnerable to 
downturn in the prices of the commodity as this may result in an economic crisis and frustrate 
budget implementation.
61
 For instance, the Nigerian budget which is benchmarked to a 
particular price of crude oil is often positively or negatively impacted when there is a rise or 
fall in petroleum prices. It is to address the possibility of such occurrences that many 
countries save excess funds in SWFs, from which they can easily retrieve funds for economic 
stabilisation.  In other instances, some countries use SWFs to ‘bailout’ crisis ridden firms in 
the wake of a financial crisis.
62
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An SWF can be used to save funds for future generations in view of eventual depletion of 
petroleum resources which is a non renewable resource, or for such a time as petroleum may 
lose its importance in the world energy market. For instance, Nigeria’s petroleum resources 
are expected to be depleted in the next 41 years.
63
 Nigeria is also exposed to the risk that 
Western countries may discover alternative sources of energy, and depend less on petroleum 
 
The future savings concept is hinged on the theory of intergenerational equity which is 
premised on the ground that future generations should be considered by government when 
making policy decisions. This is more so as they will be impacted by the outcomes of the 
petroleum industry, one way or another. A case in hand is Oloibiri, Nigeria’s first oil well. 
Although the well has dried up for some time now, the current generation of the Oloibiri 
people are unable to farm on most of their lands which have been severely affected by 
petroleum operations which occurred long before they were born.
64
 
Finally, an SWF can be used for infrastructural development, which is a vital component for 
economic diversification.
65
 For instance the UAE are already preparing for a post petroleum 
economy and one way of doing this is to turn the UAE into an international economic and 
financial centre and a tourist destination. The UAE has in that regard invested heavily on 
infrastructural development, in the form of roads, skyscrapers, electricity, etc.
66
 in order to 
support an economic diversification policy.
67
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Architecture and Another Example of Ad HoC Global Administrative Networking and Related ‘Soft’ Rule 
Making? ( 2010) 29 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 465, 467 
63
 James Enejo, ‘W'Bank: Nigeria's Oil Resources May Last 41 Years’ Thisday (5 October 2012) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/wbank-nigerias-oil-resources-may-last-41-years/126921/>accessed 2 April 
2014 
64
 Sonibare SO, OO and others, ‘Assessment of Organochlorine Pesticides Residues in Higher Plants from Oil 
Exploration Areas of Niger Delta, Nigeria’ (2012) 433. 
Science of the Total Environment, 2012, Vol.433, pp.169-177 
65
 Ben Euguzozie, ‘How Sovereign Wealth Fund can Drive Nigeria’s Growth, Infrastructural Development’ 
Business Day (16 May 2011) <\http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/analysis/features/21470-how-
sovereign-wealth-fund-can-drive-nigerias-growth-infrastructure-development> accessed 8 July 2011 
66See Mohammed Shibab, ‘Economic Development in the UAE’ in Ibrahim Abed and Peter Hellye (eds) United 
Arab Emirates: A New Perspective (Trindent 2001) 249 
67
 See Chiazor Ezenwa, ‘Nigeria’s Sovereign Wealth Fund And Inter-generational Equity’ Thisday (13 October 
2013) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-s-sovereign-wealth-fund-and-inter-generational-
equity/161419/> accessed 26 February 2014 
 208 
 
6.3.3   SWFS,  SOES AND OTHER  INVESTMENT VEHICLES COMPARED  
 
SWFs have no standard form, and differ in size, structure and capacity. For instance, while 
some countries manage their SWFs directly from their central banks, like Norway, other 
SWFs are in the form of separate legal entities conferred with authority to manage and invest 
their country’s revenues. But most SWFs differ from other government owned investment 
mechanisms like state owned enterprises (SOEs), and government pension funds, principally 
from the fact that they are usually ring fenced from undue political and government 
interference.
68
 
 
Again unlike SOEs, SWFs do not usually engage directly in business, but are mainly 
investment entities which hold a range of diversified portfolios across the globe. And while a 
traditional institutional investor may be partly government owned, all SWFs are solely owned 
by states’ governments. Another important feature of SWFs is that they invest not only in 
their local economies, but also in the international capital market, and operate with stronger 
financial orientation in their investment strategies.
69
  
 
‘Pure economics’ is not necessarily behind all SWFs’ investment decisions however, since 
other factors also influence their investment decisions. A prime example is Norway whose 
SWF is governed by an ethical council which annually publishes a list of firms in which the 
fund will not invest in; for reasons ranging from tobacco, sale of arms, and for human rights 
issues.
70
 In some other instances, religious and cultural issues may affect the investment 
decisions of some SWFs. For instance, the Kuwaiti’ Investment Authority which manages 
Kuwait’s SWF may be reluctant to invest in Israeli companies because of Middle East 
tensions between both countries.
71
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6.3.4  THE ROAD TO NIGERIA’ S SWF: THE EXCESS CR UDE ACCOUNT  
 
In 2004 the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) introduced an oil price based fiscal rule 
under which the funding of Nigeria’s annual budgets was tied to a benchmark crude oil price. 
Petroleum revenues in excess of the benchmark were transferred to an ‘Excess Crude 
Account’ (ECA), an IMF backed initiative, established to stabilise the Nigerian economy in 
cases of petroleum price fluctuations.
72
 The ECA which is essentially a savings bank account 
differs from an SWF in two ways. First it is not managed by an independent entity, but by 
Nigeria’s central bank, and ministry of finance. Secondly, funds from the ECA are not 
invested in shares, stocks or any other form of investment.  
 
For a country that had exported petroleum since 1958, the ECA represents the first deliberate 
effort to save excess petroleum revenues until such a time as there is need for economic 
stabilisation. The ECA, like Norway’s Petroleum Fund, yielded immediate results by 
enabling Nigeria to pay $12 billion owed to the Paris Club.
73
 This payment was the platform 
for the negotiation of the writing off of the remaining $18 billion debt by the Club.
74
   
 
Laudable as the ECA was, it had no defined legal framework and this raised genuine 
concerns that the federal government was short changing states and local governments in 
distribution of funds from Nigeria’s federation account. There were also concerns that the 
ECA breached some portions of the Nigerian constitution.
75
 There was definitely need for a 
properly defined legislative framework in order for the FGN to save and invest excess 
petroleum revenues. This came in the form of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority 
(NSIA) Act 2011, which will be analysed in the next part of this chapter.  
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6.3.5  NIGERIA’S SWF: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIAN SOVEREIGN 
INVESTMENT AUTHORITY  ACT 2011 
 
The Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) Act 2011 established the Nigerian 
Sovereign Investment Authority (the ‘Authority’) to manage Nigeria’s SWF. The fund 
consists of three funds one each for economic stabilisation, future generations, and 
infrastructural development.
76
 The Authority is a self-sustaining entity governed in 
compliance with principles of financial sustainability and with independent decision making 
powers that are exercised transparently.
77
  
 
The NSIA Act authorises the Authority to receive excess crude revenues from the federation 
account and to manage and invest same in a diversified international portfolio of assets.
78
 The 
Authority is further charged with obtaining the best achievable financial returns on all capital 
and assets, having regard to the need to protect and enhance long term economic value.
79
  
 
The NSWF commenced with a $1 billion seed capital contribution from the federal, states 
and local governments that make up the Nigerian federation.
80
 From the realised profits the 
Authority is mandated to make distributions after a unanimous vote by its board, subject to 
consent by its governing council.
81
  
 
Many have hailed Nigeria’s SWF as a starting point for an effective management of 
petroleum revenues. But good management of the funds is one thing, and effective 
application of its profits to the Nigerian people is another. What is the guarantee that funds in 
the NSWF will not be mismanaged like so many other government entities as in the past? 
82
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For without good and effective management, funds in the SWF may be stolen and 
misappropriated by self serving people, given that Nigeria’s governance framework is weak 
and its democracy only emerging. The governance framework for the NSWF will be analysed 
next in the light of the Santiago principles in order to determine whether there are sufficient 
safeguards for effective and sound management.  
 
6.3.6  GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR  THE ATTAINMENT 
OF THE NSWF’S MANDAT E: THE ROLE OF INTER NATIONAL SOFT LAW  
 
Good corporate governance has come to dominate global headlines since Enron and 
WorldCom, and many other corporate failures, impacted the global community. It implies 
compliance with the law, transparency, accountability, board independence and ethical 
practices, as vital components required for a healthy corporate performance.
83
 It is arguable 
that good corporate governance is imperative for Nigeria’s NSWF in order to attain domestic 
and external legitimacy.  
 
Domestic legitimacy refers to a country wide acceptance of the NSWF which transcends its 
legal status. For instance, although the ECA was not a legal entity, it enjoyed domestic 
legitimacy because many Nigerians saw it as a welcome development to avoid the ‘as usual’ 
squandering of petroleum revenues. Its domestic legitimacy was shored up from the fact that 
funds from the ECA were used to obtain Nigeria’s release from the Paris Club and for the 
stabilisation of the economy during the global financial crisis.
84
 In fact it can be posited that a 
legally established entity may lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the people due to 
mismanagement, while one that is not established after a legal process may enjoy greater 
legitimacy if it serves the interests of the people. In fact good corporate governance in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
optimally, thus informing the ongoing privatization programme in Nigeria. For example, although NNPC had 
great potentials of rising to become an international NOC, internal corruption and external political interference 
have been among its most limiting challenges. 
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case of Nigeria’s NSWF may be the only guarantee for its continued existence, which 
currently hangs on the delicate balance of a Supreme Court judgement.  
Nigeria’s federal constitution establishes semi-autonomous states which are free to utilize 
their revenues within the ambit of the law.
85
 Section 162 of the constitution requires 
petroleum revenues to be paid into a federation account, and to be shared between the federal 
states and local governments, as they accrue. A careful reading of the section would show 
that there is no direct authority on the federal government (a single arm of the government), 
to invest or save funds from the federation account.  It is on the basis of this perceived 
violation, that states’ governors challenged the constitutionality of the ECA and the NSIA 
Act 2011 in the Supreme Court.
86
 The Court had in 2013, granted the parties a long 
adjournment to settle their differences out of court, due to the sensitive nature of the case; but 
the parties failed to reach any amicable settlement.
87
 
 
In the light of failures of the opposing parties to settle out of court, the Supreme Court began 
to hear the parties to the case from March 24 2014.
88
 Currently it has been adjourned to 
September 23 2014.
89
 Should the Court find that withdrawals of funds due to states and local 
governments are illegal; the federal government would have to repay such funds by 
withdrawing same from the NSWF.  The only other option would be to persuade states and 
local governments about the justifiability of the NSWF. Hard as this may seem, the chances 
that any such persuasion would work, would depend largely on an excellent governance 
framework of the Fund.  
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External legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the NSWF by the international community 
and investee countries.
90
 Good governance of the NSWF would require Nigeria to ring fence 
the Authority from undue external interference while simultaneously guaranteeing that it is 
managed in a transparent and professional manner. But why should it matter what the 
international community thinks about the management of Nigeria’s SWF? An understanding 
of globalisation and its impact on world economy is necessary to appreciate why 
mismanagement of an SWF can affect the global economy and the international capital 
market. 
 
The importance of SWFs in the global economy grew in the wake of the global financial 
crisis that began in 2008.
91
 But with this growth came concerns in western nations that SWFs 
could be used for ultra economic objectives, which could destabilise the world economy. This 
concern, real or imaginary, was underscored by the fact that many SWFs were not owned by 
countries that practiced the western form of democracy. And some were covertly and overtly 
perceived to be unfriendly to American and European interests.
92
 There was also the concern 
of transfer of technology through the ‘back door’.93   
  
There was need therefore, to convince the global community that SWFs meant well, were 
properly governed, and had no ulterior motives. Thus good governance became a prerequisite 
to a global acceptance of SWFS, especially by investee nations most of which are in the 
West. To attain this objective the IMF in 2008 mandated an international working group on 
SWFs to develop internationally recognised governance standards for SWFs. The working 
group met in Santiago Argentina in 2008 and published 24 voluntary Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices (GAPPs) which are a benchmark for the measurement of the 
governance structures of SWFs.
94
 The GAPPs were adopted by all members of an umbrella 
                                                 
90
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body for SWFs: the International Federation of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWFs), which 
was established in 2009.  
 
The GAPPs are voluntary and states are free to vary from them as circumstances determine.
95
 
They are essentially a form of soft law, which SWFs operating in the international capital 
market will do well to comply with in order to attain external legitimacy. The Authority is 
required to implement best practices with respect to managerial independence and 
accountability, corporate governance, transparency and performance reporting which reflect 
the GAPPs, or other similar principles and conventions. The extent, to which the NSIA 
incorporates the principles of the GAAPs, will be considered next. 
 
6.3.7  A COMPARISON OF THE NSIA AND THE GAPPS PROVISIONS THAT 
RELATE TO GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF T HE NSWF 
 
Between voluntary and mandatory frameworks  
 
Good corporate governance of the NSWF is not only a desirable element, but a legal 
requirement. This approach contrasts with the UK approach which is largely voluntary and 
where firms are required to ‘comply or explain’.96 The UK approach is based on the 
assumption that firms will likely and voluntarily comply or face the consequences of non 
compliance in their share prices.
97
 The voluntary approach has its strengths and weaknesses 
however, although Finch criticises it for not being able to entrench accountable leaderships in 
listed firms.
98
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and sound governance structures that provide for adequate operational controls, risk management and 
accountability.  
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As corruption remains a clear and present risk in Nigeria, it is not surprising that the NSIA 
Act makes good governance a mandatory issue. This is underscored by the fact that with so 
much at stake in the NSWF, there is need to apply the higher of the options between 
‘mandatory’ or ‘voluntary’ compliance to effective corporate governance frameworks. 
 
Board independence: GAAPs and the NSIA Act  
 
An independent and responsible board is a prerequisite for good corporate governance.
99
 In 
that regard the NSIA Act envisages a strong board which is properly remunerated, 
independent and accountable. The board is expected to operate under a transparent regime 
with a vibrant financial orientation and sound risk management policies.
100
 To that extent, 
section 1(4) of the NSIA Act frees it from the control of any other person or authority.
101
 
 
In a conspicuous departure from the NNPC Act and the NDDC Act, the NSIA provides for 
various layers of leadership of the Authority designed to guarantee board independence and 
professionalism. First a board made up of a balance of executive and non executive directors 
is appointed to formulate policy, and to pursue the attainment of the Authority’s objects.102 
Secondly a governing council, consisting mainly of political and government appointees, is 
appointed to oversee the affairs of the board.
103
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 It consists of the President (chairman), the Vice President, governors of the 36 states, the Attorney General of 
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The governing council is required to observe the independence of the board and its officers, 
and not to require it to take or to refrain from any specified action.
104
 This reflects GAPPs 6 
and 10 which require the governance of SWFs to be sound and established on a clear and 
effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and 
operational independence.  
 
In practice however, statutory provisions for an independent board can be easily 
circumvented if the board is not meritoriously appointed. Similarly arbitrary powers of 
removal can further erode other provisions that guarantee board independence. And it is for 
this reason that most corporate governance codes require that boards be appointed through a 
transparent and merit based selection process conducted by a nominations board manned by 
independent directors.
105
 To that extent, the NSIA Act requires the president to appoint the 
board of the Authority on the recommendation of the minister of finance, who acts with the 
co-operation of a nominations committee.
106
This requirement reflects GAPPs 7 which 
requires SWF owners to appoint their boards in accordance with clearly defined procedures.
 
  
 
Balance of power in the board 
 
The NSWF’s board composition complies with standard corporate governance principles by 
providing for a mixture of executive and non-executive directors. This is to ensure a balance 
between experience and skill, and to prevent the dominance of the board by a powerful 
individual.
107
 It separates the positions of chairman and managing director, and provides for 
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six non-executive directors, one of whom is the chairman, and three executive directors, one 
of whom is the managing director.
108
  
 
That the number of non-executive directors (who ordinarily should be independent) exceeds 
the executive directors will enable independent executive monitoring in order to ensure 
compliance with good governance practices and the law.
109
 But passivity and lack of 
informational depth of non executive directors (NEDs) has in the past been a challenge to 
good corporate governance.
110
 While this risk remains even in the governance of the NSWF, 
the NEDs may be more inclined to be independent given that they are not appointed by the 
managing director (or by the president, at his prodding).
111
 It is therefore hoped that the 
NEDs will be able to bring in their experience, connections, foresight and some level of 
independence to steer the board in the right direction.  
 
As desirable as board independence is, board independence is only one of many factors 
required for good corporate governance. In fact external interference may sometimes be 
necessary in order for a government to ascertain that SOE and other government owned 
institutions are managed in way that is congruent with national priorities, and to ensure 
managerial accountability. But such should not be done to an extent that frustrates board 
independence.  
 
Beyond board independence, there is also need for adequate professional support with 
international exposure, since the Authority will operate mainly in foreign territories. The 
NSIA Act makes provisions for that also. In practice many SWFs engage consultants like JP 
Morgan, State Street, City Group, etc. to act as custodians and fund managers and to advise 
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on investment in the international capital market. The NSIA Act authorises the Authority to 
appoint asset managers and custodians on the basis of comprehensive assessment criteria.
112
 
Currently JP Morgan has been appointed as the external manager of the NSWF. Such 
external fund managers will additionally bring their skills and independence to guarantee a 
higher standard of governance of the NSWF and further insulate the fund from external 
interference.  
 
6.3.8  DESIRABILITY OF SUBSCRIPTION TO AN INTER NATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS IM PACT ON THE GOVERNANCE OF THE NSWF  
 
Although the NSIA requires the Authority to be governed in compliance with standards 
which reflect international best practice,
113
 it is equally important that it is subjected to an 
international peer mechanism like the IFSWFs.
114
 Subscription to international good 
governance standards and best practices and membership of any such organisation would be 
an added incentive to act in line with good corporate governance standards in the 
management of the NSWF. This would be especially useful as the NSWF operates within the 
international capital market which will imply that its obligations will transcend local 
circumstances. Any breach of these obligations may result in entry blockages in many 
investee nations.  
 
In fact it is arguable that the above average performance of the NLNG as observed in chapter 
five is not totally unconnected to its international affiliations.
115
 The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) had a pre funding requirement that the Nigerian government agree to hold 
less than a majority of the shares of the NLNG.
116
 That requirement became one of the most 
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in David G. Victor, Amy M. Jaffe, and Mark H. Hayes (eds) Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040. 
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strategic factors behind the performance of the NLNG. Without total control, the FGN has 
been unable to tamper with the board’s composition, continuity, or the assets of the firm.  
 
 Again the performance and relative successes of NEITI in the area of industry transparency 
cannot be entirely disconnected from Nigeria’s membership of EITI and its peer review 
mechanism. And although Shaxson has argued that certain improvements in petroleum 
revenue management are the product of internal fiscal policies, rather than its transparency 
initiatives,
117
 it is also true that EITI’s minimum transparency standards gave Nigeria a 
platform to design NEITI to promote transparency in the NPI 
 
It is by no means the case that domestic standards are always inferior to international 
standards. In fact domestic standards of countries like Britain, Norway, the USA and the 
Netherlands are often the basis for drafting of international best standards. The NEITI 
requirements which exceed those of EITI, can, if successfully implemented in Nigeria, 
eventually create a framework for international best practices. What is argued however is that 
states should be free to adopt standards that exceed international best governance standards 
for the governance of their SWFs, or any other entity. This is especially so where the impact 
of that entity transcends national boundaries.  
 
Why the NSWF is strategically important 
 
The NSWF is significant for Nigeria as a first of many reform initiatives that have been 
introduced in the NPI. If properly managed, it will steer a path towards sustainable 
management of Nigeria’s petroleum revenues. Late as it may seem in coming, it represents an 
effort by Nigeria to effectively manage its petroleum revenues, avoid waste and enthrone 
good governance. Had the NSWF been established in the early 1970s, when Nigeria enjoyed 
an economic boom following the oil crisis in the Middle East, it is safe to assert that fund 
would have grown to such an extent as would have enabled it to cater for some of Nigeria’s 
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developmental needs, help diversify the economy and would have also improved the standard 
of living of Nigerians. 
 
An earlier NSWF would have also limited the amount of money available for political 
profligacy. Although Algeria’s crude oil reserves, estimated to be about 12 billion barrels of 
crude oil, are far less than Nigeria’s 37 billion, Algeria’s SWF, which was established in 
2000 currently, manages over $42 billion, far in excess of what Nigeria holds. There may 
therefore be need to aggressively save funds in the SWF especially where these revenues 
arise from sale of petroleum over and above the bench mark as reflected in the annual budget.  
 
The NSIA requirements for good governance exceed those of the GAAPs in scope. By 
making adherence to such standards compulsory, there is another indication that the NSWF is 
a departure from the previous ways of managing SOEs and government backed initiatives. 
While it remains to be seen how the NSWF will be managed in the future, the framework for 
good corporate governance is promising, and not the least encouraging. The NSWF may 
reflect the spirit of a people who are desirous of getting things right, after getting so many 
things wrong in the past.  
Research has shown that the risk of managerial self-dealing increase with greater 
independence, and in essence create the owner-agency problem.
118
 The dilemma has always 
been how to strike a balance between board independence and a functional accountability 
framework. It is therefore important for good corporate governance that Nigeria strikes a 
balance between board independence and board accountability. The extent to which the NSIA 
Act subjects the Authority’s board to a corporate accountability framework, and how that 
framework reflects international best practices, will be analysed in the next part. 
 
6.3.9  THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN NIGERIA :  AND ITS POTENTIAL 
IMPACT ON THE N EITI AND NSIA INITIA TIVES  
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What is accountability? 
 
The linchpin of various reform initiatives in the NPI is hinged on the establishment of an 
accountability framework. For instance, the NSIA Act requires that after a five year period, 
the Authority may declare profits and make distributions to the various tiers of the Nigerian 
federation.
119
 But what is the guarantee that these profits will be properly managed at states 
and local government levels?  
 
Accountability implies answerability for one’s actions. A person could be accountable either 
to the people in general, or to a government entity in particular or indeed both. Thus 
accountability gives ‘teeth’ to transparency initiatives. Andrew Keay noted that mere 
publication without requirement to answer and justify certain course of actions, will only lead 
to improved transparency without more.
120
 
 
The concept of punishment, rewards, and responsibility should undergird any accountability 
system. For instance the managers of Nigeria’s petroleum revenues, or of the Authority, 
should be open to sanction for managerial failures. Similarly, the management board of the 
Authority should be answerable to the governing council, the non executive directors, and to 
the people in general. Where the board exceeds performance targets, it should expect rewards 
either in the form of a pay rise, or tenure extension. Conversely, where directors break the 
law or act unethically, they should be sacked, and be subject to civil and criminal sanctions. 
An accountability framework is dependent largely on effective monitoring and regulatory co-
operation, and regulatory capacity.  
 
From 1999, Nigeria began introducing some anti corruption reforms. It established the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices 
                                                 
119
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120
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Commission (ICPC). Other policies geared towards financial prudence like the FRA 2007
121
 
and the PPA 2007,
122
 were also enacted. Laudable as these anti corruption initiatives are, the  
anti corruption agencies have largely been unable to effectively monitor the utilisation of 
petroleum revenues  by states and local governments across the breadth of Nigeria as they 
struggle with lack of adequate capacity, funding, and are often subject to undue political 
interference.
123
  
 
Nigeria also faces the issue of politicisation of the enforcement and regulatory process and 
this has weakened the sanctioning of corrupt individuals. The result is that influential persons 
who are loyal to the political class are often unlikely to face the full weight of the law even 
where they violate Nigeria’s laws on corruption and resource management. Thus the need for 
an independent regulatory process complemented by a viable whistleblower and class action 
regime should be extended to monitoring the application of petroleum revenues in Nigeria.
124
 
 
Nigeria imposes the death penalty for sabotage, armed robbery and murder.
125
 But persons 
convicted for corruption are given relatively lighter sentences even though misappropriation 
of petroleum revenues, especially in a large scale, has more detrimental effects than 
robbery.
126
 And with the back door introduction of plea bargaining into Nigeria’s criminal 
procedure, persons convicted of stealing billions of naira are given light prison sentences in 
addition to forfeiting the monies they steal.
127
 This procedure may have unwittingly 
emboldened persons to steal government funds, since all they have to lose is a few months in 
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prison. It is therefore proposed that Nigeria should adopt an extensive and strict punishment 
regime for corrupt application of petroleum revenues. Persons who breach their offices of 
trust should be given at least a life sentence where the amount of money stolen is 
monumental. China imposes the death penalty for corruption in certain cases.
128
 And even 
though corruption is still said to be endemic in China,
129
 it is arguable that the deterring effect 
of such sanctions may have contributed to China’s economic growth. 
Accountability in the management of the NSIA  
 
The 1992 Cadbury Report on corporate governance noted that the ‘most direct method of 
ensuring that companies are accountable for their actions is through open disclosures by 
boards’.130 It is in that regard that the NSIA Act requires the Authority to publish reports and 
statements, audited according to international standards, on a regular basis.
131
 It is also 
required to regularly publish its investment plans, and procedures for the appointment of its 
management board.
132
 This requirement mirrors the GAPPs 2 and 4 which requires SWFs to 
publicly disclose their policies, objects, procedures and general approach to funding, 
withdrawal and spending.
133
 Such publications will ensure the Authority is open to external 
and independent scrutiny.  
 
But accountability should follow publication however, if it is to have any regulatory effect. 
Thus it is surprising that the NSIA Act has no sanction provisions for the board other than for 
disqualification of directors from office in certain cases.
134
 The question then is how can an 
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underperforming board be brought to account? Under the Act, executive directors will remain 
on the board as long as their contract remains,
135
 while non executive directors will remain in 
office for four years subject to reappointment for another four years.
136
  
 
The power to sack non performing directors is one of the most vibrant accountability 
mechanisms of corporate governance, if properly utilised. Thus companies’ boards are held to 
account by various means. Shareholders may decide not to re-elect non performing directors, 
refuse to give them a pay raise, or elect to vote them out even before their contract expires. 
But the president’s powers to sack directors of the Authority appear to be limited to cases of 
material breach of duties of the Authority. Such directors can only be removed on the 
recommendation of the minister, based on a unanimous vote of the board that such a director 
be removed from office.
137
 And while the board of the Authority is subject to directors’ 
obligations and duties as provided for in CAMA, it is unsure if section 262 which regulates 
removal of directors, is equally applicable to them.
138
  
 
Ordinarily non performing directors should be removed in pursuance to their contracts of 
employment, but the recent Nigerian Supreme Court decision in Longe v First Bank of 
Nigeria
139
 however casts some uncertainty in this regard. In that case the Appellant was 
removed as managing director of the Respondent by a letter which alleged some financial 
improprieties in regard to a loan. On his appeal against his dismissal however, the Supreme 
Court held that being a director, he was covered by the protection of section 262 of CAMA 
and could not be removed like an ‘ordinary’ executive of the bank. And the Supreme Court 
agreed with him, and held that his appointment could only be terminated by the strict section 
262 procedure. It is for that reason that it is proposed that the contracts regulating the 
appointment of executive directors should tie their continued stay to good performance. 
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In contrast to companies however, the NSWF board is subject not to conventional 
shareholders’ control, but to a governing council, to which it is obligated to render regular 
accounts audited according to international standards.
140
 The governing council is not subject 
to the many oversight limitations of the conventional dispersed shareholder who may not 
have the time or expertise to understand financial reports.
141
 With its mix of politicians and 
professionals, it appears to be in a better position, with the aid of its standing subcommittee, 
to monitor the affairs of the board, interpret its reports, compare same with those of other 
SWFs globally and take action where necessary. It therefore lies within the ambit of the 
council to effectively monitor the board of the Authority. Research has shown that traditional 
institutional shareholders are often passive in the monitoring of the governance of firms in 
which they invest.
142
 To that extent, there should be clear incentives for the council to 
perform its oversight functions as a public duty 
  
It is proposed that there should be definite targets for the executive directors of the Authority 
upon which they can be assessed, and called to account. Accountability should not however 
be required to an extent that will stifle managerial innovation and flexibility. This can occur if 
an over bearing governing council, or the NEDs become over intrusive on the operations of 
the management team of the NSWF. This can eventually break their confidence in taking 
decisions that may have long term benefits for the NSWF. To attain that fine balance between 
accountability and enterprise requires experience, commitment and integrity. For instance the 
Cadbury and the Greenbury codes which sought to address the accountability gap in the UK 
corporate governance, were said to have hindered enterprise and innovation, and had to be 
balanced with the Hampel report.
143
 
 
Finally in the area of accountability, it was noted that company law subjects boards, not only 
to shareholders, but also to regulators like the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). Listed 
firms are additionally subjected to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and to 
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the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Regulators are often empowered to sanction erring directors by 
imposition of fines, or outright bans either for life or for a given period.
144
 
 
 In the case of the NSWF, although the board is subjected to CAMA’s requirements for 
company directors, it appears to be subjected to no other authority other than the governing 
council. And it appears unclear whether CAC has any authority over its activities although its 
board is subject to CAMA’s duties for directors. Should the NSWF invest in the UK for 
instance, its board would however be required to comply with regulations and be subject to 
scrutiny by the Prudential Regulation Authority which regulates investments in the UK.
145
But 
in Nigeria it is not subject to any formal regulator. There is therefore need to subject the 
Authority and its officers to a formal regulator, like the CAC, or SEC, while the governing 
council should play the role of a conventional shareholder, or act like an institutional 
shareholder.  
 
This part has analysed Nigeria’s strategy for better management of its petroleum revenues as 
epitomised in the NSWF and the ECA. Genuine petroleum revenue management however, 
should be geared towards the development of the Nigerian economy in general. But there is 
further need to ensure that those whose lives are directly affected by the impact of petroleum 
explorations have a special right to the benefits accruing from the industry.  It is to that extent 
that part three of this chapter will seek to analyse the arguments for and against greater fiscal 
allocation for the Niger Delta Region (NDR) on the basis of federalism, justice, and equity. 
 
6.4 THE NIGER DELTA REGION AND PETROLEUM REVENUES: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES ARISING FROM THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR ‘RESOURCE CONTROL’  
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6.4.1  A SHORT DISCOURSE ON  FEDERALISM  
 
Perhaps because of the importance of petroleum to energy supplies, many federal 
constitutions centralise the management of petroleum resources while providing for some 
revenue sharing formula between the various tiers of government.
146
 The sharing formula 
adopted by a country is usually undergirded by principles of equity, need, population, land 
mass, derivation and national interests.
147
 But there is need for balance, equity and justice in 
the sharing of petroleum revenues, as this can determine if host regions are justly treated or 
not. This has been the case with Nigeria where the NDR has for some time now argued for a 
return to fiscal federalism in the sharing of Nigeria’s petroleum revenues. 
 
Fiscal federalism entails that federating units are able to either manage their petroleum 
resources directly, or benefit significantly from their natural resources. Currently, Nigeria’s 
federating units lack fiscal federalism in the truest sense, as the states are disproportionately 
dependent on central government. It has been argued that this hinders the federating units 
from developing their natural resources and exploiting their economic potential to the 
fullest.
148
 The next segment of this chapter will analyse the issues arising from the advocacy 
for greater participation in Nigeria’s petroleum revenues. Other options that can be exploited 
to ensure justice and peaceful production of Nigeria’s petroleum will also be considered. 
 
The Natural resources charter (NRC) notes that ‘failing to provide reasonable compensation 
as well as equitable participation in the national benefits can give rise to citizens’ frustration 
                                                 
146
 They include Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, and Iraq. See Carlos Gervasoni,  ‘A Rentier Theory of Subnational 
Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces’ (2010) Vol 62(2) 
World Politics, Alberto Diaz-Caveros, Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America 
(Cambridge, 2006) and Michael M. Gunter, ‘Arab–Kurdish Relations and the Future of Iraq’ (2011) 32 Third 
World Quarterly, pp 1623–1635 
147
 See Olumide Elamade, ‘The Inter-face of Ethnicity and Revenue Allocation in Nigeria's First Republic’ 
(2012) Vol 10 African Identities, p.95-110, see also  Akomaye V. Agba, and Ben Obi, ‘Oil Rent Management 
and Fiscal Federalism:  The Nigerian Experience ‘ (2007) 
<http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/mar2007/PDF/Ben_Obi.pdf> accessed 9 January 2012 
148
 Apart from petroleum resources, Nigeria is rich in iron, tin, bitumen, coal and steel  etc. See Jennifer 
Abraham, ‘Harnessing Nigeria’s Solid Mineral Resources’ Punch (14 November 2013) < 
http://www.punchng.com/business/am-business/harnessing-nigerias-solid-mineral-resources/> Accessed 12 
February 2014 
 228 
 
and may lead to disruption of extractive projects or to conflict.’149 And that governments 
‘should pursue opportunities for local benefits, and account for, mitigate and offset the 
environmental and social costs of resource projects’.150   
 
The clamour for greater participation in petroleum revenues by the NDR states is known as 
the struggle for ‘resource control’, and is the subject of much literature.151 The struggle which 
has a multifaceted dimension includes litigation, interest groups, politics, and militancy. An 
understanding of the history of Nigeria’s constitutional development will aid an appreciation 
of the arguments put forward by the NDR.  
6.4.2  THE ISSUES AND LEGAL ITY BEHIND THE RESOU RCE CONTROL 
AGITATION IN THE NDR  
 
Nigeria has had a chequered revenue allocation policy. Its independence and republican 
constitutions of 1960 and 1963 respectively, clearly favoured the principle of derivation and 
thus prioritised the interests of the NDR as a petroleum producing region. The 1964 Binns 
Commission however tilted the scales in favour of the need principle. This was based on the 
argument that it was imperative to provide funds to meet the minimum responsibilities of 
government, on the one hand, and for equal development to address imbalances.
152
 The 1968 
Dina Commission restored derivation but gave it lower significance than the 1963 
constitution. From 1968 onwards however, derivation was relegated to the background in 
favour of population, need and land mass. The NDR states were worst hit by this change in 
fortune, given that over 90 per cent of Nigeria’s petroleum is produced from that region.153  
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The NDR’s clamour is not so much for the right to ‘manage’ as it is for the right to an 
increased ‘derivation’ along the lines of the 1963 constitution. In other words, the NDR states 
are not necessarily challenging the right of the federal government to manage and regulate the 
petroleum industry, but for a significant stake in petroleum revenues. Thus ‘finance’ and not 
‘control’ underscores the struggle. This in contrast to Iraq where the Kurdish region clamours 
not only for the right to partake of petroleum revenues, but also for the right to manage the 
resource, award petroleum contracts and monitor production output.
154
 
  
The NDR relies on Nigeria’s constitutional history. Among Nigeria’s four post independence 
constitutions, the first two were democratically enacted, while the 1979 and 1999 were 
imposed by the military. The first two constitutions recognised the right of federating units to 
a sum equal to 50 per cent of the proceeds of all royalties and rents received from 
petroleum.
155
 Beyond 50 per cent entitlement, states were further entitled to share from a 
distributable account, to which 30 per cent of petroleum revenues were paid, while the 
remainder of 20 per cent was paid to the federal government.
156
 It is worth noting that under 
the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, petroleum derived from a region’s continental shelf was 
recognised as being a part of those regions.
157
  
 
The NDR was unable however to truly enjoy the benefits of the first two constitutions, since 
they were enacted at a time when petroleum had not come to dominate the Nigerian 
economy. The Nigerian army took the reins of power in a 1966 coup and suspended section 
140 of the 1963 constitution, and began to rule by arbitrary decrees. The unelected military 
substantially reduced the rights of the NDR states to petroleum revenues in several ways. 
First through section one of the Petroleum Act of 1969, ownership and control of all 
petroleum resources in, under or upon any lands in Nigeria were vested in the federation.
158
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Secondly the Offshore Oil Revenues Act 1971 disentitled the NDR from all offshore 
petroleum revenues, in direct contrast to section 140(6) of the 1963 constitution.
159
 
 
The deprivation of the NDR continued with successive regimes. For instance from 1971-
1975, NDR revenues from petroleum produced onshore in the NDR were reduced to 45 per 
cent. Between 1975-1979, it was reduced to 20 per cent and from 1979-1981 nothing was 
allocated to the region. Derivation from petroleum revenues was marginally increased to one 
and half per cent from 1982-1992 and from 1992-1999, there was some attempt to increase 
derivation to 3 per cent. This level of derivation was possible because the military forcefully 
crushed any opposition to its authority, in the NDR.
160
 
 
The NDR suffered from environmental degradation and lack of accountability in the 
management of petroleum revenues during the military era. This perceived injustice was 
furthered by the fact that the military was dominated mostly by the majority tribes of Yoruba, 
Hausa and Ibo, of Nigeria, which ironically do not own any significant petroleum resources. 
It has been noted that:  
‘…by 1967 and certainly by 1969, petroleum, particularly the mineral oil, was becoming the 
major resource in terms of total income and foreign exchange earnings in the country. It was 
therefore, not difficult for the majority groups who are in control of the Federal Government 
to reverse the basis of revenue allocation with regard to petroleum resources from derivations 
to the Federal Government’s exclusive ownership.’161 
 
This situation of things continued until 1999 when Nigeria returned to civilian rule after 
nearly 30 years of military rule. The 1999 constitution which was promulgated by a military 
decree provided for a 13 per cent derivation for onshore production from the NDR states. It 
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however did not capture offshore petroleum revenues even though such petroleum was 
produced from the continental shelf of the NDR states.
162
 
 
With civilian rule, the clamour for resource control which had been in snippets, took a new 
dimension. Litigation, advocacy, and militancy were all used by communities and groups in 
the NDR to clamour for better treatment from the FGN. But this advocacy has not gone 
unchallenged from the Northern regions of Nigeria, as will be shown below.  
 
6.4.3  NORTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE RESOURCE CONTROL CAMPA IGN  
 
The Northern region of Nigeria, whose elite (not necessarily the masses), had benefited 
largely from the NDR’s petroleum wealth has posed the strongest opposition to the resource 
control drive. They argue for even economic development among all regions on the basis of 
need rather than derivation.
163
 Politicians from the Northern region also pose the strongest 
opposition to the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill 2012.  They oppose the proposed 10 
per cent Petroleum Host Communities Fund as being a back door avenue to increase 
derivation for the NDR.
164
 Furthermore, the Northern elite have argued that the NDR 
governors have been unable to account for their utilisation of the 13 per cent derivation they 
have received since 1999. The NDR governors have countered that due to the swampy nature 
of the region, development in the NDR is about three times what will be required in the 
North.  
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There is admittedly some merit in the arguments of the NDR, which struggles with poverty 
and much environmental degradation from petroleum operations.
165
 With increased 
derivation, NDR states will be in a position to build roads, bridges and the much needed 
infrastructure needed to connect the swampy areas of the region with the rest of the states’ 
capital. Increased derivation may also lead to more hospitals, better education, and an 
increased standard of living for the NDR people. 
 
6.5 ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
NDR 
 
Fiscal federalism has some advantages as it may ‘force’ other federating states to develop 
their human and natural resources and shore up their internal revenue generation rather than 
rely on petroleum and on the federal government.
166
 But increased derivation can only impact 
the people positively where there are mechanisms to call leaders to account for their 
management of public funds. For instance the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its vast 
petroleum revenues, is 57
th
 on the list in the UNDP human development index, behind Poland 
and Croatia which are not rich in petroleum.
167
 One reason for this is that the Saudi monarchy 
which controls most of the petroleum revenues in the Kingdom is not elected, nor 
accountable to the people. 
 
Admittedly, there has been some notable increase in living standards in the NDR, although 
there is still need for improvement. For instance Bayelsa state which was the poorest and 
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least developed region in the NDR, now owns a university, a polytechnic, a hospital, and is 
embarking on the development of bridges to link its three senatorial districts. In the areas of 
education, numerous scholarships have been awarded to various citizens of the state to study 
within Nigeria and overseas. Most of these initiatives were absent during Nigeria’s military 
era. But the developments in the NDR since 1999 still fall short of the amount of money it 
has received so far.  
 
Without good leadership and accountability, increased derivation may result in corruption 
and further increase the ‘resource curse’. For instance, the NDR has earned significantly 
more than Nigeria’s other federating states since 1999, but much of this has been 
mismanaged, and stolen.
168
  According to Joseph Amberkederim, the ‘amount of money that 
has accrued to the South-South governors
169
 in the past nine years is enough, more than 
enough to transform the Niger Delta... if monies are being used judiciously and 
religiously…’170 
 
Rivers state (an NDR state), received 1, 053 billion naira between 1999 and 2008 in federal 
allocations, in contrast to the north-eastern states of Yobe and Borno which received 175 
billion and 213 billion respectively. On a per capita basis, by 2008 the 18.97 million people 
who lived in the six states in the north-east received on average 1,156 naira per person, while 
in contrast, Rivers state was allocated N3,965 per capita, and on average the oil producing 
South- South region received on average N3,332 per capita.
171
 Despite this amount, poverty 
remains an issue in Rivers State.  
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Corruption is however not unique to the NDR but is a country wide problem, and arguably 
should not be the reason to disentitle the region from what is rightfully theirs. It is the 
position of this thesis that there is need for a deepening of Nigeria’s democracy, not only in 
the NDR, but also in the rest of the country.
172
 Currently major hindrances exist to better 
improvement of the NDR: Northern opposition and weak democratic checks and balances.  
The next segment will explore other approaches that have been explored to promote the 
standard of living of people in the NDR, notably treating the region as a special development 
case, states’ developmental agencies, and corporate social initiatives.  
 
6.5.1  SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE NDR   
 
One option for the development of the NDR has been to treat it as a special developmental 
case, and in that regard, to establish a separate agency to spearhead its development. This 
approach is not new however, and was proposed for the region even before Nigeria became 
an independent nation.  
 
In 1958 the Willinks commission noted that there were genuine developmental challenges in 
the NDR, and that the region had genuine fears of marginalisation from the major tribes. In 
response to recommendations of the Willinks commission, the Niger Delta Development 
board (NDDB) was established to develop the NDR.
173
 The NDDB was not very effective in 
fulfilling its mandate due to a lack of political will to develop the NDR. In fact Frynas notes 
that the NDDB was nothing more than a public relations programme.
174
 
 
In 1992, the military government of Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) established the Oil 
Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) to perform functions 
similar to those of the NDDB. The OMPADEC was again unsuccessful due to a marginal 
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allocation, and internal corruption. It was replaced by the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) in 2000. NDDC however suffers typically from the same challenges of 
OMPADEC, 
175
 and its impact in the region, has been minimal.
176
 
 
Treating the NDR as a special case can only be impactful if there is a concerted effort to 
ensure that the NDDC is properly empowered to execute their mandate. In that regard, there 
is need for adequate funding, monitoring and focus. Such agencies should not be involved in 
granting of scholarships, mini roads, and providing dust bins (as NDDC has been doing), but 
should focus almost exclusively on capital projects like roads, power and infrastructure. And 
such agencies should be properly monitored by the National Assembly in order to prevent 
corruption and diversion of funds by the political class.
177
  
 
6.5.2  TOWARDS THE DEVELOPM ENT OF PETROLEUM HOS T COMMUNITIES  
 
Past developmental efforts in the NDR have been focused on the region as a whole with little 
attention paid to petroleum host communities (PHCs). Most PHCs remain significantly poor 
and undeveloped, with a high level of illiteracy and high maternal and infant mortality. This 
is also due to the fact that there is hardly any government presence in most PHCs, especially 
those in the very interior swampy regions. Some PHCs in the NDR like Bonny, Forcados and 
Brass are very close to the Atlantic Ocean and are not motorable.
178
 But this group which 
actually owns the petroleum in the NDR has argued for special treatment, given that they bear 
the brunt of petroleum operations and loss of landed property. 
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The claims of PHCs to special benefits over and above the rest of the NDR is often founded 
on equity, justice, and common law. On the aspect of equity and justice, it will be recalled 
that most of the NDR land owners whose primary source of livelihood in the NDR is fishing 
and farming, have suffered more than any other persons in the NDR. They have lost lands to 
oil pipeline, petroleum concessions, access roads, canals and bridges that are constructed to 
oil locations. For example the US state of Texas allows private ownership of petroleum 
resources, subject to government regulation.
179
 In Nigeria however, PHCs have not been 
given any right to petroleum nor to petroleum revenues found on these lands in the past.  
 
Under common law, the owner of land also benefits from all that is found under the land.
180
 
This principle has however been overridden by section one of Nigeria’s Land Use Act of 
1978 which vested all lands in a state in the governor, to be held on trust for the people.
181
 
But other sections of the Land Use Act recognise the deemed right of occupancy of persons 
who used such lands for agricultural purposes prior to the enactment of the Act.
182
 And 
section 44 of Nigeria’s constitution also provides for compensation in cases of compulsory 
land acquisition.  
 
It is also important to recognise PHCs as providers of the platforms on which PEPCs operate. 
And although they do not have contractual relationships with PEPCs, they provide these 
firms with ‘social licence’ upon which to operate.183 It is in recognition of their importance 
that virtually all the petroleum firms in the Niger Delta execute memoranda of understanding 
with various communities.
184
 A hostile and uncooperative community can make petroleum 
production difficult, if not impossible, as has been witnessed by militancy, sabotage and 
recently, oil thefts in the NDR.   
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In order to address the developmental demands of PHCs, some NDR states have established 
intervention agencies similar to NDDC. Secondly, PEPCs have also increased their corporate 
initiatives by building hospitals, awarding scholarships, and granting PHCs special 
employment and contractual privileges. Thirdly the FGN has sought to tackle the concerns of 
PHCs through the proposed establishment of the PHC fund. These initiatives and their 
potential for effective application of petroleum revenues will be considered next. 
 
6.5.3  DEVELOPING PHCS: THE PIB AND THE PETROLEUM HOST COMMUNITY 
FUND  
 
The PIB 2012 proposes to establish a Petroleum Host Communities Fund (the PHC Fund). 
The fund will be funded by ten per cent of the monthly net profits of all PEPCs operating in 
the NDR.
185
 In principle the PIB fund is a welcome development as it appears to be the first 
federal government attempt at addressing the developmental challenges of the PHCs in the 
NDR. It is doubtful however if the Bill will be enacted into law with the PHC fund intact, due 
to Northern opposition.
186
 The PIB provisions for the PHC Fund also seem to be lacking in 
details on the modalities for the constitution of the Fund’s management, the process for 
disbursement of funds to communities and the criteria for determining entitlement to the 
fund.  
 
It is proposed that rather than seek to compensate communities with cash, the monies from 
the PHC Fund, be used to execute developmental projects within these communities, grant 
scholarships for educational projects and construct infrastructure. Such initiatives however 
should be at the instance of representatives of affected communities who should also be on 
hand to monitor the implementation and execution of such projects. 
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6.5.4  STATES’ DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR IMPACT IN THE NDR  
 
Edo, Delta and Ondo states established ESOPADEC, DESOPADEC, and OSOPADEC,
187
 for 
the development of their PHCs.
188
 Under the DESOPADEC law, 50 per cent of Delta State’s 
13 per cent derivation from the federation account will be paid directly to the commission. 
The remaining 50 per cent will be utilized by the rest of the state. This approach which is 
unique at state level is equitable because it seeks to reward PHCs over and above other non 
petroleum producing communities given that they bear the brunt of pollution and the 
acquisition of their lands by the FGN. If this approach is properly implemented, it will ensure 
that PHCs benefit from petroleum production. It will also ensure that they are compensated 
for their loss of farming and fishing from environmental pollution, and for the acquisition of 
their landed properties.  
 
States’ development initiatives are closer to PHCs than other federal government institutions 
like the NDDC, and are thus in a better position to identify the peculiar challenges of each of 
these communities. Fourthly, these agencies are more focused on PHCs and not the whole 
state. But in addressing specific PHC development initiatives, there are other issues that need 
to be addressed. First is how to determine which communities are to benefit from petroleum 
which straddles two or three communities.
189
 Also with current petroleum technology, it is 
possible to produce petroleum from a particular acreage while operating from a neighbouring 
community. Would such adjacent community benefit from the fund? These issues require 
clarification. In order to promote peace and co-operation it is proposed that PHCs and other 
impacted areas be catered for, by such developmental efforts. This is because although some 
other communities do not own petroleum, they provide the access to PHCs and pipelines are 
usually constructed to pass though their lands. 
 
                                                 
187 
The above acronyms represent the Edo State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission, Delta State Oil 
Producing Areas Development Commission, and the Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development 
Commission respectively. 
188
 Idemudia (n 7, chapter 1)186. The above acronyms represent the Edo State Oil Producing Areas 
Development Commission, Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission, and Ondo State Oil 
Producing Areas Development Commission 
189
 It is a fact that determining ownership of 76 oil wells between Cross Rivers State and Akwa Ibom State has 
divided both states as the Supreme Court and the Boundary Commission sought to resolve the issue. See 
Attorney General of  Rivers State V. Attorney- General of Akwa Ibom State, All FWLR (pt.579)1023 
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It is also important that a transparent framework be developed in order to prevent corruption, 
ensure accountability and prevent fraud in the management of funds in the state agencies, and 
the PHC Fund, if be passed into law. Idemudia notes that already, there has been the 
challenge of lack of adequate community input, corruption, and the politicization of the 
appointment of their boards, and an abandonment of government responsibility to these state 
development agencies.
190
 To that extent, the discussions relating to transparency in paragraph 
6.2.1, apply with equal force to these states developmental agencies.   
 
6.5.5  CORPORATE SOCIAL INITIATIVES AND PHCS DE VELOPMENT IN THE 
NDR  
 
It is arguable that the most impactful PHC specific development initiatives in the NDR has 
been done, not by government, but by corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of 
PEPCs, especially IOCs. In order to improve community relationships, most PEPCs in the 
NDR made it a point of duty to establish community relations departments through which 
they engage with PHCs, and execute CSR initiatives. Due in part to corruption, lack of 
adequate government funds and to the difficult terrains, the only ‘government’ known to 
many PHCs in the NDR are PEPCs which execute tasks which should ordinarily be 
performed by local governments. These firms construct bridges, roads, hospitals, granting of 
scholarships, electricity and develop schools.  
The debate on whether a company exists only to make profits for its shareholders, or to 
accommodate the interests of other stakeholders, is not new to company law.
191
 In the NDR 
however, many PEPCs have CSR programmes, to support government programmes and in 
other cases, for ease and security of their operations.
192
 And PEPCs have been known to 
target not just PHCs, but sometimes, even specific land owners. For instance in Rivers State, 
the Ogba community in the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni local government area, is specifically 
                                                 
190
 Idemudia Uwafiokun, (n 7, chapter 1), 191 
191
 Adolph A. Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 HLR 1049 
192
 William T. Allen, ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation’ (1992) 14 Cardozo Law 
Review 261, 264 
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targeted by Elf and Agip for development, and is provided with 24 hour power supply, 
hospitals, roads, employment and contracts.
193
 
 
CSR initiatives of PEPCs appear to be more effective than those of governments perhaps due 
to a lower corruption index, accessibility to difficult terrains, and corporate monitoring of on-
going community projects. Also, companies are less polarised in their allocation of projects 
and are likely to channel funds to where they are needed. And since the accounts of PEPCs 
are monitorable under CAMA, there is more openness in the distribution of these funds. 
Beyond tackling PHC specific initiatives, PEPCs appear to be the only means for a family 
specific compensation in the NDR. For instance, in Ogba land in the Ogba/Ndoni/Egbema 
local government area (LGA) of Rivers State, Total gives special attention to land owning 
families, beyond its PHC specific development initiatives.  
 
If PEPCs are so effective in the development of the region, when compared to LGAs, can 
Nigeria explore channelling the development of PHCs, and the region in general through 
PEPCs? This approach may have a more lasting and effective approach to the development of 
PHCs in the NDR, and is proposed as a viable alternative to the PHC Fund. Thus each 
petroleum company should be allowed to vote 10 per cent of their net profits for long term 
investment projects in PHCs. For instance, in collaboration with representatives of PHCs, 
PEPCs can be required to contribute ten per cent net profits for PHCs, in development of 
education, and other projects.  
 
This proposal would imply that petroleum firms act as de facto governments in many PHCs, 
and complement the role of the government, as in fact they have been doing in the NDR. In 
fact the continued relevance of local governments in Nigeria has been questioned, given that 
their presence is hardly ever felt in many of the states, and this is epitomised in the NDR.
194
 It 
is on record that the only LGAs that have 24 hour electricity (an essential commodity for 
                                                 
193
 Total ‘An Enduring Partnership with the Communities ‘ (2013) 
<http://www.ng.total.com/03_total_nigeria_commitments/030401_community_relations.htm> accessed 28 
February 2014 
194
 See Oluwatobi O. Adeyemi, ‘Corruption and Local Government Administration In Nigeria: A Discourse Of 
Core Issues’ (2012) 1  European Journal of Sustainable Development, p.183 
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development) in the NDR are areas where PEPCs operate.
195
 In these areas can be found 
good water, schools, hospitals and that the general standard of living of these communities 
are generally better than in other areas where the people depend entirely on government.  
 
An arrangement could be made for PEPCs to contribute a certain amount of their profits for 
the execution of development projects in the NDR, and such expenditures should be tax 
deductible. This option may be more viable than the PHC Fund, since such private firms may 
be more transparent, professional and less political in the execution of their mandate. And 
this concept is not new. In fact Britain and the Netherlands vested companies with the right to 
govern some colonial regions before they were formally taken over by colonial 
governments.
196
  
 
It is not however proposed that PEPCs should take the role of the local government as this 
would amount to a dereliction of duty. Capital projects should remain the responsibility of the 
government, while some collaboration is needed between government and PEPCs in order to 
develop PHCs.  
 
PEPCs as ‘de facto governments’ may face some hurdles however, given first that Nigeria’s 
crude oil, at the current rate of production, is estimated to finish within 41 years.
197
 What will 
happen after petroleum expires? Secondly, given that managers of PEPCs are not elected 
representatives of the people, this idea is likely to be resisted and viewed as some form of 
neocolonisation, even though in reality, CSR initiatives have been the mainstay of some 
communities in the NDR.  
 
                                                 
195 For instance Bonny and Finima local government areas have access to 24 hour power supply due to the 
operations of NLNG. The Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni local government areas have access to 24 hour power supply 
due to the operations of  Agip, and TotalFinaElf, and the some parts of Ogbia local government areas have 
access to 24 hour power supply due to the operations of                 
196
 For instance there was the Royal Niger Company which ‘ruled’ in Nigeria as a proxy for the British 
government in the 19th century. See J.P. Afam Ihedi, and Ndumbe J. Anyu, (n 178) and there was also the East 
India company which operated in India. See Ron Rosner, ‘ The East India Company’ (2012_ 43(3) Asian 
Affairs 
197
 James Enejo, ‘W'Bank: Nigeria's Oil Resources May Last 41 Years’(n 63)  
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Another way petroleum firms can complement other developmental efforts in the NDR, is to 
encourage a local ‘local’ content by giving special concessions to firms from the NDR. And 
just as NOGICDA gives special privileges to Nigerian firms vis a vis foreign firms, why 
should not firms from the Niger Delta Region be given special privileges and unique 
advantages over and above other Nigerian firms? To that extent IOCs should also make it 
their policy as part of community development initiatives, to patronise firms from the NDR 
and grant employment privileges to persons from these states. Thus while the government 
should focus on capital projects like roads and hospitals, PEPCs can be involved in 
patronising NDR firms, employment and in granting of scholarships. 
 
The above argument is premised on the fact that CSR initiatives of an indigenously owned 
petroleum company are more likely to impact on the NDR than that of a petroleum company 
that is owned by indigenes from other parts of Nigeria. Currently most of the indigenous 
PEPCs are owned by persons from the North and West, due to the deprivation of the NDR 
during the military era. There is thus need for a deliberate empowerment of NDR firms in this 
regard.  
 
6.6 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has argued that an equitable and effective management and utilisation of 
petroleum revenues in Nigeria should be the end of the reforms currently underway. And that 
it is so important that it should not be a side issue. This argument is premised on the basis of 
justice, equity, and exigency. It argues that not only is it just that the Nigerian people benefit 
from the industry, but that failure to grant the people their due, can lead to social tensions 
which would ultimately disrupt any gains made in the industry.  
 
The chapter focused first on transparency in petroleum industry revenues, and argued for a 
more concerted effort to progress from industry transparency to transparency in expenditures. 
Transparency is likely to lead to the savings of funds which would have been otherwise 
stolen. But such savings also require effective and strategic management and to that extent 
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this chapter examined the NSWF, and compared its governance framework with that of the 
GAPPs. And while commending the initiatives introduced in the form of NEITI and the 
NSWF, the chapter argues for a stronger accountability framework which has been a major 
limitation in Nigeria. Again calls for capable and independent regulators as shown in chapters 
two and three, were re-echoed. And the chapter also advocated the introduction of 
complementary approaches in the form of private sector participation. To that extent, it re-
echoes calls for a whistleblower regime and a private sector driven regulatory regime. 
 
The third part of the chapter focused specifically on the NDR and its developmental 
challenges. It analysed initiatives that have been introduced to develop the region which 
range from 13 per cent allocation of petroleum revenues and the approach of establishing 
developmental agencies like the NDDB, OMPADEC, and the NDDC.  Finally, the chapter 
also analysed the recent initiatives aimed at specifically developing petroleum host 
communities which include the proposed PHC Fund as contained in the PIB, initiatives of 
Edo, Ondo and Delta states, and the CSR of petroleum firms.  
 
6.6.1  A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO PETROLEUM REVENUE S APPLICATION AND 
UTILISATION 
 
Although the Nigerian economy has been growing steadily since 1999, the impact of this 
growth on the population has been minimal.
198
 This paradox portends dangers for the 
country. Poverty is an albatross that can destroy the fabric of the nation. The rising Islamic 
insurgency in Northern Nigeria which has resulted in over 1500 deaths has been blamed on 
poverty and illiteracy.
199
 There has also been agitation in the Eastern and Western parts of the 
country. And then there is the Niger Delta insurgency.  
 
                                                 
198
 See A. H Ekpo, ‘Employment, Growth and Poverty Reduction in an Oil Export Economy: Evidence from 
Nigeria’ (2012)  being paper presented at the 53rd Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, 27-30 
August, Nicon  Luxury Hotel, Abuja. 
199 Death Toll in Boko Haram Attacks 1500’ BBC (1 April 2014)<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
26816222> accessed 2 April 2014 
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Battling poverty is no more a side issue, and IOCs which partner with the Nigerian 
government cannot afford to smile to the bank while the communities in which they operate 
remain in squalor. It is high time that IOCs and their host governments require an undertaking 
from Nigeria that their joint partnerships will be reflected in development of the communities 
in which they operated.  
 
Currently, although the NDR and PHCs still claim to be marginalised, the truth is that since 
the return to civilian rule in 1999, they have had improved access to revenues in comparison 
to other communities and states in Nigeria. For instance, the NDR benefits from the Niger 
Delta Ministry, NDDC, PEPCs, and from the 13 per cent derivation, but there is need for co-
ordinated approach to the development of the region. Such co-ordination will make it easy to 
determine the extent of development programmes targeted at the region, or whether such 
sums are actually mismanaged either by government officials, or by community leaders.  
 
A holistic and concerted effort is required in Nigeria coupled with detailed and long term 
planning. The NSWF is a step in the right direction and its Infrastructural Fund can be 
applied to the development of railways, roads, power, and hospitals.  
 
There is need for an integrated approach that would combine the strengths of the federal 
government, state governments, local governments and the CSR initiatives of PEPCs. Such 
approach should however be well co-ordinated in order to actually determine the extent to 
which petroleum revenues are being channelled to the states, NDR, and to PHCs. It is hoped 
that as Nigeria’s democracy deepens, it would entrench the welfare of the people above that 
of its elite. For it is only when the people benefit from the industry that Nigeria’s reforms can 
be truly said to be successful.
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7  C H A P T E R  S E V E N :  C O N C L U S I O N   
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Through a series of law reform initiatives, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) seeks to 
address multiple issues which have bedevilled the Nigerian petroleum industry (NPI). This 
thesis has analysed these initiatives in a holistic manner in order to provide policy makers 
with insights on how a more integrated industry reform can positively impact the Nigerian 
economy. First the thesis sought to establish factors that can be used to determine when a 
petroleum industry is effectively managed and regulated petroleum. Secondly it established 
that those factors are weak in the NPI when compared to Norway, and Brazil. Thirdly the 
thesis sought to determine the extent to which Nigeria can combine administrative and legal 
reforms in order to develop those factors. To fulfil its purpose comparisons have been made 
between the Nigerian, Norwegian, and Brazilian petroleum industry legal regimes. Lessons 
have also been drawn from Malaysia, the UK, and USA, where necessary.  
 
This study is important because it is the first comprehensive attempt to comparatively analyse 
current legal reform initiatives in the NPI in the light of the fact that the industry has socio 
economic implications for the Nigerian society.  It is also the first study that will seek to 
combine the strengths of a private sector driven NOC with those of administrative and legal 
reforms in order to develop the NPI.  
 
The main body of this chapter is divided into five parts. The first part synthesises findings 
made in response to the research questions, and in the light of those findings, the second part 
argues for a strategic multi shareholder private driven NOC. The third part argues for 
effective and vibrant administrative reforms in the NPI as complementary to the NOC, while 
the fourth part addresses the limitations of the study and makes recommendations for further 
research. The fifth part concludes the chapter.  
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How far has the thesis achieved its original goals? 
 
In order to determine the extent to which the thesis has achieved its original goals, it is 
important to return to the research questions:  
 
What factors, if any, can be used to determine if a petroleum industry is effectively managed 
and regulated? And to what extent can Nigeria combine a functional and inclusive privatised 
NOC, with other administrative and legal reforms, in order to develop and generate positive 
outcomes from the NPI?  
 
Chapter two which set out the theoretical framework for the thesis was devoted to the 
resolution of the first and second research questions, in generalised terms. Chapters three, 
four, five and six were specifically dedicated to addressing the specific factors identified in 
chapter two. Drawing comparisons mainly from Norway and Brazil and Nigeria, this thesis 
established in chapter two that basically, a petroleum industry will be effectively managed 
where to a reasonable extent, there is:  
effective and efficient regulation; 
a significant indigenous participation; and  
effective frameworks to ensure an equitable application of petroleum revenues for the 
public good. 
 
The rest of the discussion will be devoted to how Nigeria can attain these factors through 
legal and non legal reform strategies. 
 
7.1.1  A TWO PRONGED APPROA CH TO PETROLEUM INDU STRY 
DEVELOPMENT: AN ALL INCLUSIVE PRIVATE SECTOR D RIVEN NOC 
AND EFFECTIVE PETROL EUM INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION 
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Nigeria should aim to develop an NOC as efficient as Petrobras of Brazil and on the back of 
this firm, aim for an effectively managed NPI. It was demonstrated in chapters two, four and 
five that NOCs are often used to implement petroleum industry policies in various countries. 
It was also shown that beyond acting as gate keepers, some NOCs equally promote and 
develop local content, generate revenues, and enable wealth distribution through 
subsidisation of petroleum products. In that regard, Statoil, Petronas, and Petrobras were held 
out as prime examples.  
 
Chapter five established the PIB seeks the creation of a privatised NOC in the place of the 
NNPC, which has struggled to perform optimally.  In that regard, this thesis recommends that 
FGN should seek to adopt the Brazilian and Norwegian approaches to petroleum industry 
development: combine an effective world class NOC with vibrant and capable administrative 
and regulatory institutions. And the NOC should by virtue of its functionality and 
effectiveness, complement the efforts of other administrative and legislative reforms in the 
NPI in the development of the triune factors of efficient regulation, significant local content, 
and an equitable application of petroleum revenues. This recommendation is premised on the 
supposition that the financial and technical capacity and strengths of a functional private 
sector driven NOC in that mould, when combined with equally effective and credible 
administrative and legislative reforms, will improve the overall performance of the NPI.  For 
instance, in the area of regulation, if the NOC operates as a major operator in the industry, it 
will be able to act as part industry regulator and monitor the operations of other IOCs. This, 
as was shown earlier, has been the Petronas story in Malaysia.  
 
It was shown in chapter four that Petronas’ regulatory efforts have helped in the promotion of 
local content in Malaysia.  Similarly it will be recalled that to a certain extent, Petrobras of 
Brazil has positively impacted industry regulation, local content and distribution of wealth to 
the Brazilian people. And more importantly, it has partnered with Brazil’s regulator, the 
ANP, to develop the industry in a sustainable and arms length manner.
1
 Like Petrobras, 
Nigeria’s proposed NOC should continue to enjoy government patronage and exclusive 
privileges in the award of contracts and execution of downstream jobs, at least during its 
                                                 
1
 See chapter 2, para 2.4.3, and chapter 4, para 4.4.2 
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fledging years. And the NOC should be used to promote the restoration of Nigeria’s 
refineries, strengthen the downstream sector of the NPI, and support the development of 
petroleum technology by investing in research. 
 
Chapter five established that the managers of partially privatised NOCs often have to grapple 
with the challenge of satisfying non-commercial government objectives on the one hand, and 
the commercial objectives of private investors, on the other hand. It was also shown that this 
factor is partly responsible for the underperformance of many NOCs and often leads to 
conflict of interests, which depletes the value of such firms. And that the propensity for such 
conflicts to occur increases where an NOC is government controlled.
2
  
 
In order to address the challenges that arise from government control, it is proposed that 
Nigeria should seek an NOC that will be able to navigate and steer clear from the pitfalls that 
NNPC has been subjected to. These challenges were identified in chapter five to include lack 
of operational focus, corruption, and undue external interference.
3
 In the light of current 
constraints to good governance in Nigeria, the NOC should be designed to harness its 
advantage in the NPI and develop its potentials in a sustainable and efficient manner. This 
will require a skilful navigation between good corporate governance, and bureaucratic 
diplomacy. Figure 7.1 shows the functions of a functional NOC.  
                                                 
2
 Chapter 5, para 5.1 
3
 Chapter 5, para 5.3. 
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Figure 7.1 Functions of a functional NOC 
 
But what structure should such a firm assume?  
 
How can Nigeria’s NOC be able to act partly as industry regulator while at the same time 
operate at arm’s length from the government, and administrative regulators? What is the 
guarantee that the firm will not be subject to undue political interference which may 
negatively impact its productivity and corporate value? How can one firm be able to navigate 
between the problems of the Niger Delta while at the same time work strategically to garner 
profits for private investors? The answer to these questions is not in arm’s length 
subsidiarisation, but in the creation of a firm whose ownership structure is deliberately 
tailored to limit external interference, address the expectations of multiple stakeholders, and 
operate with good corporate governance at the same time. This will require some reliance on 
law, a shareholders’ agreement, and international dispute resolution procedures, all geared 
towards the promotion of transparency, good governance, efficiency and productivity.  
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The NLNG model was proposed as a means for achieving efficiency and limiting external 
interference in a partially privatised government NOC.
4
 The merits of that model were 
identified to include relative board stability, protection of the firm’s assets and finances, and 
the pursuit of corporate objectives in a professional manner, through the use of company law. 
It was also shown that reliant on the co-operation of its other shareholders, the FGN as a 
shareholder in NLNG has sought a synergy that has met the aspirations of the government to 
some extent, and the corporate investors in the firm. For instance, while generating profits for 
the government, the NLNG is also actively involved in the implementation of Nigeria’s gas 
policies, and has managed to do this in an efficient manner. The result is that the NLNG 
makes profits for all its shareholders, with reduced incidences of both corruption and bad 
corporate governance. If nothing else the success of the NLNG model, relative to NNPC, has 
proven beyond doubt that a partnership between the FGN and private investors is possible in 
the NPI. The NLNG therefore remains a beacon of hope to many Nigerians that Nigeria can 
somehow ‘get it right’, notwithstanding the many challenges of NNPC. 
 
It remains however that while the NLNG model may promote efficiency, and implement 
national objectives, NLNG’s impact is limited to the gas sector, and its share structure is 
narrow and restricted. What is proposed for Nigeria however is an NOC whose share 
structure should resemble the NLNG model, the NOC should be more inclusive and target a 
wide variety of issues. This is because a functional NOC within the Nigerian context should 
be fully vertically integrated and poised to promote transparency, national objectives, the 
aspirations of the NDR people, and those of the Nigerian public in general. And while the 
NLNG/FGN partnership is often shrouded in secrecy and confidentiality due to its private 
ownership structure, public listing will guarantee a greater level of transparency and promote 
the firm as an avenue for wealth distribution.  
 
As in the NLNG, the FGN should not hold more than 40 per cent of the NOC’s shares. This 
is because the FGN should be able to exert some leverage over a private sector driven NOC 
through the use of golden shares, without necessarily owning majority of the firm’s shares. 
Thus golden shares can be used to ensure arm’s length dealings with the NOC, while 
                                                 
4
 See chapter 5.5.5   
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guaranteeing that the government can intervene on matters of national importance, where 
necessary.
5
 A limited government share ownership will limit the propensity for government 
interference in the firm’s assets, its day to day operations, and in its core objectives.  
 
Should the FGN not have some leverage over the NOC, the firm may pursue profits at the 
expense of other government objectives and policies. For instance IOCs operating in Nigeria 
have been unwilling to invest in developing other equally important aspects of the NPI on the 
ground that they will not make ‘bumper profits’. For instance, Shell, Mobil, Total, Agip, and 
Chevron (the ‘Big Five’) have been very reluctant to invest in local refineries in Nigeria on 
the ground that they would not make significant profits.
6
 Similarly, the Big Five have been 
unwilling to partner with the Nigerian government in the farming out of marginal oil fields to 
small operators, even though it was obvious that they were not developing such fields, and 
had not done so for nearly ten years.
7
 In the same vein, it may be further argued that while the 
NLNG has partnered in the implementation of Nigeria’s gas policies, it has done so because it 
has benefitted hugely in the process from a barrage of guarantees, tax reliefs, and assurances, 
but has no testimony of incurring significant expenses in the implementation of Nigeria’s non 
commercial gas policies.
8
 
 
Clearly therefore, some government leverage over the investment decisions of the NOC will 
be inevitable in order to align its goals with the long term objectives of the FGN, and ensure 
goal congruence. For instance government controlled Petrobras has continued to implement 
Brazil’s petroleum industry policies even though such projects at times do not benefit the 
commercial interests of private investors. Due to the constraints of the corruption and weak 
democratic governance, and the propensity for undue interference however, this thesis does 
                                                 
5
 See A Verr, Post –Privatization Appraisal of Control and Management in Privatized Banks : The Need for A 
Golden Share, in IA Ayua and Owasanoye (eds) Privatization of Government Owned Banks and Issues of 
Ownership and Control (Legal and Economic Perspectives) Proceedings of a Roundatable , NIALS , Lagos 
(1996) , 75-76 
6 
Chika Amanze-Nwachuku, ‘Why Int’l Oil Coys Shun Refineries in Nigeria’ Thisday (5 September 2011) < 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/-why-int-l-oil-coys-shun-refinery-projects-in-nigeria-/97808/> accessed 12 
March 2014 
7
 See S 16A of the Petroleum Act 1969, as amended in 1996.  See also Etikenrentse G, Nigerian Petroleum Law 
(2nd edn Drewdrew 2004) 98 
8
 Adepetun S, and Segun K, ‘The Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Project’ (1996) 24 Energy Policy 595, See 
also Ibironke T. Odumosu, ‘Transferring Alberta’s Gas Flaring Reduction Regulatory Framework to Nigeria: 
Potentials and Limitations’ (2007) 44 Alberta L. Rev, 210 
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not subscribe for a government controlled NOC as is the case with Petrobras and Statoil, but 
for a government leveraged NOC. Thus rather majority control, Nigeria can rely on golden 
shares to ensure that it will always be in a position to exercise some leverage over the firm on 
a broader scale. Thus golden shares will ensure the NOC does not pursue profits at the 
expense of other equally important non commercial objectives of the FGN.  
 
The case for golden shares is strengthened by the fact that an NOC that represents the 
aspiration of the Nigerian people will have to be prepared to make sacrifices in order to 
gratify some objectives of the government as the Petrobras example demonstrates. To that 
extent, Nigeria should hold majority of the NOCs shares, but retain some golden shares with 
the clear objective of protecting national interests, and not to obtain a political leverage over 
the firm.  
 
7.1.2  A STRATEGIC MULTI ST AKEHOLDER NOC AND POTENTIALS  FOR 
DEVELOPING THE NPI  
 
It is recommended that Nigeria should identify strategic stakeholders in the NPI and give 
them shares in the firm: the shares should however be tied to specific responsibilities and 
expectations from each group of shareholders. The purpose for adopting such a structure 
should be for leverage, reparation, wealth distribution, guarantees, good corporate 
governance and efficiency. Every class of shareholder in the firm should be strategic and 
deliberate.  
 
The company should have a diverse group of shareholders who should represent the FGN, the 
Niger Delta people, the wider Nigerian public, and strategic international investors. Each 
shareholder should be strategic and deliberate. For instance the FGN as shareholder will 
guarantee continued government patronage and exclusive privileges, as is the case with 
Petrobras. And as shareholder the FGN will benefit from the profits of the firm, in addition to 
taxes, and will be in a better position to exert some influence over its overall strategic 
decisions. 
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In order to address some of the grievances of the NDR as identified in chapter six, about ten 
per cent of the firm should be allocated to the region. Such share ownership may be used to 
obtain guarantees of positive participation by the region, in the building of an industry that 
requires the co-operation of the NDR to tackle sabotage and provide adequate security for 
PEPCs to operate. Secondly, the participation of the NDR, will give the region a greater stake 
in the regulation of environmental pollution from petroleum exploration activities of the firm. 
 
In order to guarantee a ready supply of technological input, technology transfer, funding, and 
human capacity, thirty per cent of the NOC should be sold to strategic investors. These 
investors should consist of a partnership between foreign petroleum firms like Petrobras or 
Statoil, and locally based petroleum firms like Conoil or Seplat Plc. Since Petrobras and 
Statoil have managed to navigate between profit making, and non profit making objectives, 
they are likely to appreciate why the NOC will need to implement a wide variety of 
objectives, which extend beyond purely private interests of firms like Agip and Shell.
9
 Figure 
7.2 shows the structure of the firm, as proposed by this thesis.  
 
                                                 
9
 It is worth mentioning that Statoil and until recently Petrobras, has operations in Nigeria, and may be more 
agreeable to a partnership with the NOC since they are used to the Nigerian terrain already. Statoil is involved in 
Nigeria’s offshore Agabmi oil field, off the coast of the NDR. See Statoil, ‘Nigeria’ (2014) < 
http://www.statoil.com/en/about/worldwide/niger/pages/default.aspx> accessed 14 April 2014 
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Figure 7.2 : The share structure of the proposed NOC 
 
But if Nigeria is to incorporate such firms into the share structure of the NOC, it will have to 
be ready to subject the firm to an international governance regime. This is because 
international investors will require the execution of guarantees and agreements which 
transcend national boundaries. For instance, they may require additional guarantees against 
expropriation, and will as a matter of course, require that certain disputes be resolved through 
international commercial arbitration.  
 
Finally, in order to further distribute wealth and ensure transparency in a post PIB post 
confidentiality era,
10
 it is recommended that some part of the firm be sold to the Nigerian 
public through the Nigerian stock exchange. This strategy will ensure that the firm remains in 
the public domain, and furthermore will prevent its sale to an oligarchy of rising 
entrepreneurs, but with narrow interests. Thus the firm will benefit from the ISA regime and 
other regimes geared towards the promotion of good corporate governance.  
 
                                                 
10 S. 174 of the PIB seeks to remove what perhaps is the  greatest clog to transparency in the NPI by making 
void confidentiality clauses in petroleum contracts between Nigeria and any company if such clauses prevent 
access to information and documents by third parties in respect of royalties, bonus payments, taxes and any 
other financial matters that directly affect revenues derived by Nigeria from the exploration and production of 
petroleum. 
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And to ensure the firm is able to operate with the efficiency of a private firm, it is further 
proposed that the shares of the FGN, the diverse public, and the NDR states, should be held 
and managed on their behalf by institutional managers. This will insulate the NOC from 
direct contact with the public, the FGN, and the NDR, except through their institutional 
managers, who can be sacked at the will of their principals, without necessarily affecting the 
component structure of the NOC.   
 
A similar approach was utilised by the UK when it intervened to aid some struggling 
financial institutions in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The UK incorporated the United 
Kingdom Financial Investments (UKFI) Ltd as a wholly owned UK government corporation 
to manage government interests in the Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Lloyd’s Banking 
Group plc and in the UK Asset Resolution Limited. 
11
 The stated goal of the UKFI was to 
develop ‘robust institutional arrangements for keeping UKFI at arm’s-length from 
Government, centred on a heavyweight UKFI board to take all major decisions relating to 
UKFI’s business and its management of the investments.’12 
 
While this approach is not without its own challenges,
13
 it has the prospect for a public firm 
to be managed like a private one, and can in essence further insulate the firm from being run 
like a statutory corporation. Such delegation of powers will equally ensure that the directors 
of the firm are properly monitored, given that dispersed shareholders are often unable to 
harness their strengths to promote good corporate governance. 
 
7.1.3  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  AND MINORITY PROTECT ION IN THE NOC  
 
There is need for a credible, open, and objective process to ensure the proposed NOC is 
properly structured. This is because even if the Nigerian government has 40 per cent of the 
                                                 
11
 UKAR was formed in 2010 to integrate the activities of Northern Rock (Asset Management plc) and 
Bradform and Bingley plc 
12
 <http://www.ukfi.gov.uk/publications/> accessed 9 March 2014 
13 In June 2013, the UK Commission on Banking Standards advocated for the scrapping of the UKFI on the 
ground that the firm cannot escape unacceptable political interference. See Hugo Duncan, ‘Commission calls for 
UKFI to be Scrapped Due to Risk of 'unacceptable' Political Meddling’  (This is Money 19 June 2013)  
<www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article> accessed 27 October 2013  
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firm’s shares, it may be able to use the firm in a way that is contrary to its core objectives. To 
that extent, there is need to ensure that the minority is able to defend the company’s assets 
and objects, through the use of the judicial process. Thus the corporate governance 
framework of the firm should seek the equitable treatment of all shareholders. One in which: 
‘…all shareholders ... have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. This in recognition of the fact that, investors’ confidence that the capital they provide 
will be protected from misuse or misappropriation by corporate managers, board members or 
controlling shareholders is an important factor in the capital markets.’14 
 
Minority protection will require the entrenchment of equitable remedies that are enforceable 
at reasonable cost. In this regard, Adedeji Adekunle notes that many ‘developing countries 
(Nigeria inclusive) have fairly adequate legislative provisions, but lack the institutional 
strength or political will to create a culture of compliance with a view to transforming the 
management pattern of corporation’.15 For instance, CAMA provides for pre emptive rights, 
equality of treatment for all shareholders of a particular class, and a qualified majority of 
votes for certain decisions etc, but harnessing the strengths of the minority to enforce these 
rights is a different thing altogether.
16
 And in order to strengthen minority protection, the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty can be imposed on majority shareholders of the company through 
the use of contract law, since CAMA does not recognise shareholders as fiduciaries of 
companies they invest in. These remedies, if properly enforceable, can limit the extent to 
which any shareholder can use the NOC to pursue selfish interests, to the detriment of the 
company in general.  
 
7.1.4  A STRATEGIC BOARD IN  THE NOC AND THE CA SE FOR PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION 
  
Beyond a strategic share structure, the firm’s board should be suited to further promote good 
corporate governance, and to ensure that various interests are represented and protected in the 
                                                 
14
 Olusola A. Akinpelu, ‘Corporate Governance Framework in Nigeria: An International Review’ ((2011) 
IUniverse 151  
15
 Adedeji Adekunle, ‘Privatization and the Challenge of Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ in Fiona 
MacMiliian (ed) International Corporate Law (Hart 2003)  171 
16
 Ss 106, 117, and 118 
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NOC. The firm’s board’s structure should also be deliberately designed to navigate 
successfully between government non economic objectives, and the commercial pursuits of 
private investors. And it should seek to do so with minimal impact on the firm’s efficiency 
and performance.  
 
Although CAMA separates ownership from management, it does not make room for 
proportional board representation.
17
 Thus a shareholder who holds more than 50 per cent of 
the company’s share can appoint or dissolve a firm’s board at will, since he has a simple 
majority.
18
 To address this limitation, shareholders of private firms can easily rely on a 
shareholders’ agreement, and in the case of the NOC, Nigeria may seek a special legislative 
provision to that effect, or an amendment of CAMA.  
 
A six member board consisting of two non executive directors and four executive directors, 
and supported by a company secretary, is proposed for the NOC. The board should be chaired 
by a non executive director nominated by the FGN. This individual’s terms of reference 
should be to promote the interests of the FGN, while maintaining some distance from the 
executive management of the company. In order to further create some distance between 
management of the NOC and the FGN, its managing director should be elected by all the 
shareholders of the firm, but without the input of the FGN. This would ensure that the 
managing director does not owe any particular allegiance to the FGN, and would equally 
promote a wider set of interests, since he is appointed by a combination of the rest of the 
shareholders, rather than a single shareholder. 
 
A director of operations should be sourced from the pool of strategic investors. This 
individual should be experienced in petroleum operations and would be expected to bring his 
experience and contacts in the operations of the firm. In order to assuage feelings of mistrust 
on the part of the Niger Delta, it is proposed that a director of personnel and human 
administration, be nominated by the NDR. This individual should be able to interface with 
                                                 
17
 S. 63 CAMA. See also Taiwo Okeowo v Migliore and ors (1979) 1 SC Reports 138 
18
 S 247 CAMA 
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the NDR in order to ascertain human capacity needs, and to ensure that trainings are targeted 
to developing human resources, to meet such identified needs.  
 
Due to the strategic role finance plays in the running of a petroleum company, it is proposed 
that a director of finance be elected by the dispersed shareholders of the company. This 
individual should be able to protect the financial interests of the firm, and especially those of 
dispersed shareholders who ordinarily would be in the least position to finances of the NOC. 
The sixth director should be non executive, and be appointed by the rest of the shareholders, 
in order to create balance in the board, and to promote governance from an impartial 
perspective.  All the directors of the firm should have equal votes, but the chairman, as a 
representative of the FGN, should have the casting vote in cases of conflict or deadlock in the 
board.  
 
Admittedly the above board structure as proposed does not reflect conventional and 
established norms of corporate governance, where corporate boards are elected by the 
majority of a company’s shareholders, and not necessarily proportionally.19 Again under 
established norms of corporate governance, board members ordinarily owe their allegiance to 
the company and do not necessarily promote sectional interests.
20
 A deviation from the norm 
may however be necessary in the case of the NOC, in recognition of Nigeria’s unique 
challenges, and the importance of the NPI to the economic well being of the country. These 
challenges therefore necessitate the need to promote good corporate governance from a 
country specific perspective by developing transparency and good corporate governance, 
incrementally. In fact a similar board structure currently exists in the NLNG, whose 
management team consists of representatives of the FGN, Total, Agip, and Shell.
21
 
 
                                                 
19
 See ss 248 and 261 of CAMA, where directors are generally appointed by a resolution of the majority of the 
members meeting in a general meeting.  
20
 See s. 279(2) and (3) of CAMA 
21
 NLNG, ‘Management Team’ < http://www.nlng.com/PageEngine.aspx?id=42> accessed 31 July 2014 
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The approach proposed above is quite dissimilar to that of the UKFI.
22
 The UKFI model is 
unsuitable for Nigeria’s NOC because while the firms the UKFI invests in appear to be 
purely commercial in orientation, the proposed NOC will more likely to be a socio-economic 
asset.  Therefore ‘over insulation’ from the FGN, as is the case of the UKFI, may frustrate the 
non economic objectives of the government in the NOC. Thus Nigeria does not necessarily 
have to establish a separate firm to manage its interest in the NOC, rather the minister of 
petroleum, acting in consultation with the president, should be able to exercise the FGN’s 
voting powers in the firm. In that regard, the minister of petroleum should be able to appoint 
the chairman of the firm, with a clear mandate of promoting the interests of the FGN in the 
firm, in a sustainable manner.  
 
Beyond such a share structure, it is important that the board be manned by men of skill and 
integrity which will be required if the NOC is to be able to navigate between commercial and 
non commercial objectives. Furthermore compromises and concessions on the part of 
government and private investors will have to be made from time to time, in order for any 
public/private partnership to work. Thus the shareholders’ agreement should be executed 
which would define the extent of interaction between the firm and the government.  
 
In order to further insulate the NOC, the shareholders’ agreement should provide that the firm 
be ‘shielded’ from routine legislative and executive enquiries, and its funding should be made  
separate from the budget of the FGN. Furthermore the firm should not be subject to special 
legislative provisions, for that would bring it within the scope of government control. In other 
words, the only avenue for government intervention should be through the agent through 
which it holds shares in the company. These measures would ensure that the firm will be able 
to generate funding either from debt capital, or from the stock market.  
 
                                                 
22
 In the case of the UKFI, government sought to ensure the firms in which t invested (‘investee firms’) were run 
on commercial basis, as much as possible, a factor which made insulation from political objectives imperative. 
Thus barriers were erected to insulate investee firms from direct contact with the government other than through 
the UKFI. A two pronged relationship was established: one between the UKFI and HM Treasury, and the UKFI 
and investee companies on the other hand. The activities of the UKFI are governed by its Board which is 
accountable to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who is in turn answerable to Parliament.  
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7.2 NEED FOR VIBRANT AND STRATEGIC LEGISLATIVE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN THE NPI 
 
Beyond a functional and vertically integrated private sector driven NOC, there is need to 
equally reform the administrative and regulatory sector of the NPI. In fact, the success of the 
NOC will be determined by the effectiveness of reforms in other aspects of the industry. The 
remainder of this chapter will analyse how legislative and administrative reforms can be used 
to develop local content, regulation, and engender an application of petroleum revenues 
equitably.  
 
 
As observed earlier in paragraph 1.7, Norway offers useful lessons than can positively impact 
the NPI reforms. It is however in the area of petroleum industry regulation that Nigeria stands 
to gain more from Norway’s robust regulation. In that regard, it is proposed that Nigeria 
should aim for a holistic regulatory approach which integrates health, safety, and the 
environment, encourages inter agency co-operation, and promotes employee participation. 
This approach is likely to be more effective than Nigeria’s current approach which focuses 
almost exclusively on environmental protection to the exclusion of health and safety, and 
fails to harness the resources of employees in HSE regulation. 
 
But unlike Norway, Nigeria should maintain the top down approach, and collaborate with 
industry in a cautionary manner. The collaborative approach was shown to be dependent on 
an assumption that the regulated is willing to comply on the one hand, and that regulators are 
capable, and have credible commitment to effective regulation, factors that are lacking in 
Nigeria.
23
 But with Nigeria’s direct participation in the petroleum industry, the collaborative 
approach to regulation may lead to further erosion of regulatory independence, and may 
rather give room for regulatory capture. Rather Nigeria should seek to distance regulators 
from PEPCs, and should adopt the top down approach until such a time as credible 
commitment and regulatory capacity is developed. 
                                                 
23
 See paragraph 3.4  
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And while some form of collaboration with industry is inevitable, Nigeria should rely on 
detailed regulations, adequate sanctions, and promote effective regulatory monitoring by 
strengthening regulatory capacity. Also it would not be realistic for Nigeria to aim for an 
SWF as big as Norway’s, as Nigeria’s population size and development needs make the 
diversion of petroleum revenues to other aspects of the economy, necessary. Similarly, as was 
demonstrated in paragraph 5.5.3, the Norwegian privatisation model of retaining controlling 
shares in Statoil may not be appropriate for Nigeria, as this would create room for undue 
interference by the Nigerian political elite; in the face of Nigeria’s weak democratic 
institutions, this can lead to corruption which will ultimately affect the performance of the 
firm post privatisation. 
 
If Nigeria is to attain truly independent and capable regulation of the NPI, it is recommended 
that in relation to the industry, the government should act only as regulator and policy maker, 
and leave the aspect of petroleum production to private players, and to the private sector 
driven and managed NOC. This has been the approach of the USA and the UK in the 
management of their petroleum industries. Nigeria should focus on how to effectively 
generate revenues through an up to date tax stream and from fees paid by petroleum firms on 
the grant of concessions. The benefit of this is that the government will be able to focus its 
energies and resources to a sole objective, while reducing avenues for conflict. This will 
however require a paradigm shift in government policy.  
 
Effective regulation will largely depend on two factors: credible commitment from 
regulators, and government commitment. Credible commitment requires that regulators and 
administrators of the NPI change from the ‘business as usual attitude’, into one of 
professionalism and credible commitment. All administrative and regulatory institutions that 
impact the NPI should operate with an attitude premised on trust and legality.  
 
On the part of the FGN there is need for adequate funding of institutions and personnel, and 
in addition, clear rules, under which such institutions would operate. In order to engender 
collaboration and avoid regulatory conflicts, laws should clarify institutional jurisdiction, and 
areas of co-operation. The government also promote credible commitment by seeking to erect 
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structures that ensure the regulator operates along the lines of good governance and 
professionalism. And there should be deliberate strategies to check regulators while ensuring 
they operate with limited restriction. This check is required to prevent independent regulation 
from resulting in unbridled corruption and abuse of power.  
 
7.2.1  IN SEARCH OF EFFECTIVE REGULATION: CEDE SOME REGULATORY 
POWERS TO PRIVATE CITIZ ENS  
 
Chapter three identified Nigeria’s dependence on petroleum as a major constraint to 
regulatory independence. It also identified funding, direct government involvement in 
petroleum production, and corruption as other significant limitations to regulatory quality in 
the NPI.  In the light of such constraints, it is further recommended that alternative 
complementary regulatory strategies be adopted by the National Assembly. The Nigerian 
government should seek the active participation of the citizenry, in the regulation of the NPI 
which can take the form of regulatory litigation. Such regulatory litigation can be filed either 
as public interest litigation, a class action, or can be filed by an independent government 
prosecutor, completely separate from the regulator, as is the case of Brazil.  
 
In the same vein, the law of class actions should be clarified and its scope broadened. It was 
shown earlier that funding is a clear and present challenge for litigation against petroleum 
firms by people of the Niger Delta Region.
24
 A viable class action and regulatory litigation 
regime will help to address this challenge however, as they will enable persons affected by 
the degradation of the environment to combine forces in bringing suits against giant 
multinational corporations which are sometimes grossly negligent in their response to 
pollution. 
 
Chapter three explored the importance of citizen participation, borrowing examples from the 
American and Brazilian approaches to regulation. It was shown that in America, through 
                                                 
24
 See chapter 3,  para 3. 9.4. See Frynas JG, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil Companies and 
Village Communities (LIT Munster/Hamburg 2000) 244 
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massive class actions, large multinational corporations have been forced to comply with laws 
rather than face huge fines that may be imposed on them by courts. The above 
recommendation is by no means an advocacy for the abdication of regulatory responsibility. 
Rather it is the recognition of the need to recognise that the citizenry are partners and 
stakeholders in the industry. This is further justified in the light of the constraints on 
administrative regulation.  
 
It is recommended that Nigeria should seek to block leakages through which petroleum 
revenues are misapplied, as this challenge can thwart expected outcomes of any meaningful 
reform process. In view of the challenge of corruption in the NPI, Nigeria should also seek 
not only to protect whistleblowers, but to reward them. There should also be a general 
recognition of this class of persons as being able to potentially complement regulatory efforts. 
Thus a whistleblower regime should seek to embolden employees and other persons who are 
privy to acts of corruption, to come forward with such information.  
 
7.2.2  ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION FOR INDEPENDENT  REGULATION OF 
THE NPI 
 
Independent regulation and the cession of regulatory powers are dependent on the willingness 
of the FGN, as policy and law maker, to relinquish its ‘tight hold’ over the NPI. This may 
never happen unless the importance of petroleum to the Nigerian socio-economic fabric is 
diminished. Currently however, petroleum remains ‘too’ important to the Nigerian 
government and regulatory autonomy appears to be an unattainable ideal for some time to 
come. To that extent, Nigeria requires an economic diversification away from petroleum, and 
the development of other equally important aspects of the economy.  It will be recalled from 
chapters two and three, that Norway reduced its dependence on petroleum by investing in 
other segments of its economy. Less dependence on petroleum meant the government was 
‘strong’ enough to regulate the industry with reduced concerns about the adverse economic 
impact of strict regulation.  
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7.3 COLLABORATION AND CO-OPERATION: A VIABLE 
STRATEGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NOGICDA  
 
Drawing comparisons from Norway, Brazil, and Nigeria, among others, chapters two and 
four established that the extent to which a country has developed its local content is a 
measure of how well its petroleum industry is managed and regulated. Conversely a weak 
local content, after many years of production, may be evidence of lack of good management 
and well thought out policies. It also established that local content policies are often 
spearheaded by viable NOCs, indigenous petroleum firms, and/or vibrant petroleum service 
firms.  
 
Chapter four also analysed Nigeria’s current initiative for the development of local content in 
the NPI as embodied in NOGICDA 2010, and compared same with the approaches adopted 
by Brazil and Norway. It was shown that although Brazil has some relatively developed 
technological capacity, its local industry has also struggled to meet the demands of local 
content legislation. This is in contrast to Norway, which by collaboration with foreign firms 
has developed one of the highest local content levels in the world, with first class service 
firms operating across the globe. It was concluded that Nigeria should aim at developing 
infrastructure, relax NOGICDA where necessary, and pursue a firm local content policy with 
vigour and commitment. To that extent, it requires an approach that is a hybrid between the 
strict approach of Brazil, and the flexible approach of Norway.  
 
7.4 IN SEARCH OF AN EQUITABLE APPLICATION OF 
PETROLEUM REVENUES: THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC 
DIVERSIFICATION, AND LEGISLATIVE AND 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS  
 
The aim of any meaningful industry reform should not be about systems, but people, thus the 
real test for the impact of any reform in the NPI should be whether the people are positively 
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impacted. Thus chapters two and six argued that in addition to effective industry regulation 
and a significant local content, equitable and effective distribution of petroleum revenues is a 
factor in determining the effectiveness of an industry.  
 
Chapter six also explored Nigeria’s initiatives towards managing petroleum revenues through 
the years. It focused on recent transparency initiatives in the form of NEITI, FOIA, and the 
PIB 2012. The chapter also analysed the NSIA Act 2011 and compared same with the 
Santiago Principles of 2008.  
 
Finally it analysed the legal framework for distribution of petroleum revenues within 
Nigeria’s federal framework and established that the NPI has in recent years been ‘haunted’ 
by the consequences of inequitable distribution of petroleum revenues, in the Niger Delta as 
seen in the rise of sabotage, oil thefts and insecurity. To address this challenge, there may be 
need to give the NDR a greater stake in the industry beyond the current 13 per cent. This will 
promote equity, reduce poverty, and in turn positively impact the NPI, as there will be a 
reduction of crude oil thefts, sabotage and militancy.   But this recommendation may only be 
possible if Nigeria diversifies from petroleum as such diversification will make the other 
sectors of the economy more ready to increase the constitutional allocation of the NDR. The 
US is able to adopt a more liberal stance towards states’ ownership of petroleum because its 
economy is not petroleum reliant.  
 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
While the scope of this thesis has been wide, a deliberate effort was made to stay within the 
ambit of local content development, industry regulation, and the equitable application of 
petroleum revenues. This has been necessary due to the interconnectedness of the triune 
factors in the NPI. This approach was necessary since an analysis on a holistic reform of the 
NPI cannot, but address in some measure, these important factors. This thesis therefore faces 
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the challenge of space, which made it almost impossible to address the legal regime for the 
regulation of downstream sector of the NPI. A narrower and more streamlined approach 
would have been justified if any of the three factors had been functional. But since Nigeria 
has struggled in regulation, local content, and in the application of petroleum revenues, it 
became imperative that these interrelated aspects of the reform be address in a holistic 
manner. 
 
The width of the thesis invariably means that attention has been devoted to various aspects of 
the NPI, sometimes at the expense of depth. But again, the interrelatedness of these various 
aspects of the industry however, means that industry reform can only be impactful and 
meaningful if it is holistic. This approach was however adopted because to do otherwise 
would have defeated the original purpose of the thesis, which was to analyse the various roles 
of law in the development of a functional petroleum industry, which can be a model for other 
African countries. 
 
The challenges facing the NPI are multifaceted and far reaching, requiring on-going legal 
study within a multidisciplinary environment. This is more so, given the socio-economic 
dimensions of the industry. To that extent, it would be possible in the future to pursue other 
aspects of the research in a more incisive and integrated manner. Currently there is need for 
more funding of legal research especially in the area of the downstream aspects of the NPI. 
Thus specific legal enquiry is required in the areas of refining, distribution and transportation 
of petroleum products within the Nigerian environment.  
 
7.6  CONCLUSION: A ROAD MAP TO AN EFFECTIVE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN A POST PIB ERA  
 
This thesis has argued that various aspects of the petroleum industry are interconnected and 
interdependent, thus a comprehensive reform should be holistic and focused. It has argued for 
legal reforms to be combined with a private sector driven NOC to promote an effectively 
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managed NPI. The role of law should be appreciated, along with its limitations. It will be 
recalled that chapter two was devoted to arguing that virtually every aspect of the NPI is 
petroleum law dependent. Law is therefore an important vehicle for the implementation and 
development of local content, viable regulation, and the equitable distribution of petroleum 
revenues. As was shown in chapter two, Brazil and Norway relied heavily on law to develop 
their petroleum industries.  
 
Chapter two however found that as important as laws are, they are by no means alone. It is an 
understanding or the lack of understanding of this limitation that may be the separating line 
between the Brazilian and Nigerian approaches to petroleum industry regulation, and 
management. For it was shown from chapters three, four, five and six, that although laws 
provide the basic framework for industry reform, their successful application and 
implementation are dependent on a variety of factors. These factors include: capable 
regulators, a strong political will, infrastructural capacity, and a willingness to comply with 
the law on the part of regulators and the regulated.  
 
Nigeria should seek to develop the petroleum industry by developing other concurrent 
factors, starting with a strategic privatization of its NOC. Nigeria appears to place undue 
reliance on law. But without a concurrent development of other equally important factors, the 
ends of the reform process as epitomised in the PIB, may be frustrated. For instance, it was 
argued in chapter five that while Nigeria has a commendable local content legislation in the 
form of NOGICDA, its successful implementation is dependent on factors outside the 
purview of the law itself. They include infrastructural development in the form of power and 
transport, among others, industrial capacity, access to funding by local firms etc. 
 
 In the same vein, it was also argued that without an independent and capable regulator, laws 
geared towards the protection of the environment may lie largely unenforced, until such a 
time as regulators are able to enforce such laws in the public interest. And even though 
Nigeria has a legal framework for the distribution of petroleum resources, the implementation 
of these laws are dependent on the willingness of the political class to be subjected to the 
legal process.  
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As a matter of first importance therefore, Nigeria should seek to promote good governance, 
credible elections, a democratic culture and a respect for rule of law. For without these 
underlying virtues, the instrument of law and legal reform in the NPI will be limited in its 
impact. For instance, it was shown that most of the challenges of the NPI (weak NNPC, 
industry regulation, and ineffective application of petroleum revenues) have been largely a 
product of weak governance frameworks and the lack of credible enforcement regime.  
 
There is also urgent need to enact the PIB into law since the Bill represents hope for the birth 
of an improved NPI. The recommendations made in this thesis should however be 
incorporated into the Bill and this will require some amendments and more importantly, a 
paradigm shift in government policy. For instance, the powers of the minister of petroleum 
should be reduced in order to ensure that there is independence of regulation.  
 
For the reasons enunciated above, it is recommended that the Nigerian political class should 
support the passage of the Bill in the interest of the country. Admittedly there may be 
concerns by this class, (which has benefited immensely from Nigeria’s patronage system, and 
corruption in the NPI), that the passage of the PIB would block avenues for corrupt 
enrichment. The truth however is that the political class, which has benefitted from Nigeria’s 
other reform and privatisation programmes in other sectors, may even benefit more from the 
PIB era.
25
 This is because the PIB seeks to reduce the role of IOCs and to promote indigenous 
petroleum firms, and local content, and firms backed by the political elite are almost certainly 
likely to benefit from concessions which will be awarded in the PIB era. Thus the PIB may 
actually enable the political class to profit from the petroleum industry in a more legitimate, 
transparent, and permanent way, as against back hand dealings and corrupt enrichment which 
has characterised the current era.
26
  
 
                                                 
25
 See Privatisation in Nigeria: the Perils, the Promise’ Thisday (3rd October 2012) 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/privatisation-in-nigeria-the-promise-the-peril/126714/ accessed 31 July 
2014. 
26
 See ‘G.N. Ogbonna and Ebimobowei Appah, ‘Rent Seeking and Group Interest on Petroleum Revenue in the 
Nigerian Economy: a Causality Approach’ (2013) Vol 5(2) Asian Journal of Business Management, 213 
 269 
 
Many new petroleum producing countries of Africa are yet unsure if significant discoveries 
of petroleum resources are a ‘blessing’ or a ‘curse’. They seek mentor countries which are 
experienced in the field of petroleum industry regulation and management. Naturally they 
should look first to Nigeria as by far the most populous nation in Africa with the largest 
economy in the continent. Sadly however, many of them are looking away from Nigeria, to 
Europe and America. Reform of the NPI at this stage, is therefore not only about improving 
efficiency and improving the lives of the citizenry, but also about the redemption of the 
image of the largest black nation on earth. For in Nigeria lies the hope of many smaller 
African countries. If Nigeria can get it right, then they can get it right. Brazil today stands as 
a model to many South American countries, as an efficient petroleum industry manager and 
regulator. Currently Chile, Argentina, and Mexico all have sought to pattern reforms after 
Brazil.  
 
Without doubt, Nigeria stands on the threshold of history. The NPI is at its middle age. The 
past forty years have largely not produced an enviable local content, a functional and 
properly managed NOC, or an effective regulator. The beneficiaries from the industry have 
largely been the Big Five, and a small cadre of former military personnel, and political 
oligarchs.  Despite its huge potentials, petroleum wealth has not translated into better 
standards of living for its people. The remaining estimated 41 years of crude oil production 
can determine the extent to which the country will be able to take its place among the comity 
of nations, as a serious player in global economics and politics. A radical reform of the 
petroleum industry is therefore imperative. Much time has been lost already. There is need to 
redeem the remaining time, and the current ongoing legal reforms may be the starting point.  
 
The strengths of a functionally private driven all inclusive NOC should be combined with 
ongoing legislative and administrative reforms. Brazil has relied largely on the ANP and 
Petrobras. Similarly, Norway relied on Statoil, and the PSA: two different arms of the same 
government. A commercial and a regulatory arm, both endued with resources and structures 
to make them functional without being subservient to the other. It is hoped that policy 
makers, operators, law makers and land owners will be able to converge on the need to ensure 
that the NPI progresses from its current state of debacle into a truly global one. Nigeria’s 
claim as the ‘giant of Africa’ will remain in doubt until it is able to effectively manage its 
 270 
 
most important economic asset for the improvement of the lives of its citizenry, reduce 
corruption, and create a platform for entrepreneurs to function effectively. And the proposals 
in this thesis can assist greatly in attaining these lofty objectives. 
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